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Abstract
C h a r a c te r isa t io n  in the  N o v e l : A n A e sth etic  o f  th e  U nca nn y
A bstract
The aim o f this dissertation is to devise techniques for characterisation in the novel 
which eschew the dominant, rational and integrated model o f  subjectivity promoted in 
creative writing discourse. It examines the Freudian uncanny and cognate concepts o f  
the sublime, the abject and ontological confusion which lead readers to hesitation, 
doubt and misrecognition in the process o f ‘reading’ character.
The emergence o f  creative writing degree programs and the popularity o f  guidebooks 
on the subject have had a modularising effect on approaches to novel writing: 
decomposing the process into constituent teachable parts. Within this discourse about 
novel writing, characterisation has become a chronically fixed element in which 
received models o f  the self, drawn from reductionist behavioural psychology, tend to 
dominate. The dissertation examines the grammar o f this modular characterisation 
and the series o f  explicit and implicit rules o f selection and transformation upon 
which it is based. It argues that it is necessary for the writer to disidentify with this 
discourse and re-examine their being-towards-others to achieve one o f  the primary 
critical or epistemological goals o f the novel: exalting the wisdom o f uncertainty with 
relation to the representation o f  self and other.
Concepts drawn from structuralist and poststructuralist philosophy, social cognition, 
postmodern literary theory, cognitive science, analytical philosophy and psychology 
are examined for their usefulness to this creative problem o f eliciting reader reactions 
of hesitation, misrecognition, ontological confusion and doubt about the nature o f the 
characters. The novel trilogies o f Samuel Beckett and Paul Auster are offered as 
contemporary prototypes o f  the effect, with their non-referentiation and disorientation 
effects in characterisation. The “grammar o f the uncanny” is then analysed with 
respect to two important aspects o f characterisation: name and character behaviour. 
Commentary on the approach to characterisation in Monsters Worse to Come is also 
presented.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter One: Introduction
Those who refuse to re-examine the rules of art pursue 
successful careers in mass conformism by 
communicating, by means of the ‘correct rules’, the 
endemic desire for reality with objects and situations 
capable of gratifying it. Pornography is the use of 
photography and film to such an end. It is becoming a 
general model for the visual or narrative arts which have 
not met the challenge of the mass media.
(Lyotard 1986:75)
And when it comes to rejecting fundamentals, I think I 
have nothing to learn, and indeed I confuse them with 
accidentals.
(Beckett 1994:80)
The aim of this dissertation is to devise techniques for characterisation in the 
novel which eschew the coherent, rational and integrated model of subjectivity 
upon which the dominant poetics of characterisation, as espoused in popular 
creative writing guides, is based. The objective is to outline strategies which 
create a “disquieting estrangement” for the reader in her1 decoding or reading of 
characters. It attempts this by performing a discourse analysis of a set of popular 
creative writing texts and outlines the epistemological framework for the 
understanding of otherness which defines them. With the aim of generating an 
opposing epistemology, a variety of ideas, drawn from research in social 
cognition, (Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Schank 1958), psychoanalysis (Freud 1919; 
Schelling 1936; Kristeva 1982; Lacan 1955; Zizek 1973) poststructuralist 
philosophy (Lyotard 1994; Kearney 2000; Heidegger 1997), analytical 
philosophy (Kripke 1982; Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), discourse analysis 
(Fairclough 2000; Teo 2000), cognitive science (Lakoff 1980; Rosch 1970; 
Haslam and Rotschild 2000), and neuroscience (Ramachandran 1998; Dejode et 
al 2001) are presented.
In particular, the Freudian concept of the uncanny and, to a lesser extent, those of 
categorial confusion, the sublime and epistemological pathology are considered
1: In t r o d u c t io n
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for their usefulness in the development of such techniques. The novel trilogies of 
Samuel Beckett (The Beckett Trilogy) and Paul Auster (The New York Trilogy) 
are presented as examples of the uncanny approach to characterisation. The 
application of this uncanny characterisation aesthetic in the creative writing 
component, a novel entitled Monsters Worse to Come, is discussed.
The examples of creative writing discourse which are examined are books 
selected from reading lists for aspiring writers which are circulated on mailing 
lists, through writer support websites and online booksellers. They have been 
written by people formally involved in the academic and publishing worlds, as 
teachers, lecturers, writers and literary agents.2 While their work does not wholly 
represent the heterogeneity of advice, assumptions and approaches which 
circulate within creative writing discourse, their mutual co-validation of 
approaches, coherence and popularity (gauged by sales, testimonials and 
inclusion on reading lists) attest to the fact that they are, at the very least, 
indicative of the commercially-driven facet of the genre. That they are marketed 
to, and seek to advise, beginning novelists has the result of encouraging the 
nascent writer’s identification with the singular philosophy of characterisation 
which the discourse promotes.
The following books were selected: Stein on Writing (Stein 2000); The 38 Most 
Common Mistakes in Fiction (Bickham 1997); The First Five Pages (Lukeman 
2000); How to Write a Damn Good Novel (Frey 1987); Novel Writing (Marshall 
2000); 45 Master Characters (Schmidt 2001); The Writers Guide to Essential 
Character Traits (Edelstein 1999); Creating Unforgettable Characters (Seger 
1990).
Critical discourse analysis examines how rhetorical strategies of identification, 
agency deletion, selectivity and elision within a set of texts tend towards making 
its contingent claims to knowledge appear to be self-evident truths in such a way 
that dissident points of view can be denied a space of articulation and the very 
existence of alternative viewpoints can be repressed or symbolically disparaged 
in their absence (Bourdieu 1992; Fairclough 1992). Or, as Teo puts it, its 
purpose is...
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...to unpack the ideological underpinnings of discourse that have 
become so naturalized over time that we begin to treat them as 
common, acceptable and natural features of discourse.
(Teo 2000: 7).
The novel, as viewed by a succession o f  theorists such as Mikhail Bakhtin, 
Wayne Booth and David Lodge is “the one grand literary form that is ... capable 
o f a kind o f  justice to the inherent polyphonies o f  life” (Booth cited in Bakhtin 
1985). When a meta-discourse about the novel reveals itself as monovocal (or 
homoglossic as opposed to heteroglossic) then the ideological (and 
epistemological) claims o f  the discourse are strengthened and serve to reduce the 
possibility o f  innovation upon which the novel as a form is based. It presents its 
conventions as ahistorical, eternal and unavailable to criticism. This stability o f  
conventions seems to be both a cause and effect o f  the increasing popularity o f  
creative writing tuition.
Writing novels, as a leisure pursuit, is serviced by university courses at 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels, ad hoc Internet discussion groups, 
websites and e-mailing lists, computer software and books for auto-didacts.3 The 
literature offers advice on getting work published, ‘writing better’, structuring 
narrative appropriately and getting to grips with the vagaries o f  the literary 
publishing world. From the evidence o f these books, the commodification o f  
novel-writing knowledge has created a dominant set o f  practices for composition 
which in turn crystallise what the discourse calls the ‘techniques o f  fiction’. The 
singularity o f  the determiner indicates the consensual nature o f  the discourse. 
The effect o f  the near universalism o f these techniques is to present to the 
aspiring novelist the idea that his task consists solely o f  choosing and developing 
a situation o f  conflict and applying the fixed and finite set o f  rules for character 
and plot development to create a novel product.4 The processes outlined in these 
creative writing guides ardently promote the idea o f  mimetic realism with 
regards to character because the techniques o f  this approach reflect those o f  
classic realism, are more easily transcribed as a set o f  criteria and because they 
re-enforce extant social conventions for recognising and understanding other 
people without the need for the writer to reflect on how his knowledge o f  others 
is constituted.
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This approach -  the systematic reproduction o f  a single, particular epistemology 
o f otherness -  is premised on rationalist and behaviourist views o f  human 
behaviour and requires the writer to assumes an epistemological mastery o f  
others. The discourse re-enforces the writer’s assumption that crossing the self- 
other divide, to the extent that one can offer a transparent interior account o f  
another type o f  subjectivity, is an uncomplicated and unproblematic element in 
creative writing discourse. Linda Seger advises the apprentice writer that the 
characterisation process begins with what ‘you already know’ and continues:
No one else can tell you whether or not you've got a character 
that's credible, real and consistent. You must rely on your own 
inner sense of what people are all about.
(Seger 1990: 25)
‘What you know’, it is implied, based on observation o f  human behaviour is that 
characters are ‘credible’, ‘real’ and ‘consistent’. This ensures that the writer’s 
special self-other relationship with character is fixed squarely within a particular 
way o f knowing in which the Other can be assessed and presented according to 
the s e lf s  tendency to infer intention, order and coherence within other 
phenomena which do not necessarily possess these qualities. This is what Martin 
Heidegger describes as a projection o f a being-towards-self onto a being- 
towards-other which is an epistemological instinct which always aborts 
contemplation o f  the nature o f  otherness and the s e lfs  ability to understand and 
represent it (Heidegger 1997). The difference between the self and other, and 
other others, is amplified to protect that orderliness and coherence:
Readers don't read novels in order to experience the 
boredom they experience in life. They want to meet 
interesting people different from anyone they've met 
before in or out of fiction.
(Stein 2000:61)
The ideological implications o f  the assumed mastery others are vast, as is its 
impact on an understanding o f the novel’s role in proposing alternative ways o f  
understanding aspects o f  existence. Milan Kundera writes about the impact o f  the 
systematicity o f  such representational schema on the novel:
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Some novels add nothing to the conquest of being. They 
discover no new segment of existence; they only confirm 
what has already been said; furthermore: in confirming 
what everyone says (what everyone must say), they fulfil 
their purpose, their glory, their usefulness to that society.
By discovering nothing, they fail to participate in the 
sequence of discoveries that for me constitutes the 
history of the novel; they place themselves outside that 
history or, if you like: they are novels that come after the 
history of the novel.
(Kundera 2000: 280)
From moral, political and aesthetic considerations, the novel works best when it 
is heteroglossic and so, the domination o f any particular type o f voice, or 
epistemological framework within a popular discourse about the novel’s 
function, calls for critique. One doesn’t need to valorise one approach to 
characterisation over another or to deny the pleasures, uses and gratifications o f  
‘conformist’ chaacterisation in order to argue that the novel is better served by
having a greater space for alternative epistemologies o f  character within its
meta-discourse. Such positivist assertions make no sense if  one regards each 
novel as a way o f investigating a different aspect o f  existence. Totalising 
rhetoric is not useful if  one subscribes to the view that the business o f  the novel 
is to “exalt the wisdom o f uncertainty”.5
It is the form o f this exaltation that I will investigate.
1.1: The Viability of a Subversive Aesthetic of Characterisation
In bringing what Paul Ricoueur calls an “hermeneutics o f  suspicion” to creative
writing discourse, I do not intend to dispute its applicability to the tasks which it 
sets itself (Ricouer 1976). Instead, I want to question the effects o f  its implied 
claims to comprehensiveness. There is a tacit assumption in the discourse that a 
novel is only a novel when it is published and widely read (that is, becomes an 
object), and that publication is a process o f  selection which proceeds according 
to certain natural laws. The cumulative effect o f  the ideology o f  this discourse 
and the operations o f  the publishing industry is to narrow the range o f  presented 
possibilities for what the novel is, what its function is, what the writer’s task is 
and what its relationship to its condition o f production can be. It presents the
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production o f  the novel as an algorithmic task, without presenting it also as a task 
carried out within a specific historical, social and epistemological framework to 
which it owes some o f its attributes. Evan Marshall, agent, novelist and creative 
writing instructor, writes:
Editors think in terms of genre when they acquire books, 
mostly from agents, who think the same way when they 
take on books from authors, who need to think this way 
too. Many writers resist categorising their novels, insisting 
that it will stifle their creativity. But a novel written without 
a genre in mind can be difficult if not impossible to sell.
Challenge yourself within your genre’s conventions.
(Marshall 2000: 9)
The implications being that the only goal o f writing a novel is to produce a 
consumable object which fits easily into the machinations o f  the publishing 
world. No critique as to how the political economy o f  selection which informs 
this process could reasonably be expected from Marshall -  and none is delivered 
-  but the failure to acknowledge that the novel, throughout its history, has 
continuously re-defined itself, given rise to new genres, and that innovation 
within the domain takes place when adherence to generic constraints and 
conventions is abrogated, leaves the aspiring writer without an alternative 
position with which to identify.6
In opposing these trends, I seem to be suggesting that the novel must -  or even 
can - always be non-conformist or subversive or confrontational in its 
relationship to what has come before.7 By way o f  a short corrective, I am instead 
arguing that there simply needs to be space for representing the novel which has 
opposing ends; approaches to composition which have a different way o f  
objectifying the novel, and an aesthetic which, at the very least, privileges 
insecurity about self-other relations and issues o f interpersonal epistemology. 
Because o f  this necessity, directives about how to write a novel are liable to 
arouse suspicion when they speak with one voice. I w ill try to defend an 
argument for what I have called the necessity o f  a particular type o f  
nonconformism before proceeding to show how the writer, by identifying 
him self with the form o f  conventional approaches, denies that space a point o f 
articulation.
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The first question to be approached is can an aesthetic o f  characterisation be 
subversive? And, if  its subversive potential can be declared, against what 
authority does it set itself? These questions are tokens o f  the debates which, in 
the last century at least, find their keenest expression in the critical philosophy o f  
Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin and Kellner (Adorno and Horkheimer 1991; 
Benjamin 1996; Kellner 1989). The split posited by the Frankfurt school and 
neo-Marxists such as Althusser between the false consciousness imposed on or 
interpellated by the subject in capitalist society, and the unmediated or liberated 
subjectivity which lies elsewhere has given way, in late twentieth-century 
thought, to a splitting o f that subjectivity (Althusser 1970). The restriction o f  the 
subject within power relations which legitimate his containment to him -  and the 
utopianism o f  the liberation which the dialectic implies -  has a mirror in theories 
o f cultural production in which the function o f  literature is often decried as 
affirming those values -  reinscribing dominant values which sanctify and 
naturalise contingent social practices and ways o f  seeing. One such ‘way o f  
seeing’ is the epistemological mastery, recognition, direct contemplation and 
uncomplicated familiarity with others espoused in creative writing discourse. 
Alternatively, art can be seen as a means o f  liberation through the renegotiation 
o f the terms o f  subjectivity and through the opportunity it presents to 
demonstrate the contradictions which lie at the centre o f  any and all ideologies. It 
is into this split that the debate between high culture and mass culture has fallen. 
Although the relativisms o f postmodern theory would seem to have dispensed 
with such a distinction, as Tania Modleski points out, in popular discourse it is 
still strong. In fact, postmodernism, in most o f  its forms, still clings to this 
opposition in its discourse on popular culture (Modleski 2001).
In this debate the issue o f  conformism in art, and its consequences, is to the fore. 
Lionel Trilling’s comment on objections to mass or popular art defines this 
objection as one premised on its willingness to offer the reader or consumer 
comfort over discomfort:
W e are repelled by the idea of an art that is consumer-oriented 
and comfortable, let alone luxurious.
(Trilling 1963:178)
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The reader’s comfort, from within what is called an elitist discourse on the nature 
o f art, is what the artist is trying to distress. This attitude is consonant with the 
Frankfurt school’s attack on the ‘spurious harmony’ o f  popular culture which the 
artist should attack. Barthes similarly criticises the absence o f  jouissance or 
‘aesthetics o f  disavowal’ in mass cultural products, revealing the disdain that is 
doled out to those writers who cater for the pleasure-seeking reader (Barthes 
1970).
The distinction between experimental fiction -  as a cipher for high art -  and 
genre fiction - as a token within popular or mass culture -  made in creative 
writing discourse strikes me as a convenient piece o f  rhetoric often used to 
bolster an argument against questions about the fundamentals o f  novel technique. 
The defence o f  generic conventions is strengthened by appeals to commonsense - 
that commonsense being that readers know what they want, which ignores the 
counterargument that the reader can only want what the market provides. 
Readerly pleasure does not correlate exclusively to the pleasure o f  genre and its 
comforting resolutions, the encountering o f familiar types who act in accordance 
with received ideas about human behaviour. There are pleasures other than the 
readers, and even the provenance and fixity o f those pleasures cannot be taken 
for granted.
1.2: A Definition of Character
The term ‘character’ has a number o f connotations. It would be useful at this 
stage to clarify what is meant by its use. When I speak o f  characterization I am 
speaking o f  stylistic and narrative techniques for the representation o f  human 
features, actions, intentions, desires and traits in the novel form and how these 
interact with reader’s cognitive strategies for recognising and developing 
knowledge (or the feeling o f  knowledge) about other people. The implication o f  
this approach is that strategies for reading ‘real’ people are similar to strategies 
used for reading fictional characters. As a form o f discourse, this kind o f  analysis 
has strong similarities with research in social psychology: cognitive judgements 
about other people; folk psychology and the inquisition about the nature and 
knowability o f  'other minds'; philosophical debates about understanding alterity, 
epistemology as well as more the more traditional concerns o f  feminist and 
Marxist discourse analysis viz. what frames o f  interpretation are hoisted around 
other social groups and minorities, essentialising them into types and social roles,
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limiting their imaginable nature?8 It follows from this that, when looking at 
strategies for characterisation in novelised fiction, we can also enquire into the 
cognitive and epistemological strategies which we, as readers, use to access and 
fix knowledge about other people.
The epistemological concerns which are the principal defining features o f  
poststructuralist literary criticism and postmodernist expression are most 
pronounced in the examination o f discursive strategies for explaining and 
defining other people or social groups. Rationalist discourse, which underpins 
most characterisation in the novel, articulates the thoughts and desires o f the 
characters in a way which represents their qualities as something other than 
contingent facts o f  self; packages them as the character’s essence. If we are to be 
concerned with the political aspect o f  representation, we should ask what are the 
writer’s obligations when electing to speak on behalf o f  others, to name and 
classify them, prepare them for audience recognition and in so doing to fix the 
subjectivity o f the reader through her identification with the character’s projected 
and coherent selfhood? This can be framed as a supplementary research question: 
What alternatives exist for the writer who wishes to avoid the schema o f this 
particular kind o f  psychological realism and to expose the construction o f  
identity -  and the crisis o f  its disintegration -  within the conventions o f the novel 
form?
1.2.1: Character and The Uncanny
One obligation on the novelist who wishes, through representational argument, to 
replace the sovereign ego as the model for characterisation is to demonstrate that 
oppositions and differences between the self and other are not fixed in nature but 
are part o f  our interiorised, shared representational schema for understanding 
experience. This has relevance with regards to novel characterisation in that 
characters require strong differentiation at every level (name, appearance, moral 
qualities, narrative function etc.) to allow for readerly recognition and, in effect, 
to ensure their own survival as plausible others. Creative writing manuals insist 
upon these differentiators as a key to successful characterisation (Bickham 1997; 
Marshall 2000). The implication is that the reader will begin to feel unease at the 
intrusion o f  some other model o f selfhood when her expectation o f the 
character’s coherent and unique identity -  o f  the wilful, stable and self-knowing
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ego battling against an opposing force -  is not met; when the character’s 
selfhood ceases to be hermetically sealed from the other selves against which it is 
counterdefined. We can summarise this effect on the reader as the feeling that the 
individual identifying qualities o f the characters have somehow become shared 
or that their distinguishing characteristics have ceased to function properly (i.e. 
their unique identifiers are neither unique nor do they meaningfully identify 
them). Dennis Barone remarks on this senstation on reading Auster’s City o f 
Glass:
When a character loses self-identity, it is as if that
character has been overfed on the character of another.
(Barone: 1995: 10)
The pursuit o f  this evocation o f readerly unease about character is what I have 
labelled an ‘aesthetic o f the uncanny’ (das Unheimliche). Freud and Kant use the 
term separately to refer to the perception o f  something which is at once familiar 
but strange; an aspect o f  existence pre-cognitively known about the self but not 
consistent with the self-concept as defined under the aegis o f  the sovereign ego. 
The uncanny provokes a feeling o f dread at an aspect o f  selfhood (in this case it’s 
contingency or the possibility o f  its disappearance) which has been forsaken, 
forgotten and which has no corollary in other aspects o f  authenticated experience 
by which it might be known again. Evoking a feeling o f  uncanniness through the 
creation o f  novel characters therefore has the effect o f  directly stigmatising the 
model o f  the coherent rational self and o f  inviting the reader in to a feeling o f  
disquiet at the fluidity o f selfhood.
I have chosen the trilogies o f  Samuel Beckett and Paul Auster to illustrate the 
formal qualities o f  this aesthetic. Their work is not part o f  the conventional canon 
o f uncanny literature but its qualities o f muted identity and existential angst 
within different re-workings o f the novel are what first alerted me to the concept 
o f revisiting characterisation through the province o f  doubt and epistemological 
insecurity. Because o f  these choices, and because my focus is on the formal and 
generative qualities o f  the uncanny in novel characterisation, a discussion o f how 
different classes o f  split subjectivity and fractured identity occur along gender, 
class and ethnic lines in different cultures is outside the scope o f  the dissertation. 
In the discussion o f particular approaches to the representation o f  others, I will
12
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point out areas in which the uncanny might manifest itself in relation to 
particular instances o f  dispossessed or split subjectivity.
The investigation o f  how to achieve this project and a demonstration o f  how this 
consideration informed the characterisation in Monsters Worse to Come is the 
central purpose o f  this critical dissertation. I also hope to demonstrate the 
relevance o f different models o f intersubjectivity to the creative process by 
annotating their influence on these efforts. This seems particularly important 
given the apparent failure o f  the academicisation o f  creative writing to engage 
with ideas which circulate within the exploratory traditions o f  the human, social 
and cognitive sciences.
1.3: C r e a t iv e  W r it in g  D is c o u r s e  an d  A c a d e m ia
The postmodern championing o f the contingent or inessential aspects o f  lived 
experience - usually accompanied by a questioning o f  epistemological issues o f  
narrative trustworthiness and a problematising o f  the conventions o f  
characterising human behaviour as rational, coherent and self-willed - is more 
evident in the field o f  literary criticism than in the world o f  publication. The 
popular novel, as with all popular narrative forms, remains essentially 
conservative in its deployment o f representational strategies.
An aversion to what is loosely called experimental fiction is also prevalent in 
university creative writing courses which have an often uneasy and sometimes 
fractious relationship with their English Literarture counterparts. James N. Frey, 
a lecturer in creative writing at Stanford University, has this to say about the 
deleterious effect o f  literary analysis on creative writing:
In English 102A, The American Novel: your professor 
taught you to hunt for hidden symbols and historical 
references, to look for vague literary allusions, to cull the 
philosophical nuances, to divine the sociological 
implications, to fathom the existential ramifications. This 
kind of nonsense has ruined a lot of writers as well as a 
lot of readers. Your primary object as a novelist is to 
move the reader emotionally.
(Frey 2000: 94)
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My focus on characterisation arises partly from a concern about the way in which 
creative writing discourse seems to divorce itself from debates about 
representation, self-other relations and cognate issues which literary criticism, 
narratology, contemporary philosophy and discourse analysis, amongst other 
disciplines, continue to interrogate. In remaining aloof, or dismissive, it fails to 
avail o f  an opportunity for expanding its range o f  techniques for dealing with the 
construction o f  ‘character’. Instead o f a cross-fertilisation o f  ideas about 
representing the human other, the academicisation, or what I have called the 
‘modularisation’ o f  creative writing, seems to have resulted in a rationalist and 
behaviourist hypostasis.
In the rationalist novel, character is chronically established through a series o f  
actions, themselves represented as a natural and necessary reaction to clearly 
presented stimuli. The clarity o f the presentation ensures the reader’s instant 
comprehension o f  the character’s motive:
Homo fictus may be complex, may be volatile, even 
mysterious, but he's always fathomable. When he isn’t, 
the reader closes the book, and that's that.
(Frey 2000: 2)
Such a formula ignores the influence o f any number o f  pre-rational, ideological 
or contingent forces on human behaviour and suggests nothing about the 
arbitrary, mysterious or unwilled aspects o f human behaviour and our 
understanding o f  it. It assumes the self to be fixed, stable and capable o f  
transcendent knowledge and epistemological mastery o f  any other who is 
simlarly stable. These tendencies, and the philosophical assumptions and 
psychological models which support them, are at odds with the critical and 
imaginative aspects o f  the exaltation o f the wisdom o f uncertainty. The potential 
for interaction between creative writing and other disciplines is largely ignored. 
Systems views o f  creativity insist that creativity thrives when domains o f  
knowledge, instead o f becoming stagnant through institutionalisation, are put 
under stress by the arrival o f  models and ideas from other disciplines.9
In writing this critical dissertation and, particularly in writing the novel, I had in 
mind that doubt and epistemological humility were the values which I wanted to
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inscribe within my own self-other relationship with character in the novel. Doubt 
is found in the avoidance o f  closure, the continuation o f a dialectic with those 
aspects o f  existence which tend to hide behind conventional narrative forms and 
stable signs. The uncovering o f hidden knowledge is what defines the uncanny 
and it is also what creative writing stands to gain by opening itself up more fully 
to other human knowledge sciences.
1.4: Structure of the Dissertation
This theoretical discussion is accompanied by a creative writing component (a 
novel entitled Monsters Worse to Come). It comprises six chapters. These 
chapters focus on separate issues but each contribute to addressing the main 
research question either by examining approaches to the task o f  characterisation 
which express or subvert the rationalist, behaviourist model o f  selfhood which 
dominates in writing about creative writing, or offering ideas about how the 
promise o f  an uncanny alternative may be developed. The discussion then 
focuses on specific elements o f the uncanny characterisation process.
Chapter 2 - Approaches to Characterisation in Creative Writing Discourse 
This chapter discusses the techniques o f characterisation in fiction, highlighting
research from social and personal cognition which outlines a framework for 
reader’s processing o f information about character. The approaches to 
characterisation advocated in creative writing discourse and the epistemology o f  
otherness which inheres in it is analysed. Its ‘modular’ approach is argued to re­
enforce particular models o f otherness which endorse received ideas about 
human agency and identity. The elements or discreet components which 
comprise the characterisation process are presented. It is argued that the view o f  
self-other relations espoused in modular approaches to characterisation relies on 
unreflexive models o f  selfhood and self-concepts which exhort the writer to 
conform to convention for characterisation by uncritically accepting his own 
being-towards-others as the ideal basis for characterisation.
Chapter 3 - The Grammar o f  the Uncanny
This chapter examines alternatives to the modularised approach to 
characterisation in the novel through an analysis o f  techniques for achieving 
uncanny effects and reader hesitation in fiction. It presents the Freudian concept 
o f the uncanny and cognate concepts from neuroscience and contemporary 
philosophy which introduce doubts into the self-concept and rational
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assumptions about intersubjective communication. These concepts are used as 
the basis for the design o f provisional techniques which produce the effects o f  
hesitation and estrangement associated with aspects o f  the uncanny in literary 
fiction. Examples o f  characterisation from the postmodern works o f  Samuel 
Beckett and Paul Auster, and their relationship to characterisation in Monsters 
Worse to Come, are foregrounded.
Chapter 4 -  Names and Naming Strategies
This chapter discusses an integral aspect o f  the process o f  misrecognition: the 
referential functions o f  names and the possibilities which exist for their creation. 
It is argued that modular creative writing discourse implicitly relies upon a 
correspondence between language and reality, such as that espoused in analytical 
and empiricist views o f  language in its rules for generating character names. The 
analytical approach to names and name functions is presented in detail to 
foreground the staple philosophical basis o f the modular approach and folk 
psychological concept o f  names: that a name uniquely refers to, connotes the 
qualities, and is an internal attribute o f the character. Poststructuralist notions o f  
the proper name, are used to devise a series o f opposing rules for naming 
characters and treating the onomastics (the act o f naming) which occurs within 
the narrative, in a way designed to elicit an uncanny reaction by demonstrating 
the contingency o f  their provenance and their potential for disconnecting from 
the things they would denote. The chapter leads towards the development o f  
guidelines for uncanny naming and onomastics in literary fiction.
Chapter 5 -  Character Action and Free Will
This chapter discusses the role o f action and behaviour in the characterisation 
process. Within modular discourse, action is typically regarded as the means by 
which characters are most efficiently differentiated from each other. Equally, 
behaviour affirms the character’s membership o f  sociological and psychological 
classes and, by relating behaviour to underlying psychological traits, allows for 
characters to appear as coherent, rational and integrated subjects. Causal, rational 
and economic behaviour is thereby established as the default mode for all 
characters. In contrast, it is argued that the epistemology o f  otherness -  the 
interrogation o f  which is one o f  the novel’s functions -  with regards to action can 
be approached from an interrogatory perspective in which repressed fears o f  
automatism, unbounded identity and adualism are invoked to create an uncanny
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effect. The uncanny approach to characterisation-through-action -  using 
techniques o f  non-transformation, external agency, sublime obstacles and 
epistemological uncertainty -  are then presented.
Chapter 6 -  Conclusion
This chapter summarises the preceding discussion o f  the uncanny approach to 
characterisation and places it in comparative contrast with the conventional, 
rationalist modular approach promoted in popular creative writing discourse. The 
different solutions they present to the representation o f  human nature and 
behaviour in the issues o f  epistemology are used to form an explanatory model o f  
the uncanny effect. The role o f rules or guidelines o f  any kind in the production 
of creative writing is discussed and it is argued that, while constraints are 
necessary for productive creativity and meaningful communication, what 
Margaret Boden calls the ‘heuristic o f constraint-negation’ is one way in which a 
creative domain can be expanded and dominant assumptions or chronic 
tendencies can be destabilised (Boden 1990). The idea o f  ‘conceptual space’ is 
presented and its relevance to characterisation is examined (Fauconnier 1997). 
The application o f  conceptual space blending to the transformation o f author- 
character relations, and other modes o f  characterisation which might ensue from 
this, are then outlined.
1.5: A Comment in C onclusion on The Two-Headed N o v e lis t  
I would like to make some concluding comments about the dual process o f
creative and critical writing.
Writing critically about writing a novel is problematic.
It has been argued that the most useful commentaries about the literary novel are 
to be found in examples o f  the form. That is to say that each novel is indirectly a 
proposal about the novel’s function and is best characterised as an investigation 
into the way in history and the self (structure and agent) interact and co-define 
each other. According to this view, a novel should create and contain its own 
hermeneutic code by implying the novel’s epistemological limits and the author 
should not have recourse to a meta-linguistic ordering o f  this argument. As such, 
a critical adjunct to a novel, such as this, can have a deformative effect on the
17
Chapter One: Introduction
novel, closing o ff certain ways o f reading it through its valorisation o f  what looks 
like the author’s preferential interpretation. As Paul Auster writes:
The question is the story itself, and whether or not it
means something is not for the story to tell.
(City o f Glass : 3)
The authorised interpretation, the supposed centre o f  meaning, should not 
therefore lie so obviously outside (or in this case, beside) the text. This is 
particularly the case with a novel which aspires towards creating an uncanny 
effect where much o f  its power is lost when an accompanying contextual frame 
serves to sensitise the reader by preparing them for the effect. Where I have 
referred to Monsters Worse to Come, I have tried to avoid asserting anything that 
looks like a pronouncement on ‘what it means’, or even what I (think I) intended 
by it. Meaning doesn’t spring directly from the writer’s intention but through 
how what he was written interacts with the cultural and psychological context 
which a reader brings to the work. Textual analysis which bears this in mind can 
teach a writer humility about the creative work and his relationship to it.
There is a second problem in that creative writers, being under no obligation, are 
frequently unaware o f  what kinds o f conventions or compositional strategies they 
are employing when writing a novel. Being overly conscious o f  the systematicity 
with which a story can be put together, and how these systems often forget the 
political aspects o f  representation and largely ignore the problematic o f  
linguistic or narratorial determinism, is anathema to the business o f  telling one. 
And so the writer revisiting, in analytical mode, the scene o f  his creative act can
fail to recognise the evaluative, ideological aspect o f  his writing or can
overdetermine the importance o f certain writerly features (the avoidance o f  
incoherent metaphysical assumptions or the inclusion o f  cryptic intertextual 
references) and ignore others which provide more insight into what will be read 
and how the reader can and will use, or interact, with the text. Research into the 
use and development o f  linguistic intelligence suggests that creative writing is a 
process which involves a large input from the subconscious in enmeshing the 
disparate parts o f a narrative together (Gardner 1983). Story-parts may get 
sutured to other parts in a particular sequence by order o f  the author’s
(unarticulated and largely inexpressible) feeling for ‘what is best’ at the time o f
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composition. It is not until the creative stitching is accomplished that such 
decisions are subjected to rationalisation and a solid justification o f  intuited, ad 
hoc decisions.
But there is a benefit to the writer in bringing the rigour o f  critical analysis to 
bear on the creative task. It allows him to see how different discourses inflect 
each other, by highlighting how the strengths o f  one can illustrate the weaknesses 
o f the other. If the two processes are allowed to act within the best interest o f  the 
critical agenda o f  the novel which creativity embodies, aspiring novelists have 
the opportunity to interrogate the novel’s form from different approaches and re­
discover within its repertoire o f possibilities those which have been repressed by 
the monologic o f  the rational ‘modular’ aesthetic.
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C h a p t e r  O n e  n o t e s
1 Pronouns are always problematic when used in the abstract. Since I’m dealing with 
three different classes of abstract beings (writers, readers and characters) I have 
decided to adopt the following conventions: the writer, since I am indirectly referring to 
myself when I use the word, is referred to as male. The reader is female and, with 
regards to character, I have arbitrarily assigned a gender in each case of its usage. I am 
aware that in assigning gender values to these roles I have assigned the active task of 
writing to a masculine agent and the passive task of reading to the feminine. My only 
justification is that referring -  even indirectly - to myself as feminine would be more 
intrusive and necessitate a further rationale which might strike a reader as whimsical or 
misjudged.
2 For example, Jack M. Bickham was a professor at the University of Oklahoma; James 
Frey a lecturer in creative writing at Stanford University and Noah Lukeman runs the 
Lukeman Literary Agency in New York.
3 The following are among the most common and popular writer-oriented websites. They 
each have their own commercial wing and particular product which, it is promised, will 
enable a writer to finish a novel in 28 days:
http://www.writersonlineworkshops.com
http://www.writersdigest.com
http://www.writequickly.com
http://www.writingclasses.com
http://www.newnovelist.com
The rhetoric of these sites is itself something which calls out for analysis. The 
newnovelist website, which sells software to aid the novel-writing process, claims that:
“We believe that by providing you with the structure, you are in fact freed up to be even 
more creative as a writer” . The idea that dealing with structure is part of the creative 
writing process would seem to have been overlooked.
4 Evan Marshall’s 16-step writing program advertises its approach as follows:
It breaks down the novel-writing process into small, manageable tasks that even the 
most inexperienced writers can achieve. Readers will learn how to find a hook, create a 
conflict, develop a protagonist and set her into motion. His expertise illuminates every 
subject, from insightful advice about choosing the right story to strategies for building 
that story with an eye toward publication. He includes plenty of diagrams, charts and 
section sheets to make following the program easier, and there's even a section with 
proven advice and information for writing effective query letters and submitting 
manuscripts for publication.
Source:http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/- 
/1582970629/qid=1082806694/sr=1 -2/ref=sr_1 _2/103-2348943- 
6431818?v=glance&s=books
5 This is the function of the novel as advanced by Milan Kundera ((Kundera 2000: 95).).
6 For histories of the novel, particularly its 19th and 20th century forms, see Pykett 1995; 
Walder 2001.
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7 In fact, creativity which involves innovation within a formal discipline is only really 
made possible by the existence of constraints which can maintain the structure of the 
work within the domain. I discuss how the domain can be transformed by changes and 
how ‘constraint negation’ is a useful heuristic for developing new creative methods in 
Chapter 6.
8 For a discussion of the Other Minds problem in philosophy and, in particular its 
discussion in artificial intelligence circles, see Dennett 1992.
9 On the subject of blending between the creative and critical disciplines, Lauri Ramey 
writes that:
Ideally, literature may be viewed as a totality that can be effectively represented by the 
image of the blended space itself. By allowing ourselves to freely imagine the critical and 
creative acts mapped over one another, we can perform some powerful acts of cognitive 
creativity and whole new worlds -  circuses, even - can evolve.
(Ramey 2001)
The uses of domain and discourse blending in generating new approaches, 
combinations and forms is treated in Chapter 6.
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Modular Approaches to 
Creative Writing
2: A p p r o a c h e s  t o  C h a r a c t e r is a t io n  in  C r e a t iv e  W r it in g  
D is c o u r s e
This chapter discusses the techniques o f  characterisation in fiction, highlighting 
research from social and personal cognition (Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Schank 
1958; Secord and Backman 1974) which outlines a framework for reader’s 
processing o f  information about character. The approaches to characterisation 
advocated in creative writing discourse (for example, Bickham 1997; Marshall 
2000; Stein 1999; Ballon 2003; Edelman 2001; Frey 2000; Lukeman 2002) are 
then presented, and the epistemology o f otherness which inheres in it is analysed. 
It is argued that through its uniformity o f advice and injunction, discursive 
cohesion and insistence on readers’ immediate recognition o f  and identification 
with characters, this user-centred approach to characterisation limits possibilities 
for the writer’s representation and understanding o f  otherness. What I call its 
‘modular’ approach results in the re-enforcement o f  particular models o f  
otherness which endorse received and behaviourist ideas about human agency 
and identity coherence. It is argued that the view o f self-other relations espoused 
in these approaches to characterisation relies on unreflexive models o f  selfhood 
and self-concepts which exhort the writer to conform to convention for 
characterisation by uncritically accepting his own being-towards-others.
2.1: Models of Character
David Lodge writes that o f all the elements o f fiction which are recognisably 
discreet, character is the most difficult one to discuss in isolation (Lodge 1992: 
67). That is because it is not achieved in isolation but is, to a large degree, 
facilitated or co-constructed by other narrative processes: emplotment, dialogue, 
narrative voice, point o f  view and the situation (place and time) in which the 
narrative unfolds. In the subtle narrative interplay between plot, place and style 
o f  mediation, characters emerge as the focus o f  the novel’s animation. They 
move, speak, interact with other characters and with the world o f  the novel. Their 
relationship to others and to their surroundings is complicated; they act on and 
are acted upon by the world o f the not-self in which the narrator finds them and, 
through this process, become more distinct.
It has been observed that despite a wealth o f  literature discussing the significance 
o f fictional characters within particular dramatic and literary works, and the
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consensus amongst writers that it is the most important aspect o f  fictional writing 
(Lodge 1992), very little work has been concerned explicitly with a theory o f  
characterisation (Chatman 1978; Culpepper 2001; Culler 1975; Van Peer 1989)1. 
Assumptions made within literary discourse about the function o f character in 
fiction have fallen into two categories: humanist and textual. O f the former, the 
formalist approach is the most heavily represented. Humanist notions suggest 
that character should be read and studied as a representation o f people and is 
characterised by psychological and sociological speculation which seeks to 
uncover the motivation for the character’s behaviour. In response to formalist 
criticisms that fiction is not an appropriate means with which to unearth the 
‘truth’ about human nature, and that character is more productively regarded as a 
text effect which functions to serve narrative necessities, Wallace Martin has 
responded that:
Our sense that (many) fictional characters are uncannily similar 
to people is not something to be dismissed or ridiculed, but a 
crucial feature of narration that requires explanation.
(Martin 1986: 120)
The explanation o f  the effect o f  characterisation on fiction readers, in its 
promotion o f a feeling o f identification or recognition o f  human attributes and 
behaviours, has drawn on theories o f  social cognition, interpersonal 
communication and sociolinguistics. Culpepper proposes a model for 
understanding characterisation in which the process is taken as a communicative 
act in which the dynamic process o f meaning-making involves the writer, the 
reader, the context and the utterance (Culpepper 2001: 24). He argues that 
readers use cognitive strategies, reading and life experiences and textual cues to 
decode the meaning o f  character actions and behaviours and to predict where 
such attributes will lead the character in the context o f  the narrative. These 
reading strategies have variously been called schemata, scripts and cognitive 
models (Semino 1997; Schank and Abelson 1977). They could equally be called 
‘heuristics’ (Duncker 1945; Gigerenzer and Reich 2000). There are distinct 
differences in the meaning o f these terms but they correspond broadly in that 
they each offer a cognitive account o f how the impression o f  understanding a 
person arises from a reader’s active, if  unconscious, reading o f  the character
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information which the writer has encoded. Schemata are the reader’s explanatory 
and predictive mechanisms in which experience, textual and contextual 
information combine to orient her towards an understanding of, and emotional 
identification with, the character, just as they apply in ‘real life’ to the 
understanding o f people. They also serve to create expectations, based on reading 
experience, about how the character will act in future situations. Neisser 
describes schemata as “anticipations: they are the medium by which the past 
affects the future”. (Neisser 1976:22).
Because its audience is one concerned with the techniques o f  production, and not 
the politics or other issues o f  representation, discussion o f characterisation 
techniques in creative writing discourse has come to focus on just these aspects 
o f ‘anticipation’, the better to harness the reader’s swift engagement with 
character. In some respects it seems as though the wealth o f  publications offering 
advice on characterisation for the novel can be explained by the absence o f an 
accepted and accessible model o f characterisation within literary criticism. 
Picking up on ideas from earlier commentators within literary philosophy 
(specifically Aristotle, Lajos Egri, EM Forster, and Vladimir Propp), the 
discourse has tended to ignore debates about representation and its problems and 
has reified the notion o f  character as the best vehicle for assuring reader- 
recognition and emotional engagement. There are, for obvious reasons, many 
differences between academic critiques o f  characterisation and popular advice 
about how to successfully undertake it. The principal difference lies in the 
differing conceptions o f  the character’s coherence o f  personality and the writer’s 
responsibilities with regards to representing what otherness is like:
The process of selecting and organizing semes is governed by 
an ideology of character, implicit models of psychological 
coherence which indicate what sorts of things are possible as 
character traits, how these traits co-exist and form wholes, or at 
least which traits co-exist without difficulty and which are 
necessarily opposed in ways that produce tension and ambiguity.
(Culler 1975:237)
Whereas Culler, writing as an academic, can speak explicitly about an ideology 
o f character - that complex o f  assumptions about the function and limits o f
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characterisation, its projection o f  coherent selfhood and its relationship to models 
o f understanding or representing people -  and the task o f  presenting traits which 
conflict with each other and problematise an easy understanding o f others, 
creative writing discourse tends to eschew the idea o f  ‘tension and ambiguity’ 
and treat characters not as ways o f  understanding people, but as idealised, 
coherent textual subjects, or what James N. Frey calls homo fictus:
When depicting the life of a fictional character, a novelist must 
choose to include only those impressions, thoughts, reflections, 
sensations, feelings, desires and so on that bear on the 
character's motivations development and decision-making - those 
aspects of character that will affect the way in which the 
character copes with the dilemmas he will face in the story.
(Frey 2000: 2)
This ontological distinction between people and homo fictus is repeated 
throughout the guidebooks: “In fiction, real people aren't vivid enough. Good 
characters have to be constructed, not copied from actuality" (Bickham 
1997:17). The distinction is only mentioned where it allows for humanist 
criticisms to be repelled. It also serves to undercut anticipated criticism about the 
difference between goal-oriented characterisation and other approaches to the 
representation o f subjectivity. A few lines later, Bickham informs his readers 
that:
Readers must make a leap of faith or intuition of some kind: they 
must use their imagination to picture physically and emotionally a 
person inside their own head, believe this imaginary person is
somehow real and even care about him.
(Bickham 1997: 17)
And so the ‘non-real’ construct o f the character is replaced with the idea o f  the 
real person so as to maximise reader empathy, recognition and emotional
involvement. This kind o f ontological incoherence defines the discourse.
Bickham’s advice provokes a central question, which is unresolved by purely 
textual approaches and at which I will now look: how is it that characters can 
evoke such a response o f  recognition and identification from the reader? What 
social and cognitive processes influence the way that readers infer the humanity
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from the description o f  a textual, fictive construct and imagine the character as 
real?
2.2: Social Cognition about Others
The analysis o f  how readers’ impressions o f characters are formed on the basis o f  
inferences they draw from character behaviour has been studied from 
sociolinguistic, social psychological and cognitive science perspectives 
(Bennison, 1993; Bockting 1995, for example). These approaches take as their 
starting point the idea that the impression formation process which underpins 
evaluations o f newly encountered people in real world settings is very similar to 
how readers create cognitive models o f fictional characters during the reading 
process. In real world encounters with people, we have no opportunity to see into 
the mind o f the acting others to understand the internal thoughts, traits and 
desires which (we assume) produces their externally observable behaviour. And 
so a series o f inferential mechanisms, or heuristics, and cognitive schemata 
derived from prior knowledge and experience, are what we typically use to gain 
knowledge about others on the basis o f their observable sociological properties 
and self-presentation. What ensues from these first steps at knowledge o f another 
is the attribution o f abstract psychological or temperamental characteristics 
(typically adjectival descriptors like ‘grumpy’, ‘flirtatious’, ‘boring’ etc.) on the 
basis o f  the behaviour within what Levinson (1992) called demarcated settings 
which frame the meaning o f such behaviours.
This is one outcome o f the heuristic evaluation process. More importantly 
though, and preceding these impressions, information about the actors’ group or 
category membership (in terms o f  age, race, gender, occupation, social class) and 
social roles (kinship roles and function) are gleaned and used to trigger schemata 
which can then produce further information which are culturally salient. For 
example, in Western patriarchal systems ‘mothers’ tend to have particular traits 
more closely associated with nurturing roles and qualities, while ‘fathers’ are 
more closely associated with actions which re-enforce authority. In each case, 
contextual information such as the type o f behaviour expected within the 
physical setting in which the character is acting will affect the interpretation at 
which a reader arrives about who or what the character is3. A character is 
regarded as being prototypical o f their type if  his or her behaviour does not
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change from one context or setting to another. (A person is prototypically 
‘boisterous’, for example, if  they shout in a situation in which this behaviour is 
highly atypical, such as in a church).
The role o f  prototypes and categories in organising human thought about the 
external world is central to all o f these readerly schema. The prototype theory o f  
Eleanor Rosch (1980) after Wittgenstein (1958) disputes the Aristotlean view  
that categories distinguish between ‘natural kinds’. In the Aristotlean view, 
membership o f  a category is defined on a binary basis and is determined by 
whether or not the object or person passes certain necessary conditions. The 
Roschean notion o f prototypicality suggests that there is no binary system in 
place because categories are fluidly but hierarchically structured and can cope 
with non-obvious examples o f a category by suggesting that it is simply less 
typical than other examples (a dodo is a less typical bird than a robin, for 
example). The continuum o f category membership in this model enables us to 
think differently about the social categories which apply to character: a character 
labelled a detective, for example, if  not distinguished by markers in the text from 
the prototypical detective o f the novel’s genre, will be inferred to possess such 
characteristics by the reader.
Fiske and Neuberg (1990) propose a model o f  steps involved in this kind o f  
impression formation through unconscious categorisation. They suggest that 
people use visual and behavioural cues, categorisation techniques and 
experience-related knowledge schemata to create a mental picture o f  a newly 
encountered person which will in turn be used to produce expectations about that 
person’s future behaviour, provide a context within which to interpret their 
present behaviour, and allow for attributes and traits to be assigned to them 
which are consistent with their ‘type’. These are: Initial categorisation; 
Confirmatory categorisation; Recategiorisation; Piecemeal integration; Ongoing 
dynamic integration.
Let’s consider how this process can be applied to the analysis o f  fictional types 
and the inferences drawn from their actions, starting with the example o f  Paul 
Auster’s character Quinn (the writer/detective in City o f Glass:
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Initial categorisation: Quinn is male, middle-aged, a widower, white, a writer, 
an ersatz detective, a bereft father. At the story’s beginning, he has no extant 
social roles: being an ex-husband, ex-father and ex-friend. Membership o f  
particular classes generates an expectation about the actor possessing 
prototypical properties o f  that class. Since Quinn has no determinable social 
roles, his writing and, latterly his detecting activities, are the ones which are most 
salient in this regard. Prior knowledge about the detective genre interacts with 
the reader’s knowledge about the properties o f  the detective type which Quinn 
exhibits to allow for assumptions to be made about his character, which are either 
re-enforced, refreshed or refuted by the evidence o f  his later behaviour in the 
text.
Confirmatory categorisation: Without any other information to the contrary, it 
may be temporarily assumed that the character has the prototypical qualities o f  
the class or classes to which he belongs. If the text supports this interpretation, by 
demonstrating that Quinn is male, middle-aged, cynical, hard-drinking, 
aggressive and womanising, for example, then the impression is re-enforced. If 
not (if it transpires that he is young, abstemious, homosexual and idealistic), this 
impression has to be re-negotiated, either by assigning him to a new category or 
by de-centreing him within the ‘detective’ category, so that he is no longer 
conceived o f as its prototype and the inheritance o f  attributes -  the inference 
mechanism -  is thwarted, in which case further inference processes need to be 
called upon.
Recategorisation: In the event that the prototype does not apply, the salience o f  
the class to the character’s identity may be downtoned or even dismissed, so that 
Quinn comes to be viewed from within a ‘bereaving father’ schema, for example, 
instead o f  a detective schema. Since the hardboiled detective prototype does not 
apply very well to him -  does not allow for accurate inferences about traits and 
predictions about behaviour -  it is replaced or its importance is relegated in the 
ongoing evaluation. In some cases, if  the character behaves in a way which 
radically alters their basic category memberships (such as gender and race), the 
effect can be startling and can cause the reader to hesitate between two 
interpretations. Many texts exhibit these properties. Dill in Neil Jordan’s The 
Crying Game and Coleman Silk in Philip Roth’s The Human Stain, for example,
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achieve this effect when the cues which respectively established their gender and 
race are shown to be erroneous. In the case o f The Crying Game, viewers have to 
decide between relinquishing their existing and well-developed impressions o f  
the character as female, or to cling to it and dismiss the traumatizing “sign” o f  
his/her male genitalia as irrelevant noise (Jordan 1991; Roth 1999).
Piecemeal integration: Or what Van Dijk (2000) calls textbase reading. 
Typically, people do not possess simply the properties o f  the prototype o f  the 
class to which they belong but have traits and habits which individuate them 
from this generic. These individuating signs or behaviours are encountered as 
episodic pieces o f information about the character’s behaviour which 
supererogate the details o f the prototype. This is what Northrop Frye refers to as 
a rounded character -  someone for whom the reader must always strive to 
dynamically update an impression (Frye 1957). Rounded characters, despite the 
underdefinition o f  the concept, act in ways which refute the applicability o f  the 
inherited prototype and, for this reason, engage the reader who is suspended 
between feeling confident about their familiarity with the character type and an 
awareness that the character is capable o f  behaving in ways which are 
inconsistent with that type.
Ongoing, dynamic negotiation o f character impression is then achieved by 
incorporating new information (new behaviours and revelations) into the extant 
model or by changing the category schema which is being used to interpret the 
actions o f  the character.
There are many types o f  actions which provide cues to these kinds o f inference 
processes. Herman (1995) and Culler (1975) discuss the linguistic behaviours 
which provide paralinguistic information about the speaker’s register, dialect and 
accent amongst other things. Sociolinguistic analysis (such as Bernstein 1972; 
Labov 1972) o f  attitudes to such features demonstrates how these features in turn 
are used as clues to infer other attributes, such as social class, origin, ethnic 
background, age, level o f  education. All o f these evaluations also, o f  course, are 
acts o f  social judgements which can serve to re-enforce or dispute existing 
prejudices about social groups. These kinds o f attributions are culture-specific 
but their mechanisms, being cognitive, are often quite global and are not 
restricted to linguistic behaviour. Other information about class, gender, age,
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race, profession, personality traits is indirectly presented by behaviour in dress 
sense, locomotive mannerisms, direct expressions o f  attitude, physical 
comportment and reaction to specific situations (Worman and Orr 1996; Vrij 
1997). This is a way o f  saying that the presence o f  traits, and o f  the character’s 
membership o f  particular social classes or typologies, are inferred from their 
behaviour in a dynamic way in which bottom-up processes, influenced largely by 
the reader’s experience and their choice o f schema through which to view the 
character, meet with top-down process such as category thinking and inference 
mechanisms.
In the next section I will present the approach which creative writing discourse 
advises novelists to adopt to characterisation so as to maximise the influence o f  
these top-down processes by eliminating the possibility that the reader will be 
undecided as to which categories the character belongs, or that they might be 
inferred to belong to mutually exclusive categories.
2.3: Creative Writing Discourse
The advice offered by creative writing instructors can be regarded as a single 
discourse system in that its intended audience (aspiring writers), its stated 
objective (advice on how to write successful novels) and its genre (instruction, 
demonstration) are the same. Typically, within a discourse system, one expects to 
encounter a dominant set o f assumptions or values against which a rival, 
dissonant element competes for priority in what Fairclough calls the order o f  
discourse. (Fairclough 1988). Mikhail Bakhtin argues that the novel, as a piece o f  
discourse, is always ‘heteroglossic’. This means that the novel is necessarily the 
site o f  tension between many different discourse modes and incompatible 
ideologies which are (locally) incoherent with the (global) consensus that emerge 
from the text (Bakhtin 1966). Heteroglossia is an ideological failsafe in that, 
according to Bakhtin, it prevents the novel from becoming a vehicle for the 
valorisation o f particular political, religious or secular philosophies. It is for this 
reason that the novel remains, for some, the best means for critical engagement 
available in the creative domain (Petry 1950; Stemlieb 2002; Mastrogianakos 
2003).
It is difficult to find a radically dissenting voice, or the evidence o f  great 
heterogeneity, in creative writing discourse. The rhetoric o f  commercial
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imperatives, reader-orientation and disdain for ‘amateur’ or innovative styles o f  
composition is endemic in the genre. There is also a strain o f  anti-intellectualism 
running through some o f its injunctions against ‘smart fiction’. Jack Bickham, a 
Professor at the University o f Oklahoma and author o f  65 novels4, admonishes 
the aspiring writer who would pursue literary experimentation at the expense o f  
alienating the reader:
Wouldn't it be better not to consider yourself so smart? To try to 
figure out what contemporary readers like and then to work to 
give them the best stories of that type they ever read?
(Bickham 1997:4)
This dichotomy between the writer’s pursuit o f  pleasure -  Barthes’s writerly 
texts (Barthes: 1968) - against the reader’s entitlement to pleasure through 
reading known story types is the bogus schism that runs through much o f the 
discourse suggesting, as it does, that the reader is a singular static entity whose 
demands do not extend beyond the re-reading o f familiar and consoling fictions 
and that the writer must elect to sate that demand or otherwise fail as a writer. In 
this view, creative writing, and characterisation as its main staple, becomes what 
Bickham calls a “fiction delivery system” (op. cit. :15) in which the objective is 
to convey the fictive information as effectively and economically as possible for 
fear that the reader will ‘never go any further’ (op. cit. :1 9 ), will reject the object 
and stop consuming, if  the expectation o f recognisable characters with well- 
signalled motivations and intense conflicts is not gratified.5
This implies or assumes that the reader is the one to be pleasured, not the writer. 
The writer’s ‘pleasure’ -  or, more accurately, his incentive - comes from 
successfully attaining publication, a readership and attendant (financial) rewards. 
In other words, the writer’s benefit is an ancillary by-product which is contingent 
upon pleasing the reader through the creation o f  a ‘text o f  pleasure’ (Barthes 
1968). Pleasure, in this view, for the reader derives from discovering familiar 
people in familiar places; revisiting sites o f  conflict which have their own 
narrative logic and prescribed outcome. The pleasure in this could be what Slavoj 
Zizek, after Jacques Lacan, has described as the automatonic pleasure o f  
encountering the Real which is experienced when a story is resolved, or a story 
element occurs, just as we had expected it but which expectation had been
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repressed because it constitutes a confrontation ‘with the Real o f  one’s desire’ 
(Zizek 1995:74). The audience or reader’s anticipation about ‘what a character 
will do’, and its validation within the story, is both flattering (in that it approves 
o f the reader’s inferences) and consoling (it re-enforces the idea that the world is 
familiar and knowable) and thereby constitutes the reader’s reward for 
understanding the types encountered, deciphering the laws o f  narrative logic and 
knowing how to read its signs.
In all o f this, characters are the vehicle for the delivery o f  this pleasure and they 
must, if  the reader is not to be thwarted, be drawn in gross outline, their signals 
outsized to aid the reader’s recognition o f their type.
It is with this process o f  ‘recognition’ that creative writing discourse identifies 
itself. This recognition is not simply o f  the sensory kind where prior familiarity 
with the character’s physical type allows the reader to summon up a visual 
accompaniment to the textual fictive dream. The power o f  recognition lies in its 
priomess: it means immediately recognising the character’s motive, emotion, 
goals and the possibilities which exist for their resolution o f  these goals within 
the genre which, in turn, must itself be recognised by clearly signalled indicators. 
This recognition involves the recurrent use o f markers, signifiers, o f  character 
traits and intentions and, most centrally, o f category membership. Recognition is 
the key to the pleasure delivery system and, to succeed, it requires constant 
iteration. As Bickham says:
All those (character) tags you devise will be waved often, not just 
occasionally, as they might appear in real life.
(Bickham 1997:18)
Real life is presented in this discourse as the site o f  lifelessness, chaos and 
contingency upon which it is fiction’s job to improve. In this context, 
improvement means cohesion and rewarding the reader who knows the 
psychological, historical and teleological rules o f the genre and the novel’s 
world. ‘Improvement’ is the imposition o f a rational set o f  schema which can 
account for how people are the way they are:
Real people act on impulses that grow out of things in their 
personalities that even they sometimes don't understand. But in
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fiction there is considerably less random chance... It's just one of 
several ways that fiction surpasses and improves upon life. And 
that's a good thing, isn’t it?
(Bickham 1997:19)
This universe o f  the novel is one where the contingent and the inexplicable 
aspects o f real experience -  o f the enigma o f the Other - hoves away from sight 
and are replaced by conventions o f explication and orientation. This is its 
consoling function. This is particularly the case in explaining character behaviour 
where action is always preceded by self-interested, rationalised decisions. 
Arbitrary decisions and prevarication are anathema to this clearly-signalled 
account o f  human behaviour. To do this effectively, creative writing discourse 
proposes what might be called an ergonomics o f  characterisation -  a 
methodology which places the reader’s pleasure-through-consolation at its centre 
and which lends coherence to experience by always presenting the integrated, 
recognisable and rational side o f  character. Without expressing any concern 
about the politics o f  representation, creative writing discourse promotes a 
particularly limiting set o f rules to ensure that characterisation functions properly 
to always orient the reader within the comfort o f  their own expectations. This 
follows on from Aristotle’s injunction against the intrusion o f  the irrational 
features o f  everyday life into poetic representation: “events that are impossible 
but plausible are preferable to ones that are possible but implausible ” (Aristotle 
1961:66).
The eradication o f  contingency results from harmonising the signifying potential 
o f the different elements which comprise the characterisation process. The next 
section presents creative writing discourse’s treatment o f  some o f these elements 
and how they are used to create a character impression which is inetgrated and 
coherent.
2.4: E le m e n t s  o f  C h a r a c t e r  C o m p o s itio n
It’s physically impossible to work on dialogue, viewpoint, 
characterisation and all the other aspects of writing a novel at the 
same time. When the process is broken down into its steps, it’s 
clear that creating a novel is, in fact, a linear process.
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(Marshall 2000: x)
The humanising o f  character proceeds by equating broadly recognisable human 
behaviour with character traits which are the outlined in exposition and 
description, often using a technique o f gross relief. Characterisation, within 
creative writing discourse, requires that each o f  the components which comprise 
the impression formation process cohere in the way in which they decode 
‘character essence’. They conform to most o f the aspects o f  the prototype or, in 
Wittgensteinian terms, have an abundance o f family resemblances (Wittgenstein 
1967).
Within the discourse, character is defined in various phases and types o f  
composition: name, physical description, internal state, (historical) relationship 
with other antagonists or characters, membership o f  social and psychological 
categories, for example. Ewen Marshall advises writers to use a profiling method 
to enable the successful exposition o f  the lead character and to allow for a 
smooth economical binding o f character to action (Marshall 2000). This requires 
the writer to explicitly describe, in the form o f what looks like a database entry, 
what Lajos Egri calls the three dimensions o f  character: sociological, 
psychological and physiological (Egri 1946). It is advised that this should be 
done in advance o f  the composition o f the story. James N. Frey suggests two 
methods for getting to know the character: interview and biography. (Frey 2000: 
14). In each case, the objective is the same: what is called intimate knowledge 
and understanding o f character will proceed from understanding their category 
memberships, their appearance, their objectives and how these features interact 
within the context o f  the situation in which the novel places them.
I have used the term ‘modular’ to describe the approach o f  this discourse (and 
will use it from now on) because in its willingness to impart the rules o f novel 
writing, it decomposes the process into formal, discreet and teachable parts o f  
which characterisation is just one. It technicises the novel through the adoption 
o f a partially algorithmic approach to its composition. Even the titles o f some o f  
these books resemble those o f manuals which ordinarily concern themselves with 
mechanical assembly or DIY {How to Write a Damn Good Novel: A Step-by-Step 
No Nonsense Guide to Dramatic Storytelling; Writing Fiction Step by Step) as 
well as conveying a corrective message (The 38 Most Common Fiction Writing
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Mistakes: (And How to Avoid Them); Write fiction the easy way!: how to enjoy 
writing fiction plus secrets to revisions! ).
‘Modular’ seems appropriate because it describes the fate o f  any subject o f  study 
which, once introduced as a formal discipline in educational institutions and 
guidebooks, necessarily becomes an object o f  utility which will come to have a 
unitary order and sequence imposed on it which the process o f  instruction will 
then naturalise. In this way, creative writing, and in particular, characterisation, is 
in danger o f becoming another discipline o f  the information sciences. 
Characterisation is always discussed as an ‘element’ o f  fiction, a technique which 
bears no relation to other kinds o f self-other relations, social interactions or 
representations o f  otherness. It is also decomposed into further submodules, 
which the discourse advises must cohere. This coherence re-enforces the 
impression which was formed by the inheritance o f  attributes from prototypical 
reasoning.
Marshall (2000) lists 17 submodules o f characterisation.6 The most important 
ones, from the point o f  view o f understanding the representational conventions 
advised within creative writing discourse, are those which allow for prompt 
recognition o f  the character’s membership o f  particular social, narratological and 
ontological categories, so that schemata or heuristics which allow the reader to 
develop a coherent impression o f what the character is likely to do in the world 
o f the novel can be activated. I will briefly discuss the discourses approach to 
three character concepts: name, type and objective.
2.4.1: Name
A  well-heeled New York Attorney might be named Roger or Eliott 
or Arthur. But those names wouldn’t suit a Cuban drug lord 
working out of Miami, who might be called Jesus or Roberto or 
Jaime.
(Marshall 2000: 15)
The name, being the first mark o f identification, works on a number o f  levels: 
referential, connotative and sociological. Orson Scott Card advises that no two 
characters can have the same name or names that sound alike, as the lack o f sign 
difference can lead to reader confusion about who is being referred to (Card
36
Chapter 2: Approaches to Characterisation in Creative Writing Discourse
2003). In Marshall’s example, a cosmetic social realism is being employed with 
the aid o f conventional and highly conservative ideas about class, ethnicity and 
names. Modular creative writing espouses an unreflexive attitude to names, 
suggesting that, in effect, any name which is plausible (meaning socially 
typical), differentiated from others and does not refer to an already existing 
entity or character, will suffice.
Other methods for generating names which are proposed within the discourse 
include consulting the telephone directory, guides for naming babies and the use 
o f name generation software which takes into account the fact that different 
genres have different subrules for naming conventions (Bickham 1997; Frey 
2000; Marshall). The function o f names -  their playful potential -  is not a feature 
o f modular creative writing discourse, as it is in literary theory and semiotics, as 
though to suggest that the polysemy o f the sign, and the philosophy o f  naming 
(onomastics) upon which its discourse rests are irrelevant to the reader, because 
it leads to a diffusion o f meaning as opposed to a constraining o f  it.
This mismatch between literary philosophy and creative writing discourse, in 
terms o f  the amount o f  attention devoted to the discussion o f  names in the latter, 
suggests that the topic is part o f the Other discourse which is excluded from 
creative writing because it undermines its epistemology and, in this way, reveals 
its inability to account for some features o f  naming which are problematic to its 
approach. I have devoted chapter four to this topic.
2.4.2: Character Type
Although it tries to distance itself from accusation o f stereotyping by deriding the 
use o f  uni-dimensional characters, modular discourse retreats to a position o f  
conventionality and formalism in its espousal o f  character-types. Schmidt’s 
Master Characters revisits Joseph Campbell’s mythology via behavioural 
profiling to devise 45 character types whose traits and responses to particular 
phenonema can provide all necessary animation to the fictional arena. Linda 
Edelstein’s Guide to Character Traits, (Edelstein 1999) attempts a 
decomposition o f  human behaviour into complexes o f  desires, habits and 
tendencies. Character behaviour, like human behaviour, she argues is always 
context-dependent but reveals itself through the actualisation o f  traits such as 
introversion, dominance, blame avoidance (see Plotnik 1996). Trait theory, as a
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branch within the psychology o f personality, has been applied to many social 
forms o f type classification and has been accused o f over-extending itself in an 
attempt to explain human behaviour in particular settings and, as a scientific 
model, it fails to meet Popper’s criteria o f  predictivity (Popper 1972) in that it 
only seeks to explain or narrativise past behaviours and says nothing about how 
these might change in the future or otherwise impact upon a character’s 
behaviour.
Character is like looking at a box I hold up in front of your eyes.
You clearly see the side facing you. You can know that segment 
of the box, unless I have concealed portions of it from you. But 
you are naïve if you think that one side is all there is... W e see 
(characters) embedded in this context or that and, over time, we 
learn all about the sides that had previously been out of view.
(Edelstein 1999: 8)
Edelstein implies that the character o f  others, like their personality, is not 
unknowable or in any way the outcome o f the writer- or reader- s e lf s  projection 
or desire, but is simply multi-faceted: it reveals itself completely in increments 
when context elicits the actualisation o f particular traits. Compare this with Paul 
Auster’s remark on his approach to characterisation:
This is how novels are written. You don't know where it's coming 
from and you don't know why these characters are inside you.
And if you did know, you probably wouldn't have to write the 
book. You'd be a journalist, I guess. A  journalist is someone who 
knows where his story comes from, but a novelist doesn't. That's 
why the writing of a novel is a great adventure for the writer.
(Auster 2000)
At the root o f the modular approach is the argument that the writer must know 
in advance o f riting why the character is there and fashion them in such a way 
that they appear cohesive to the reader. Extensive research from the psychology 
o f  creativty and testimonies o f  writers suggest that this degree o f  advance 
planning is greatly at odds with the process which underpins discovery and 
innovation (See: Gardner 1993; Csizzentmihalyi 1990; Boyd 1991). There is also 
an elision between the cohesion o f personality and the cohesion o f  the construct
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o f the dramatic character which is evident in the enchainment o f  “real people” 
with “believable characters” in the title o f  the first chapter o f  Edelstein’s book. 
The real or authentic character she argues, is one who is believable and 
believability is a product o f conforming to expectation. Typology, with regards 
to characterisation, has the same problem as trait theory within the field o f  
psychology: it always tends towards stasis in making an object o f  others. It can 
predict nothing because human behaviour is highly contingent, its motivation 
sometimes hard to discern, and instead imposes an interpretive structure on only 
the barest outline o f  observations.
2.4.3: S t o r y  G o a l ,  O b je c t iv e  o r  M o t iv a t io n
In a well constructed story, the events are causal. Event B cannot 
happen unless event A happens. The cause and effect nature of 
events makes for a finely woven tapestry.
(Frey 1987: 79)
Motivation is a third key element in the discourse about characterisation. 
Unconsciously, because the writer (and, later, the reader) must work within the 
boundaries o f  categories for representing other people, these categories become 
interlinked through (often unspoken) causal mechanisms. For example, details 
about a character’s development and background foreshadow, and are used to 
account for, her motivation and personality. Similarly, gender delimits the kinds 
o f characteristics which are predicted or easily recognised by the reader. Ewen 
Marshall’s hymn to foresightedness, in advising the development o f a database in 
which these qualities are kept in account, is intended to enable the writer to better 
anticipate the character’s key motivations and likely reactions to the situations in 
which the narrative places them. The result is a list o f  restrained categories which 
trammel the writer into a particular narrative code and epistemology o f otherness 
from the off.
A stubborn relic o f behavioural psychology infuses such a model o f  human 
behaviour. In the area o f character exposition, each tic o f  the character’s 
behaviour must be recognisable, to the reader, as a response to a presented 
stimulus. Behaviour is posited as intentional and must correspond to solving the 
problem or achieving the stated objective. In this method, there is no room to 
manouevre out o f the nexus o f cause and effect. The reader must know why an
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action has been undertaken and the plausibility o f  that explanation is highly 
correlated to its conventionality. Bickham discusses the criticisms that such an 
approach to characterisation writing often elicits and argues that it is not the job 
o f fiction to represent people as they are but to amplify their qualities for the 
purposes o f  reader comprehension and engagement. This insistence on the 
orientative function o f writing inflects the approach to character to the extent that 
it is advised that each element in the process be designed so that it re-enforces 
the impression o f  character which is formed by the others. In other words, traits, 
name, social category membership, actions and motivations must correspond in 
terms o f  the character impression they tend to generate.
2 .4 .4 :  IN TER -R ELA TED N ESS OF T R A IT S
In fiction, characters and their backgrounds are almost always 
much more consistent than real people in real life.
(Bickham 1992: 19)
The first question to which a reader applies a character-centred heuristic is ‘Who 
is this character?’. This is in effect a series o f questions which together centre on 
the identity markers o f  the character. When they cohere in expected patterns they 
provide the answer to the main question which is - what type o f  character is this? 
Knowing the character’s type (and closeness to the prototype) produces an 
anticipation about the behaviour that can be expected from them, as well as 
outlining their quest and hinting at whether or not it can be achieved. In this 
way, everything is subsumed to the task o f  profiling the character in decodable 
ways: within detective fiction the type ‘detective’ typically implies ‘male’ and 
‘middle-aged’, with some additional elements including ‘cynical’ and ‘divorced’ 
and so on, as discussed earlier. James N. Frey suggests that novel 
characterisation o f detectives should involve:
...selecting features that are the antithesis of those of most 
detective characters -  features that have become stereotypes -  
old, fat and alcoholic. Your decisions on what characteristics to 
include in your characters should be based primarily on two 
considerations: breaking stereotypes and good orchestration.
(Frey 2000: 9)
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Noah Lukeman suggests that innovation in this concatenation o f  attributes and 
action properties is both productive but also highly limited: one can’t change 
more than one attribute without changing the genre, which Marshall suggests 
results in a failed novel because selection o f genre is the first step to success 
(Marshall 2001:16). As a result, good-natured teenage girls are not realistic 
detectives. Realism, or believability, another cornerstone o f  fiction, is premised 
on allowing heuristics to work effectively in a way that does not confuse the 
reader. These heuristics are probabilistic information o f  sociologist and 
psychological types. Apart from re-asserting the principles o f  convention at the 
expense o f  innovation, what this reveals is the atomisation o f  characterisation 
into very strict rules o f  transformation. Within creative writing discourse, there 
are highly developed rules as to what is permissible within the system o f fiction. 
Even departing from convention is highly regulated. Frey states that:
The idea is to be creative within accepted form, as the architect 
will change the corners, pillars, slope of the roof, yet still have all 
the bedrooms, bathrooms and closets his clients have come to 
expect.
(Frey 2000: 8)
The analogy is revealing: the client’s expectations are the most important object 
to be considered in the creation o f character and innovation, if  it is to be 
attempted cannot change the fundamentals, only the ornamentals. Creative 
writing discourse concatenates these traits in such a way as to reward the 
application o f conventional inferential schema on the reader’s behalf: a 
character’s background is correlated to and often explains their behavioural 
traits. These traits are signalled by actions but are re-enforced by details about 
occupation and temperament. The name must only differentiate them from other 
characters and must be consistent with someone o f their ethnicity, class and age. 
The traits which are produced by these assignations are what in turn produce the 
character’s potential for action. This action will not take place until it is provoked 
by a suitable stimulus, which must be presented to the reader that she can 
understand the reasons for the character’s behaviour. A stimulus must produce a 
response and at all times the character must behave optimally. So goes the logic.
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This is a model o f  characterisation in which the techniques which amplify 
reader’s recognition and emotional involvement with the character by vaunting 
rationalist conventions, and which valorise the reader’s own ego, are presented as 
the only techniques worth pursuing. I will now try to develop these criticisms and 
account for the dominance o f  this particular epistemological framework in 
creative writing discourse by looking at how the ethic o f  reader-centred ‘design’ 
runs through its prescriptions for effective characterisation.
2.5: “User-oriented” Characterisation
Remember what the reader wants. Don't try to inflict your author
concerns on her. You must give her what she wants at the start,
or she'll never go any further[...] Good fiction characters ... are
never, ever real people. You have to provide shortcut identifying
characteristics that stick out all over him, you have to make him
practically a monster - for readers to see even the dimmest
outlines.
(Bickham 2002: 12,18)
The term ‘user-orientation’ has associations with the role o f  design within the 
world o f  human-computer interaction in the improvement o f  productivity and 
user comfort (Wickens & Gordon-Becker 1997). The approach o f user-centered 
design is to posit a causal link between these two concepts. In the world o f the 
text, the reader is more productively engaged with her task when she is 
comfortable about the objective she is being asked to attain, that is when she is 
familiar with all the elements and objects and norms o f  the fictional world. 
Similarly, the writer is productive when he is oriented towards a specific end and 
has a method for achieving it. Its objective o f user orientation is the same as that 
that o f other information design disciplines: to maximise the flow o f information 
to the reader by minimising potential areas o f  confusion or frustration.
Other disciplines within the information sciences have a similar approach to text 
as modular creative writing. “Document design” revisits reader or reception 
theory from an engineering point o f view (Schriver 1996) and does away with 
the troubling notion o f  the inestimable role o f  subjectivity in the reader’s 
completion o f  the text by making o f these responses a probabiility-based object 
to be factored into the document design process. Thus the reader becomes an
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element. Whereas this empirical and behaviourist approach to composition 
applies itself mostly to technical writing, textbooks web pages and graphics, its 
influence -  its philosophy o f reader-orientation and its assumption that the only 
function o f  communication is the transfer o f information -  heavily mirror those 
o f creative writing discourse, within which communication functions have 
become synonymous with the transference o f  information to the exclusion o f  
other possibilities.
Other language functions such as performance, confusion, description, criticism 
(see Newmeyer 2000) therefore become occluded. The iconoclast o f usability 
approaches to web design, Jacob Nielsen, echoes modular approaches to creative 
writing when he writes o f  non-conformist web design that:
Every page that doesn't conform to expected behavior and 
design conventions undermines users' ability to build a 
conceptual model of the web, and thus reduces their ability to 
use other sites with ease, confidence, and pleasure.
(Nielsen 2002)
The recurrence o f  the fixed notions o f ‘ease’ and ‘pleasure’ as somehow cognate 
and interdependent is the same ellipsis which one finds in modular approaches to 
creative writing. This is evident in Marshall’s argument that novel writing 
benefits writer and reader when it proceeds on a step-by-step basis. Information 
models o f all kinds - text usability, information architecture and readerly- 
oriented schema for the presentation o f text - are increasingly prevalent in 
universities programmes and reading lists (such as Fleming 1998; Nielsen 2002; 
Hartley 1994). The very idea o f  avant-gardism or experimentation is prohibited 
in advance by virtue o f  their insistence on adhering to established conventions. 
This approach, in common with those in creative writing discourse, fetishises the 
convention by sacralising it and dehistoricising it (’’it’s how people read”), giving 
rise to a philosophy o f  self-justificatory, circularly-argued conservatism (“so it’s 
what they expect”).
By pointing this out, I seem to be implying that this is necessarily an invidious 
development. This is, o f  course, debatable. Since the stated objective o f  many o f  
these books and courses in creative writing is to facilitate commercial
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publication, it can be argued that it makes sense that advice, such as that given by 
editor Noah Lukeman (Lukeman 2002), about how publishing gatekeepers read 
and evaluate manuscripts for publication assists writers in their task. But this 
depends ultimately on what one regards as the writer’s task. The objection to 
creative writing discourse, the modular approach, which I am sustaining is that it 
does not address this question because it does not accept that it needs to: it knows 
that publication and reader consolation are those objectives. And it suggests that 
publication criteria are somehow machinic and uniform, another predictable, 
ahistorical element in the system o f the novel which operates with natural laws. It 
is because o f  this that the attitude to characterisation which it espouses has the 
effect o f  calling out to the aspiring writer to align his subjectivity and being- 
towards-character to its naturalised conventions. It estimates the novel’s value 
solely on its value as a commodity.7
This atomisation o f the act o f novel writing is coterminous with other 
developments within what might be called the “démocratisation o f  creativity”. 
Models o f  creativity have been a concern for mainstream psychology since the 
1950s (Simonton 1996) and interest in the field has centred around descriptive, 
systemic approaches, exemplified by Newell and Simon’s computational 
modelling o f  creative acts giving rise to the field o f  artificial creativity (Newell 
and Simon 1972; Lansdown 2001; Schank 1981). Attempts in cognitive science 
and artificial intelligence to develop models o f  creativity which are strictly 
deterministic and rule governed mirror the rationalist and positivistic approach to 
creative writing which can be found in the burgeoning number o f  university 
courses, self-help tutorials and guides to writing which have arisen in the past 
twenty years. These factors conspire to present the creative process o f novel 
writing as the outcome o f determinable modular functions.
A fear o f  the automation o f creative acts is unfounded on the basis o f  low level o f  
achievements in this field. But I am not making the point that acts o f  creativity 
should be, or even can be, devoid o f  the application o f rules or rule complexes 
but that, in exhorting aspiring writers to always project a coherent and untroubled 
knowledge o f  another in the process o f characterisation, this discourse validates 
the writers tendency towards unthinkingness, which because he is subject to 
normal social and cognitive influences, are the very tendencies from which he
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should be trying to escape and interrogate. The availability of rules, delivered 
with such strong and admonitory rhetoric, serves to normalise these conventions 
and, in so doing, allows the writer to remain in the comfort of his own 
prematurely closed experience of others.
2.6: D is c o u r s e  a n d  w r it e r -o r ie n t a t io n
The reason aspiring writers might adhere to modularised rules is that it provides 
a model of novel writing which is as writer-oriented as it is reader-oriented. I 
mean that the process of modular characterisation provides a means for the 
author to create and preserve his own sense of a coherent subjectivity (or his 
“consistent self-ideology” as Epstein calls it (Epstein 1970)) as a social self and a 
confident, ‘prototypical’ writer through a mastery of the rules for representing 
others. Modular creative writing encourages the writer to step into the position of 
authority, to assume what Pierre Macherey calls the author’s role as God, which 
already has its own battery of techniques and presuppositions for presenting 
people through comprehensive knowledge of their thoughts and actions 
(Macherey 1977). The danger is that the writer allows himself to ascend to the 
role of the author as constructed in public discourse and proceeds to enact the 
priveleged and inexplicable mastery of others associated with the Author 
function (Foucault 1977). In this, the writer re-experiences a kind of 
Heideggerean ‘thrownness’: his subjectivity has already placed him outside of 
direct contemplation of the object (the character) but he cannot know what the 
nature of his dislocation is and what options, if any, exist outside of the position 
of God into which conventional characterisation techniques place him 
(Heidegger: op cit). Owing to the homoglossic rhetoric of modular creative 
writing, he does not necessarily know that an alternative being-towards-character 
exists.
The writer writes from within a conventional tradition of self-other relations but 
his consideration of this problem is non-transparent and rushes towards 
resolution by the quickest way -  by adopting the conventions which are ready-to-
Q
hand. We can see why this matters so much, if we consider Kundera’s 
comments on the novel’s main epistemological concern:
All novels, of every age, are concerned with the enigma of the
self. As soon as you create an imaginary being, a character, you
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are automatically confronted by the question: what is the self?
How can the self be grasped?
(Kundera 2003: 13)
Modular creative writing proposes an instant problem to this question. It is not an 
investigative response but an effective, closing one. One of the principle reasons 
why the modular method of characterisation is popular is that it permits the 
novelist to function as an author without reflecting on how his knowledge- 
authority is constituted or validated. In other words, it is expedient and 
pragmatic. For a novelist to write without certain knowledge of the essential 
details of others (the safety net of a shared epistemology and ontology of 
otherness) is to flirt with apophasis: to risk having nothing that can be said or 
nothing to say. This would be to subscribe to what Peter Haidu calls the 
“tradition of ineffability with regards to the sublime” (Haidu 1995) or to allow 
the irresolvable epistemological question of what it is like to be another to 
overwhelm and displace the purpose of the novel which is to illustrate and exalt 
these kinds of uncertainties. That is to say that any alternative to the modular 
approach to characterisation treads carefully between the assimilation and 
reproduction of dominant representations of another and a refusal to 
acknowledge otherness as something about which anything can be said.
To see how the writer-self part of this highly particular self-other relationship 
impacts upon the characterisation process, requires a description of the novel as 
an encounter between the writing self and fictive others in which social forms of 
cognition about others is a major force. In this view, at the centre of the novel, 
articulating outwards its representation of action and character, and the 
intersection of the two, is the authorial voice: a self dreaming of others.9
To be able to characterise requires that a novelist makes assumptions about his 
self, and others, and the relationship between the two. In the modular approach 
this assumption is that he has complete knowledge of his own expository 
character (what T.S. Eliot called his ‘writer’s idiom’ (Ricks 1989)) and is 
satisfied at the imaginability and possibility of faithful representation of others 
and that there is a natural and describable transparency of the difference between 
these two positions of being. This presents an image of the novelist as a 
Cartesian subject disinterestedly surveying the objects of his own fictive
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imagination and describing and interpreting their actions. As Heidegger argues, 
this kind of being-alongside-self, in some magical space of contemplation in 
which objects are directly presented to consciousness, is itself the primary myth 
of rationalism (Heidegger 1962). One never gets outside of the symbolic 
structure and system of relations to consider others unblinkered and afresh: one is 
always-already implicated in ways of thinking which owe nothing to the ego and 
to which the self is mostly blind. This is the problem of representation which 
runs all the way through the novel: an epistemological problem which the 
novelist cannot solve by argument or demonstration and which modular 
approaches advise the writer to elide by concatenating the external signifiers of 
people to reveal the character thoughts and desires. And yet, this very problem is 
also the liberating attraction of writing fiction -  knowledge of others can be 
presented without the need for empirical or rational validation.
Given this freedom to ignore this first problem of knowing and to avail of 
stylistic and narrative conventions for representing others without the need for 
explicit accounting of how any such knowledge can finally be authenticated, it 
could be argued that the writer has an obligation to reflect upon what 
assumptions he makes about the coherence and transparency of his own self- 
concept and how it influences him in the task of narrative characterisation. In 
other words, there is benefit, or a different form of pleasure, in reflecting on what 
kinds of tendencies underlie the writer’s way of seeing others and realising them 
as characters in his writing. In order to consider what this benefit might be -  and 
how it can be labelled as such - 1 would like to examine the effect of the writer’s 
self-concept on his tendency to accept conventions for representation, bridge the 
epistemological divide between self and other and bring certainty and premature 
closure to the task of characterisation.
2.6 .1: T h e  E f f e c t  o f  t h e  W r it e r ’s S e l f -C o n c e p t  o n  C h a r a c t e r is a t io n
The writer works as a self, partly constituted in language and symbolic exchange
with others. His concept of self, being dependent in this way on others, is always 
at stake when he writes or thinks of others, and in ways of which he is not 
necessarily conscious. In this way, his theory of mind about others, about how 
they can be represented or understood, inflects his approach to characterisation in 
that some characters are implicitly identified with aspects of self, and some with
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aspects of the self s other. For this reason, a model of how the self is socially 
constituted can help to sketch what is at stake when a self begins to essentialise 
the nature of others in fictional writing.
In The Self Concept, Victor Gecas refers to the self as: “a reflexive phenomenon 
which develops in social interaction and is based on the social character of 
human language” (Gecas 1982:1). Two prevailing theoretical strands in the study 
of the self-concept dominate 20th century psychology -  the social 
constructionism of James (1950) and Mead (1946) such as this and the 
cognitivist approach. Broadly, their differences centre on the importance of 
social interaction to which James and Mead refer: whether identity is something 
which can exist in isolation from the cultural codes by which it is rendered 
intelligible. That is, whether identity is bounded from the world (internal, 
dualistic) or whether it comes into being only through interaction with the world 
(reflexive, adualistic) and, if so, what is involved in this process (see Gergen 
1985; Harre 1979). The relevance of these models to the novelist is this: 
cognitivism suggests that the writer and his characters are individuated and 
integrated objects and so the writer, in describing another, is not affected by his 
need to differentiate himself from, or identify with, what he describes. He can 
therefore be said to describe authentically in that he is capable of penetrating the 
other’s mind and describing its contents. This is part of the supporting set of 
myths which circulate within modular creative writing discourse:
Of course you should and must look into your character's head 
and heart. And some of your insights must be given to your 
reader, so she can know about the character, sympathise with 
the character.
(Bickham 1997:15)
The idea that you can look into your character’s head and heart, or penetrate 
them as Frey puts it (Frey 2000:10) is alluring but it could also legitimately be 
called infantile in the sense that it is a theory of mind the like of which children 
maintain during developmental stages. In this way of knowing, other people are 
diaphanous objects who/which contain emotions and thoughts which are clearly 
visible to the God-author. Dana Brand discusses this problem of omniscience in 
reference to the role of the flaneur and the detective in fiction:
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The flaneur demonstrates what the reader would like to believe 
but does not, that the urban crowd can be epistemologically and 
imaginatively mastered.
(Brand 1990: 220)
Epistemological mastery of others is the basic assumption of modular 
characterisation and is supported by a magical version of the cognitivist view of 
selfhood. The social interactionism approach champions the view that identity is 
constructed in encounters and by the continuous exchange of information 
between self and other -  an ongoing co-construction of identity in which roles 
are assigned, disputed and competed over. The outcome of this approach, and its 
popularity in non-positivist traditions within the social sciences and humanities, 
is in exposing the fluidity of self-identity and its anchoring in social life. It has 
given rise to radical theses of selfness which confront and dismiss folk 
psychological models about the immanent and durable soul-like self which 
accompanies an individual through all phases of being. The persistent myth of 
the eternal self is something which modular discourse advances and, against 
which a novelist who wishes to reconsider the nature of self-other relations in 
fiction should work. This can be achieved by bringing a reader into conflict with 
their own essentialised views about the identity of others drawing attention to 
what Heidegger calls a projection of being-towards-self onto being-towards-an- 
Other (Heidegger 1956). The logical extension of this secularisation of selfhood 
and the questioning of the sovereignty of the rational and immanent ego are 
hinted at in Daniel Dennett’s notion of the self-concept as the outcome of 
ongoing experimentation with fictive selves (Dennett 1989), Goffman’s stages 
and roles analogy (Goffman 1959) and Gecas’s summary of Epstein’s theory of 
the self-concept. These suggest, however, that the fluidity of the self-concept is 
always frozen during representation, either expressed or internally formed, of self 
and others:
Epstein suggests that the self-concept can best be viewed as a 
theory that a person holds about himself as an experiencing, 
functioning being in interaction with the world. He would have 
been accurate if he had conceptualised the self-concept as a 
self-ideology -  when it comes to our self-concepts, we are much
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less interested in theory testing than in self-affirmation and self­
protection.
(Gecas 1982: 4)
Most twentieth century views of the self-concept adhere to the view that the task 
of the self-concept is the maintenance of a positive sense of identity; the ego sees 
the world in such a way as to assign the self to categories with positive values 
within the culture in which the individual is embedded. Coherent 
characterisation of self through action and appearance (the public self which is 
validated and defined in concert with others) and the need for positive self­
esteem override the drives for self-enquiry or hypothesis testing and result in the 
exclusion or facile resolution of uncertainty within the self-concept and, 
resultantly, the self s view of others. The self-narrative is not one of enquiry but 
one of affirmation. The self-concept, thus viewed, is a major force in projecting 
meaning onto the world and closing off routes to other interpretations. Cognition 
about other people (characters) plays a major part in these processes. It is also the 
case that in order to affirm its worth, the self disguises its projections and 
methods of judgement, and explains away contradictions in its reasoning as 
properties of the world outside the self. It is these contradictions, which are 
themselves illuminating and the object of critical enquiry, which modular 
discourse disposes of in its question for narrative cohesion.
As argued, this rush to closure and certainty in judgement about people obtains in 
aspects of storytelling. The main tendencies of the self-concept which are to 
relevant to the writer’s task of characterisation could be summarised as follows:
■ The novelist-self s denial of its own mutability and the role of contingent 
factors in the creation and maintenance of the self-concept;
■ The will to differentiate the writing self from others -  to identify the self 
positively by comparison with a negative reference group;
■ Conceptualisation of others is more influenced by the need for positive self- 
image than for an understanding of the nature of otherness.
What these traits can result in, for the novelist, is an approach to characterisation 
which has at its objective the affirmation and maintenance of his authorial self 
across time and narrative at the expense of an investigation of possible
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techniques for the presentation of otherness. In order to maintain a positive and 
coherent self-image as a writer and social being, the writer may tend to assume a 
masterful position in relation to others. They also describe how the features of 
the self-narrative influence ways of incorporating others into a narrative-based 
theory about the world. How one needs to view the self imposes restrictions on 
how one views others. It provides a way of thinking about how the speaking 
subject, the novelist or his narrator in this case, fabulates itself out of the material 
it has to hand (social codes, cultural artefacts, myth, other people) and shows the 
role of narrative which facilitates this through sustaining the appearance of a 
coherent identity and, more importantly, how such narratives invariably involve 
other people from whom the speaking self is differentiated or with whom 
identified. The novel’s characters and imagined reader become instruments with 
which the narrative centre can make itself and the world cohere in some fixed 
relation.
In the The Writing o f Fiction, Theodor Goodman describes what I think of as the 
novelist’s principal responsibility to others, given the unfettered freedom he has 
for creating experimental selves:
It is only when, in ignorance or wilfulness, we attempt to clamp 
the type about some unique individual, that the truth and the 
reality vanish, leaving nothing but the narrow, the suspect utility 
of superstition or prejudice. Whatever the determination of the 
type, some degree of fashioning has entered into it; any shrewd 
sceptic can prove the manipulation by pointing out the 
fingerprints of our disregarded mental handling.
(Goodman 1961:118)
According to the model of the self-concept which places the drive-for-coherence 
at its centre, and the essentialising of other people as a constituent of this, our 
disregarded mental handling is a prevailing trend. It is what happens when the 
writer does not intervene or does not know how to recognise his epistemology of 
otherness as just that: nonexperiments in understanding other subjectivities. If the 
author does not regard his characters as people (however provisional their 
peopleness might be), and have some idea that representing people is not a matter 
of relating what everyone knows, then the novel becomes nothing but a vehicle
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for the recapitulation of known things and a vision of the universe as a 
deterministic experiment involving the conflicting and rationalistic actions of 
different types of being. Alternative epistemologies of otherness in which the 
assumptions no longer apply, or are tested, can be developed if the rationalism 
which quietly occupies the centre of modular discourse is put under stress.
2.7: C o n c l u s io n
In presenting a model of how readers decode character and, from it form an 
impression of the character as a coherent self and stable member of particular 
social categories, it was argued that modular creative writing advice was 
designed to synchronise with the reader’s inferential schemata, and re-enforce 
their anticipation of character traits through effective design in each of the 
componential parts of character. Name, function, sociological categories, traits 
and objective are aligned so as to reflect the essential quality of the character and 
in turn to allow the reader to feel comfortable in her expectations of peoples 
actions, attributes and fixed membership of particular classes. Essentialist 
reasoning which often inflects our attitude to social categories, and which it is the 
novel’s job to challenge, is the unacknowledged presence in this discourse. The 
manifestation of this model of representing otherness is apparent in injunctions
Harmonise all facets of character traits to each other by firstly deciding on the 
character’s membership of ontological, sociological and psychological 
categories; name, gender, age and behavioural mannerisms can then re-enforce, 
or only slightly amend the idea that the character is a prototype of these 
categories.
Explain character in a causal way by the presence of a trait and a threat. A 
character cannot behave below the threshold of their established capability -  that 
is they are always rational and always function at the limit of that rationality.
I argued that writers need to understand their own writerly and evaluative 
tendencies in order to understand how their own subjectivity is interpellated 
within such advice and their consideration of self-other relations aborted. The 
assuredness of tone with which creative writing discourse proceeds tends to 
dampen reflectiveness as it explains deviation from its rules as failure (by which 
it is understood that the only form of failure is commercial failure).
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The discovery of opposing and alternative epistemologies of otherness is part of 
the novels’ brief. The next chapter looks at ways of reflecting on the possibility 
of the self s understanding of otherness to develop a characterisation technique 
which thwarts the reader’s inferential process, not just by making inferences 
result in slowed-down or imperfect recognition, but by expressing subjectivity in 
a way in which the elements of recognition are themselves troubled and another 
more radical epistemology of otherness is promoted. The conventions of modular 
creative writing discourse insist on re-affirming the familiar and affording the 
reader maximal orientation with regards to character, genre and the world of the 
novel. And so the approach which I am seeking will involve estranging the 
reader from the familiar and producing misrecognition where recognition usually 
triumphs -  the uncanny.
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C h a p t e r  2 N o t e s
1 There are, of course, definitions of character. According to Theodor Goodman, a 
character is an agent, who per force of this description, carries out some actions in the 
world of the novel; who does things necessary to enhance the authenticity of the fictive 
Illusion and who embodies certain values which are reflective of the novel’s world 
(Goodman 1961:109). According to Goodman, a lead character often metonymically 
represents the world of which he is a part, either through his attitude to it or fate in it or, 
in the case of allegory and historical fiction, as an embodiment of its qualities. Character 
can thus be a synecdoche, or a subordinate type, of the novelworld.
This formula, and that of David Lodge, are useful and, yet, they ignore a problematic 
aspect of representing the human in text: the relationship between the character and his 
world is a dialectical one and depends largely on other features of the novel, such as the 
narrative events which permit the character to become defined (to emerge as 
characterful) are more reflective of that world -  or the insistence on an economic, 
profluent narrative - than his responses to it. The character lacks choice in this most 
important of features. In most conventional fiction, characters do not choose the 
circumstances which enable them to discover and display the type of character they are. 
Instead, the character’s propensity to act in recognisable ways (their traits) are triggered 
by the situations in which they find themselves (threats and quests).
2 Of course, it is not the task of a critical discipline to issue a univocal opinion on these 
matters. This absence of consensus is what marks the academic discourse apart from 
the commercially-oriented one and is arguably its greatest virtue in this regard.
3 In the case of fiction this contextual information would include knowledge about the 
rules of the genre in which the action takes place.
4 For more information, and titles, about Jack M. Bickham, see 
http://title3.sde.state.ok.us/literatureanda/jack.htm
5 An important set of question arise from this: who or what is this imaginary reader and 
what are the writer’s obligations to her? Do they exceed the writer’s other obligations to 
himself or his community or to the tradition of the novel (amongst other conceivable 
‘obligations’)? Do these questions even obtain when novel-writing is regarded as a 
process which, when successfully executed, results only in a consumable object?
6 Marshall’s 17 sub-modules are: Character type; Connection to lead; Story Goal; 
Gender; Age; Appearance; Mannerisms; Distinctive Speech patterns; Personality; 
Background; Personal life; Private life; Work life; Strength; Weakness; Name. (Marshall 
2000: 28-29)
7 This invokes larger debates about the role of the novel as a tool of criticism or 
opposition within a culture, the possibility of subversive or counter-hegemonic 
characterisation, and whether these objections are simply satellites circulating around 
the romantic myth of creativity. I have tried to develop some aspects of this argument in 
the introduction. I hold only to one view in this matter: that homoglossia, in any 
discourse, but particularly in on which is concerned with creative behaviour and is so 
assured in its tone, is unhelpful in that it symbolically annihilates and tends to invalidate 
approaches which do not share its convictions. Which is often the way with rhetorical 
systems. The point with this discourse is that it normalises the idea of standard and 
success in characterisation through an equation with publication and reward. Popularity 
is not used as a yardstick to measure the validity of a methodology in most discourse 
strands.
8 It can also be argued that formalist and structuralist narrative schemas (Volosinov, 
1931; Propp, 1930; Todorow, 1990) re-enforce this way of approaching characterisation
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in which the representation of others is largely pre-determ in ed by the requirements of 
the co-emergent narrative form.
9 The concept of fiction as a dream is a comment on both its self-labelled illusory nature 
and on its origins in unconscious creative thinking founded on associations dredged up 
from the subconscious without the intervention of the author. This is a highly 
romanticised idea which harks back to antique ideas of the creative muse and would 
seem to be inconsistent with a model which proposes that a writer should know his own 
idiom, to quote Eliot, or explicitate why it is that he has chosen to represent aspects of 
existence in a certain way. However, the analogy still seems to be the best available as 
it alludes to the central problem of mediating a personal vision to an audience of others: 
that of inviting these others to see what the author has seen although the author knows 
that the image is ephemeral or cannot fully grasp the reasons for his enthralment with it. 
Writing fiction is, in this way, the private investigation of unreal encounters which 
connive at saying something authentic to others about those aspects of existence which 
are shared and therefore real.
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The Grammar of the 
Uncanny
C h a p te r  T h ree :  T h e  G r a m m a r  of T h e  U n ca n n y
3: T h e  G r a m m a r  o f  t h e  U n c a n n y
The previous chapter presented the dominant approach to characterisation 
espoused in creative writing discourse. It was argued that this approach 
naturalised a rationalist epistemology of self-other relations for the purposes of 
characterisation and that the vehemence of its advice is at odds with the critical 
and exploratory function of the novel in such matters. This chapter examines 
alternatives to the modularised approach to characterisation through an analysis 
of techniques for achieving uncanny effects and reader hesitation in fiction. In 
this connection, it presents and discusses the Freudian concept of the uncanny 
(Jentsch 1906; Freud 1919; Schelling 1936; Todorow 1989; Kearney 2002); the 
poststructuralist concepts of the sublime and the abject (Lyotard 1995; Kristeva 
1982; Heidegger 1997) models of categorical thinking advanced by cognitive 
science (Lakoff 1990; Rosch 1975; Wittgenstein 1958; Haslam and Rothschild
1999) and research from various areas in psychology and neuroscience into 
chaotic self-other relations (Ramachandran 2000; Zimbardo 2000; Milgram 
1970; Dejode et al. 2000). Its relationship to ontological paradoxes is also 
explored. It discerns in these concepts a basis for the design of patterns or rules 
of categorial and linguistic transformation which produce the effects of hesitation 
and estrangement associated with aspects of the uncanny in literary fiction. It 
provides examples from the trilogies of Beckett and Auster and Monsters Worse 
to Come and outlines provisional directions for an aesthetic of the uncanny 
relevant to the novelist's task of characterisation which will be developed in 
subsequent chapters.
Is In tr o d uc tio n
There is no doubt that one sometimes meets with strangers who 
are not entire strangers, through their having played a part in 
certain cerebral reels.
(Beckett 1997 (Molloy): 112)
In the previous chapter, I presented the argument that modularised approaches to 
characterisation in creative writing discourse promote an understanding of the 
novel as fundamentally concerned with maximising the reader’s familiarity, 
comfort and ability to recognise discreet and different elements within the
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rational, fictive world. This can be labelled an orientational aesthetic. It was 
suggested that it has the effect of reproducing the same type of subjectivities in 
terms of reader positions and reader identification with characters. Not only is 
this particular type of prescriptivism and repetition anathema to the subversive or 
critical functions of the novel, but it serves to validate particular modes of 
perception and uses of language which, in their singularity of expression, 
discursive cohesion and systematicity of reproduction, endorse the idea of 
hegemonic and dominant discourse practices. In this way, it denies space within 
the discourse for the articulation of alternative views of the self and its many 
possibilities, particularly in the self s relationship to Others. To summarise: the 
rational ‘modular’ method is both flattering to the reader, in that it allows her to 
feel competent in her decoding strategy for recognising the essential nature of 
others, and consoling in that it re-enforces her view of the limited, essentialised 
nature and knowability of others.
These criticisms presuppose the existence of an alternative approach which is 
unburdened by these problems and which has the potential to enable a writer to 
arrive at a more ‘authentic’ approach to the representation of others. The 
question therefore arises as to what such an alternative might be, what qualities it 
might possess to distinguish it from the rational-modular and how its claim — if 
there is such a claim — to greater authenticity might be supported. It also 
provokes the question as to whether belief in such a method, one which 
‘transcends’ the modular approach, is simply the expression of a desire for the 
novel to be a utopian place of aesthetic innovation, radical dissent and social 
criticism or alternatively, and perhaps worse, an affirmation of writerly 
indulgence and irrationalism in which the relativism of some postmodern 
approaches to literature are adopted wholesale to permit the writer to refuse to 
engage with the reader’s expectations because no particular decoding strategy 
can ever be affirmed as ‘the right one’.
I am proposing an approach to characterisation which has no claim to greater 
authenticity but has a particular and separate function, its main objective 
corresponding to the previously declared doctrine that the novel should exalt the 
wisdom of uncertainty. The first principle of this approach is the production of a 
controlled uncertainty within the reader’s mind about the act of decoding the
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character. Such an approach aims to cause hesitancy and to arrest the easy 
recognition and projected knowledge of others. To begin with, this approach 
might take a number of forms. It might foreground the relationship between 
author and character to emphasise or acknowledge the often repressed fact of the 
latter’s provisional and subjective authority. In doing this, it would signal to the 
reader that the representation of character is tentative and its claims to complete 
knowledge of this other are open to doubt.1 We find such an admission in 
Auster’s Ghosts in which the detective Blue is paid to carry out surveillance on a 
man named Black whose actions seem to him to have no discernible meaning:
The only way for Blue to have a sense of what is happening is to 
be inside Black’s mind, to see what he is thinking, and that of 
course is impossible.
(Ghosts : 139)
“Of course” it is, but the inability of the narrator -  or the detective - to transcend 
the self-other divide is quite frequently ignored in fictional narratives. Modular 
approaches advise that the head and heart of the character be exposed at key 
times to explain to the reader the rationality of the character’s behaviour in given 
situations. Suppressing the awareness that knowledge claims which seek to 
explain the internal state of another are magical, implausible, totalising and 
inexplicable, is typically part of a reader’s schema for dealing with narrative. The 
real limitations of intersubjectivity are repressed in favour of the pleasures of the 
symbolic code. Advertising the inability of a character or narrator to use 
transcendent reasoning brings this repressed fact back into focus.
An uncanny approach might also use modular techniques for characterisation 
conversely, or perversely, for the purposes of creating disquieting estrangement 
for the reader: estrangement firstly from the character and secondly from the 
process by which the assumed knowledge of others is typically claimed or, in 
other words, from the process of characterisation. This would take the form of 
providing copious information about a character which triggers inferential 
schemata and then disrupting the cohesion of the inferred attributes by 
announcing that the character belongs to a race, gender or species which is not 
part of the provided implicature.
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It might even reveal its own machinations, a la John Barth in Lost in the 
Funhouse (Barth 1962), and comment on the nature of character-as-construct at 
the same time as it invites the reader to know and identify with or against that 
character. The tension between demonstrating the levers which animate the 
character (or create the impression of the character in the reader’s mind) and the 
desire to reject an epistemology which holds that person and character (object 
and sign) are properly connected is apparent in this approach. But, for me, it does 
not have the appeal of the desired function of ‘exalting uncertainty’ because in 
foregrounding the character-as-construct, it produces no profound doubt or 
slippage. There is the exposure of the mechanics of storytelling but, with this 
ardent framebreaking, no hesitation is likely to arise for the reader about the 
essential nature of the encountered character. The clear distinction between self 
and other, and between all other types of others which is the foundation of 
modular approaches to characterisation, is not troubled by this approach. 
Although we can be enthralled by the mastery which invites us to empathise with 
‘someone’ whom we are told exists nowhere but on the page and in our mind, we 
are not left in doubt about their ontic status. It is in this arena that reader 
uncertainty is most profound.
The same accusation can be leveled at Joseph Heller’s ‘frame-breaking’ in Good 
as Gold:
Once again Gold found himself preparing to lunch with someone - 
Spotty Weinrock - and the thought arose that he was spending an 
awful lot of time in this book eating and talking. There was not 
much else to be done with him. I was putting him into bed a lot 
with Andrea and keeping his wife conveniently in the background 
... Certainly he would soon meet a schoolteacher with four 
children with whom he would fall madly in love, and I would 
shortly hold out to him the tantalising promise of becoming the 
country's first Jewish Secretary of State, a promise I did not 
intend to keep.
(Heller 1983:321)
David Lodge writes of this passage that “two simple words have a powerful 
shock effect, because they have been hitherto suppressed in the narrative
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discourse in the interests of mimesis: they are T  ( referring to the novelist 
himself) and ‘book’ (referring to the novel)” (Lodge 1990b:43). The shock, 
however, is one of reorientation and not disorientation: as soon as it breaks frame 
and tells the reader that there is an intrusion from one ontological plane (reality) 
into another (fiction), it diminishes its own power for irresolvable uncanny 
estrangement. By naming the features of the new ontic plane (the writer and the 
book) it ceases to cause hesitation.2
Illustrating the problems of representing otherness in this way is a possibility 
which depends ultimately on the writer approaching the task of characterisation 
with the tools of estrangement: of causing the reader to question their familiarity 
with the characterisation process by methods of which the reader is not 
conscious. The postmodern and postructuralists concepts of the sublime and the 
abject (Kant 1973; Zizek 1973; Baudrillard 1983, Kristeva 1982; Butler 1993), 
with their emphasis on the disruptive potential of the sign within subject-object 
relations, are useful concepts in this regard. However, the exaltation of 
uncertainty, as an aesthetic tradition, is most usefully developed with the concept 
of the uncanny, or das Unheimlich: the sensation arising from experiences in 
which the familiar returns in an unfamiliar guise. In the next sections, I will 
examine this concept of the uncanny, and the cognate concept of categorial 
confusion the better to formulate their potential application to novel 
characterisation.
3.2: T h e  C o n c e p t  o f  t h e  U n c a n n y
Yes it sometimes happens and will sometimes happen that I
forget who I am and strut before my eyes like a stranger.
(Molloy: 42)
The uncanny or unheimlich can be defined as an experience of disquieting 
estrangement from something which has previously been familiar and consoling.
'X • •In the most dramatic cases the ‘something5 from which the dissociation occurs 
is the self -  such as a person failing to recognise their own likeness and 
interpreting the estranged image as the presence of another, as in the above quote 
from Beckett. The uncanny first came to the province of psychoanalysis through 
Jentsch’s Zur Psychologie das Unheimlichen (Jentsch 1906). Jentsch equated the 
uncanny sensation with the production of intellectual uncertainty or
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disorientation about the real nature of encountered objects: a definition which 
Freud later interrogated within a reading of Hoffmann's The Sandman (Hoffman 
1817; Freud 1919). For Jentsch, Hoffman's story creates an uncanny reaction for 
the reader because of the revelation that Olympia, the object of Nathaniel’s 
desire, is a human-engineered automaton, machinic and bereft of human quality 
-  what Marie-Helene Huet calls ‘a monster of illegitimate fantasy’ (Huet 1983). 
In this case, the uncanny reaction originates in the disorientation which ensues 
when the previously familiar and integrated idea of the animate is problematised 
by the addition of elements which are anathema to it. The divinely authored, 
natural human body is profanely denaturalised. For Freud, the uncanny reaction 
to Hoffmann’s story centres more on the primal fear of loss which is generated 
by the tale of the Sandman's plucking eyes from sleeping children, an allegory, 
he argued, for the castration complex. Freud queries Jentsch’s suggestion that the 
uncanny arises from our doubts about the authenticity of Nathaniel’s testimony -  
since the account inclines towards the rational, and implicates Nathaniel in that 
rationality, there is no hesitation about who, or which interpretation, to believe:
There is no question ... of any intellectual uncertainty here: we 
know that we are not supposed to be looking on at the products 
of a madman's imagination, behind which we, with the superiority 
of rational minds, are able to detect the sober truth; and yet this 
knowledge does not lessen the impression of uncanniness in the 
least degree. The theory of intellectual uncertainty is thus 
incapable of explaining that impression.
(Freud 1906: 333)
Freud posited two origins for the uncanny sensation (1) broad psychosexual and 
infantile anxieties such as fears of castration and loss of identity-coherence; (2) 
the return of prerational or primitive thoughts, typical of developmental stages in 
thinking, such as animism and adualism. Within the ensuing discourse about the 
uncanny, many other ideas about its qualities have emerged which have 
expanded these twin concepts. Schelling wrote that "everything is unheimlich 
that ought to have remained hidden and yet comes to light" (Schelling 1936) 
which suggests that the uncanny is synonymous with the return of the repressed: 
that which is occluded from official and public discourses, and from the ego’s
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projection of ordered reality and its own integrity, reveals itself once more in 
clandestine, indirect ways and causes the experiencing subject to mistrust his 
intuition or doubt the authenticity of the nominally real. Freud suggests that at 
the heart of the semantic field from which the original German term is derived 
(unheimlich=unhomQ\y, unfamiliar) is the kernel of this irresolvable strangeness 
and also its doubledness because heimlich and unheimlich, as well as being 
antonyms are also synonyms in German. And so the return of the thoroughly 
familiar (self) as the irreducibly strange (other) is due to their essential 
relatedness, or what Terry Castle calls their embodiment in each other (Castle
2000). This equates the uncanny with other psychoanalytical concepts, 
particularly that of jamais vu: the feeling that an old and familiar object is being 
perceived for the first time (Findler 1994). Auster’s Quinn, in another encounter 
with his mirrored self, experiences this feeling:
Now, as he looked at himself, in the shop mirror, he was neither 
shocked nor disappointed. He had no feeling about it at all, for 
the fact was he did not recognise the person there as himself.
(City o f Glass'. 119)
The uncanny has been discussed at length in the context of its manifestation or 
effect in literary fiction, usually within the genre of the fantastic and macabre, 
and as a spectre within the philosophy of doubt. Amongst others, the works of 
Poe (Madden 1993; Wuletich-Brinberg 1988), Hawthorne (Vanon-Alliata 2000; 
Newlin 1968), Descartes (MacCallam 2003), Kierkegaard (Rumble 1998), 
Dickens (Schiffmann 2001; Dillon 1996; Racadio 1992; Daleski 1984), Kafka, 
(Peucker 2001; Harman 2002) and Nabokov (Rowe 1974) have been subjected to 
particular attention. The accent on 19th century fiction from speculative, gothic 
and broadly romantic genres is indicative, in some ways, of how academia 
regards the uncanny: as something not so numinous that it can’t be perfunctorily 
categorised as an attribute of a strict set of sub-genres. This has given rise, it 
seems, to a particular taxonomy of uncanny fiction in which the appearance of 
doubles, or doppelgangers, misbehaving mirrors, phantasmic selves, automata 
and magic transformations in an otherwise non-magical context are regarded as 
the main stimulants to feelings of existential dread (Royle 2003).
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But these are first principles, surface identifiers of the way in which the uncanny 
is understood to express itself. The grammar of uncanny production and the 
possibility of reconfiguring the way it is expressed proceeds from interrogating 
the deep structure of this process: examining the reasons for the manifestations of 
these objects in the production of the effect. The prevailing feature of ‘the 
double’ or split identity hints at the core fascinations of uncanny literature such 
as psychic disturbance (Dostoevsky’s The Double 1985(1866)), repressed 
narcissism (Nabokov’s Despair 1966)), and incoherent subjectivity (Palahniuk’s 
Fight Club 1990)). These types of uncanniness, however, share a broader 
aetiology in that the projection or apperception of a second self, or a 
misrecognition of self-as-other, is not limited to exotic and classifiable forms of 
psychoses but is rather a possibility which is both irresolvably linked to 
developmental, conceptual thinking and manifests itself in oblique ways in 
normative reasoning.4 The strength of the uncanny effect is not linked to our 
feelings of horror at the state of another who can, after all, easily be classified as 
mad and therefore non-normative (completely other), but at the unrequested 
return to us, as readers, of a way of thinking and perceiving which has been 
repressed, abjected by the rational reading self as a primitive, magical or pre- 
rational mode of thought.
These terms carry pejorative connotations, as though they imply that the 
uncanny, as a focus for analysis or an aesthetic in itself, is feverishly irrational -  
a reversion to premodemism or an anti-enlightenment project. The 
counterargument, offered by Monleon (Monleon 1990), amongst others, is that 
the uncanny and the fantastic are legitimated objects of analysis precisely 
because of their ability to usher in and provoke non-dominant readings of texts, 
and permit the inscription of minority, critical and subversive viewpoints which 
challenge the dominant symbolic order by demonstrating its contingency and by 
establishing the symbiotic relationship between the rational and its own Other. 
The category of ‘the rational’ is loosely and discursively bounded from the 
irrational so as to protect its own integrity. As Foucault argues, the irrational is a 
construct which serves to legitimate scientific mastery of others by 
counterdefining what is progressive, normative and acceptable (Foucault 1977).
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The production of reader disorientation associated with the uncanny stems partly 
from the revelation that thoughts which were dismissed as irrational are 
discovered to have equivalent explanatory power as rational inferences in 
reading. It is in the undecidable area between the two categories that the 
principles of an uncanny narrative can be found.
3.2.1: R ules  of  the  F an ta stic  U ncanny  N a r r a tiv e
The inter-relatedness of the rational and irrational is remarked on in Todorow’s 
discussion of the ‘rules’ for the production of the fantastic narrative in which the 
uncanny is argued to function only when it counterpoints an irrational 
epistemology with the dominant encoding or rationalist mode of representation 
(Todorow 1980). Todorow’s three rules of the fantastic can be summarised as 
follows:
(1) The fantastic involves a hesitation between two alternative explanations for a 
phenomenon, one of which is rational, that is consistent with ideas about how the 
world works, how the self works, the laws of nature and separateness of the 
physical and spiritual worlds; the other which is suprarational or irrational in that 
it requires the reader to concede that their received ideas of the world are 
mistaken and that, as Paul Auster has written in all of his novels, ‘anything is 
possible’. Neither of these explanations are satisfactory or conclusive in that the 
narrative, often a first person account, does not force a hermeneutic closure in 
favour of either account but arrests its speculations within the moment of 
hesitation.
(2) The identification of the reader with the character who experiences the 
uncanny sensation must be close to that of the naive reader: that is the reader’s 
response to the strange event is prefigured and inscribed within that of the 
protagonist so that the protagonist’s hesitation corresponds with, or provokes, the 
readers;
(3) The reader is placed in a context or narrative frame where the phenomenon 
which gives rise to the uncanny sensation is not simply part of the established 
conventions of the genre but which stands apart as inexplicable in the logic of the 
narrative world in which it is to be found. For example, in futuristic science- 
fiction, the prospect of artificially intelligent objects does not in itself have the
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same uncanny effect as such apparitions would in a contemporary social realist 
text. The supra-rational must draw attention to itself as unpermitted within the 
implicit laws of the text’s genre.
In City o f Glass, Paul Auster offers an example of the uncanny when writing of 
Quinn’s vigil at Grand Central Station, waiting for the arrival of Peter Stillman 
Sr. who he hopes to recognise from an old photograph. He sees an old man 
fitting the description and decides to pursue him, confident that this is Stillman. 
But then:
Directly behind Stillman, heaving into view just inches behind his 
right shoulder, another man stopped, took a lighter out of his 
pocket. His face was the exact twin of Stillman’s. (Quinn now 
realised that) whatever choice he made - and he had to make a 
choice - would be arbitrary, a submission to chance. Uncertainty 
would haunt him to the end.
(City o f Glass: 55-56)
The process of recognition always contains the possibility of misrecognition. 
This is the fantastic-uncanny in operation within the rational genre of detective 
fiction. The assumed certainty of recognition and distinction -  of being able to 
differentiate between one person and another -  which is the first principle of any 
investigation of, or encounter with another, is shown to fall within the realm of 
doubt. Uncertainty is inescapable, just as singularity is unattainable: everything is 
doubled. It thereby becomes reasonable to doubt everything and the narrator, 
with his warnings about uncertainty, does not offer us any help in identifying the 
‘real’ Stillman to ourselves. The reader cannot escape from Quinn’s uncertainty 
because we know no more than he does. There is therefore no ‘real’ Stillman. All 
that is ‘real’ is the sense of disorder.
This is another key feature of the uncanny which is also a key feature of 
characterisation in novels: that of recognition. In the context of creative writing 
discourse, recognition involves harnessing heuristics for enhancing the 
memorability of characters which means that they are always-already easily 
recognised. The modular constraints on character creation result in a branded 
entity who cannot be unfamiliar because the inferences to which her qualities 
give rise are designed to complement each other in distinguishing her from all
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the other characters in the novel’s world. Therefore many of the effects of 
uncanniness are also always-already lost. Recognition works differently in 
uncanny approaches to characterisation. The uncanny effect is at the same time a 
process of recognition and one of misrecognition of some clandestine aspect of 
self. It is recognition in that it recovers repressed ’knowledge' or ‘psychic 
material’ about the self which in turn prepares the experiencer for what 
Heidegger calls a more authentic way-of-being in the world (Heidegger 1997), 
one which acknowledges how the self has only come into being through its own 
ideology or drive-to-coherence. The process of distinction between individuals is 
not between natural and unique kinds but moves along a vague and fuzzily 
categorized continuum which always has the potential for causing confusion. 
Blue, in Auster’s Ghosts, foreshadows his own identity confusion when he meets 
his client Black. The narrator tells us that:
He finds Black’s face pleasant enough with nothing to distinguish
it from a thousand other faces one sees everyday.
(Ghosts: 139)
The uniqueness of the other cannot be discerned and a little bit of disorder begins 
to appear in Blue’s epistemology of otherness. Heidegger’s ‘authentic living’ 
involves a being-towards-death which accepts the sovereignty of the Real over 
the symbolic, the prevalence of disorder. The uncanny is misrecognition in that 
what is brought to light is not part of the well established self-narrative and 
therefore any attempt to explain it within the parameters of these narratives 
automatically traduces it and deprives it of its power. This is how the uncanny 
gains its effect in characterisation: reader ‘recognition’ proceeds from the 
effective design of the character but must, perforce, hesitate between recognition 
and misrecognition of the character if that method of decoding no longer yields 
the expected result.
3.3: M is r e c o g n it io n
The uncanny effect in characterisation can perhaps be most clearly illustrated 
with an extreme example of a ‘real life’ example in which the properties of 
distinction between people and coherence of self- and other-identity are less 
stable. The neurologist VS Ramachandran recounts the case of a 15-year-old boy 
named DS who suffered a minor head trauma during a car accident
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(Ramachandran 1990). He subsequently fell prey to delusions associated with 
Capgras Syndrome. This is not cited by Ramachandran or other researchers in 
the field as an instance of the uncanny but bears all the hallmarks of the effect. 
Because of his minor brain damage -  which resulted in no loss of intellectual or 
motor functions -  DS began to believe that his parents were impostors -  identical 
replacements for whom his real parents had been substituted for reasons which 
he admitted were unknown to him. This ‘doubledness’, in which the very 
familiar reappears as strange, is an archetypal feature of the uncanny.
The neurological features of the case are instructive.5 DS had experienced very 
minor damage to a part of the limbic system called the amygdala, which is 
responsible for lending emotional tone and context to communication and 
information processing. In general terms, memory of faces works in the 
following way: when we see someone we recognise, as well as visually 
processing their features and unconsciously comparing them with extant 
memories of how that person looks and sounds, we unconsciously make an 
embodied response, that is we physically respond to the person-stimulus and, in 
fact, our body’s temperature rises very slightly (Keane et al. 2002). The 
precognitive body ‘recognises’ the person first and the rational conclusion based 
upon the evidence of perception — that this a person we know— follows from that 
first impulse. When the ability to make that response is weakened, the rational 
conclusion is aborted, troubled and puts the suffering subject into a position of 
hesitation between two unlikely but necessary choices as to how what impression 
to form of the encountered person.
Let us re-imagine the experience of DS as a narrative in which he plays both the 
role of a character and the implied naïve reader confronting a confusing text in 
sympathy with the character. His first unconscious response to the change in his 
way of relating to his parents is to conclude that they are otherworldly fakes, 
inauthentic parents. They sound, behave and look like his parents. They care for 
him, love him, communicate with him just as his parents had done. They possess 
all of the things his parents possessed (all the same identity markers), have the 
same memories but he cannot accept that they are his parents because his 
unconscious, embodied perception of them has changed. Something which is
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beyond language -  precognitive in that it is an emotional response - has 
overpowered the judgements of his rational side.
Having resigned himself to living with these very caring and sympathetic frauds, 
he begins to re-examine the logic which has lead him to conclude that they are 
fake and, in time and because of their kindness and parentlike behaviour, he 
vacillates between this first interpretation and the only other one which is 
available to him. This second, equally rational in its own way but increasingly 
disturbed conclusion is that, if they are his parents, as he wants them to be, then 
something else is wrong in his way of relating to them. The only explanation he 
can reach is that he is the inauthentic one; he is not himself: he is the wrong 
reader. The real DS -  the authentic DS -  is living elsewhere and will return 
home some day to usurp him in their affection. The third interpretation, offered 
by Ramachandran, that he is suffering from an organic, neurological problem 
outside of the fabric of his relationship with his parents, is not available to DS as 
a reader of his own experiences. He can only hesitate between two 
interpretations, both of which are internally rational but, for the sovereign ego, 
equally calamitous. He is living in a moment of the fantastic uncanny, alternately 
doubting the authenticity and essential nature of his self and that of others.
This kind of misrecognition is not just an example of ‘identity grotesque’ limited 
to those with physically damaged limbic systems or chronic schizophrenia. 
Identity displacement of this kind occurs in subjects with no neurological 
anomalies: as a mode of thinking it is a possibility afforded by the interplay 
between the ego’s rational self-image, and embodied, unconscious responses. 
The irruption of naturally occurring disharmony between the two arises due to 
the ongoing conflict between them as ways of being. Misrecognition of self-as- 
other, or other-as-self, is implied by the existence of the self in the first place and 
its reliance on others to furnish matter for the distinction between them. Charles 
Cooley’s concept of the looking-glass self -  the self that see it’s selfness through 
others -  rounds out this interdependence:
...the self idea is always a consciousness of the peculiar or 
differentiated aspect of one's life, because that is the aspect that 
has to be sustained by purpose and endeavor, and its more 
aggressive forms tend to attach themselves to whatever one finds
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to be at once congenial to one's own tendencies and at variance 
with those of others with whom one is in mental contact. It is here 
that they are most needed to serve their function of stimulating 
characteristic activity, of fostering those personal variations which 
the general plan of life seems to require.
(Cooley 1902:179)
The self has to be sustained by identifying itself in ways which differentiates it 
from others. Without others, there is no counterweight, no scales of difference 
with which to gauge the self s meaning. Psychological research conducted by 
Milgram (1974) demonstrates how easily the self-concept submits itself to the 
authority of others with a resultant loss of coherence and sense of autonomy. 
Zimbardo’s study of the effect of arbitrary role assignation on subjects in the 
Stanford prison experiment produced a similar identity crisis for participants 
who, disconnected from their habitual roles and relations to others, engaged in 
aggressive actions which they later claimed did not reveal their true nature, traits 
and sense of self (Zimbardo 2000). In other words, their behaviour did not 
truthfully ‘signify’ them.6
The removal of habitual roles and relations with others also induces a crisis in the 
self-concept. As Blue discovers in Auster’s Ghosts -as do all of Beckett’s 
narrators -  when he finds himself in solitude, he is vulnerable to the return of 
past thoughts and barely repressed memories which make him feel that he is 
changing, that the sense of orderliness by which he defined himself is 
disintegrating: “That’s what happens when you’ve noone to talk to” (Ghosts: 
151). That’s what happens when you’ve no other to define you.
This is the doubled inscription to which Todorow alludes: because of the strength 
of the rational self-narrative which denies its dependence on others or any other 
form of contingency, the feeling of change and incoherence which affects the self 
without others, and which can produce seemingly irrational and inexplicable 
behaviour, is both familiar and strange. Character in disorder produces for the 
reader a familiar recognition because it describes a possibility for all selves, and 
a misrecognition because the disordered way of thinking, which is an always- 
already part of the rational self, has been for so long repressed. The extension of 
this is that it is towards an uncanny self misrecognition that rational thought will
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sometimes lead. The determinants of this ‘sometimes’ effect in the 
characterisation process are my concern.
3.4: F o r m a l  P r o p e r t ie s  o f  t h e  U n c a n n y
So what are the formal properties or conditions of this uncanny misrecognition 
that they might be applied to fictional characterisation? They can be broadly 
presented under three headings or effect-types: Hesitation; Blurred distinctions 
between binary categories and; The return of repressed knowledge.
3.4.1 H e s it a t io n
Both Bleuler and Freud attribute to the uncanny a derealisation (<dereistisch) 
effect. This causes the subject or reader to resort to a being-alongside self in an 
attitude of contemplation about the real nature of objects, unable to explain the 
sensation of unfamiliarity by using an established inference or cognitive schema 
(Heidegger 1997). The uncanny phenomena arrests the reader’s rational 
inferences, produces hesitation, and then forces a choice between rational and 
suprarational explanations for the phenomenon. This is what Todorow calls 
hesitation before the Real: chaos has been momentarily glimpsed behind the 
curtain of orderliness (Todorow 1990). So that the hesitation between these 
choices may continue, the narrative strives to avoid closure. Hesitation in itself 
arises when a awareness of a slippage between the representation of the object 
and the object itself becomes presented to consciousness. At this stage, the 
character experiencing it and the reader who identifies with the character’s 
predicament, has no sense of where their disorientation has arisen from, except 
that it creates a sense that the representation of a familiar thing bears no relation 
to the strangeness of reality.
In the case of Auster’s Blue, this awareness of slippage comes when he begins to 
ponder the reoprts that he has filed about the behaviour of the man he is tailing. 
He has not recorded anything that is untrue and he has been assiduous in his 
observations. And yet, something which he cannot describe is missing from his 
report. It does not capture the impression of the man. He is lead to ponder 
whether his reports have in any way reflect the nature of the other he is watching 
and whether his text is simply a projection of orderliness onto something which 
has no necessary order in itself:
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As the days go on, Blue realises there is no end to the stories he 
can tell. For Black is no more than a kind of blankness, a hole in 
the texture of things and one story can fill this hole as well as any 
other.
(Ghosts: 144)
In the case of the uncanny, the effect on the experiencing subject is ultimately 
one of distrust or scepticism about the act of representation, about the ability of 
the sign to capture or refer fully to the phenomenon which it deigns to signify. 
This in turn creates the sense that there is something sublime or monstrous which 
resides outside of the representative possibilities of the symbolic system. 
Something which is being pointed to but which cannot be named: the monstrous 
sublime. It is the feeling of unpresentability which prolongs the hesitation. And 
this feeling of the unpresentable arises from the confusion of mutually exclusive 
and discreet concepts within the text which is its second feature.
3.4.2: B lu r r e d  d i s t in c t io n s  b e tw e e n  t h e  a n im a te  an d  in a n im a te  
Jentsch's definition of the uncanny explains it as a basic categorial confusion of 
two mutually exclusive concepts: living and dead, wilful and automatonic. As 
long as the reader is allowed to linger between these two interpretations, the 
technique will create intellectual uncertainty because the concept of the 
inanimate does not allow for properties common to the animate, such as desire, 
will and emotion. When two fundamental and opposing concepts are conflated 
or undifferentiated in this way the whole bedrock of the symbolic system which 
supports conceptualisation is destabilised, and the differentiation between signs 
and concepts, which is necessary for rational understanding, is problematised.
Mapping animate qualities on to inanimate objects is a common poetic 
transformation, typically manifested in anthropomorphism. It is also a trait of 
human cognitive behaviour from a very early stage in conceptual development. 
These kinds of projections tend to disappear within what Piaget calls the 
symbolic operations phase as they are replaced by the constitution of meaningful 
referential concepts, such as animate and inanimate, during logical operations 
and re-enforced by socialisation (Piaget 2001). It is the return of this familiar pre- 
rational understanding of the world, through the revelation of a blurred boundary 
between two supposedly discreet categories, which produces the uncanny effect.
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The various conceptual frameworks in which the uncanny is discussed therefore 
posit it as something which springs from the failures of conceptual boundaries to 
hold together in discourse. It is derived from an invocation of the contradictory 
spaces in which the projection of orderliness which is the job of the superego ~  
and of narrative and modular characterisation -  has failed to be mapped in 
proper proportion, creating the impression that the referent is caught within a 
caesura in langugae. Typically, these contradictory spaces are derived from the 
binarisms which run through the symbolic system of a culture such as those 
described in structuralist models of mythical, anthropological, logical and 
linguistic orderings of meaning in the world: human/inhuman; nature/culture, 
presence/absence; recognition/misrecognition; known/repressed and so on (Levi 
Strauss 1958; Cresswell 1985).
Theoretical strands within cyborg theory, and other post-humanist and post­
feminist theory, pursue these kinds of transcendences or elisions of binary 
oppositions as part of a project to escape the fixity of identity under the 
operations of the oppositional epistemologies. Barbara Kennedy describes Donna 
Haraway’s cyborg manifesto as calling for:
Cyborg heteroglossia; a breakdown of boundary categorisation 
and a confusion of boundaries, which is pleasurable liberatory- 
metaphorically, ideologically and epistemologically.
(Kennedy 2000:286)
The uncanny is similar to this project but has this exception: its concern is not 
about simply causing confusion about which category an object belongs to, and 
whether such categories have authentic boundaries, but about such uncertainty as 
it pertains to representations of the self. Research in cognitive science (Haslam 
and Rothschild 1990; Stevens 2000; Rehder and Hastie 2001) suggests that 
people tend to accept the non-essential (fluid) nature of artefacts (non-natural 
objects), but not that of living things. Living things belong, by virtue of their 
‘essence’, to particular and fixed categories. Artefacts are more easily re­
assigned from one category to another without causing an epistemological crisis. 
Cyborg theory, it seems to me, tends to mistake confusion aroused by non­
natural constructs for the liberating demise of essentialist categorisation and 
reasoning. It is in the production of uncertainty about the essential qualities of
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given, natural things (people) that the uncanny, and its more profound powers of 
destabilising, are to be found. The failure to distinguish between the self and 
other is the most uncanny of all category failures relevant to characterisation. It is 
also a ‘primitive’ fear which aligns it with the third aspect.
3.4 .3: A l l u s io n s  t o  f e a r , t a b o o  a n d  t h e  ‘p r e - r a t io n a l ’
The return of precognitive knowledge, represented by fears and taboos, conflict 
with the self s rational self-narrative. For example, a phenomenon which reminds 
us of our origins, our coming-into-being before the self, tends to be excluded 
from a self-narrative because of the tendency of the ego to narrativise with a 
mind to maintaining the notions of will, order and coherence at its centre. As 
with modular approaches to characterisation, for the ego, action must always be 
preceded by an explicitly signalled intention, even if this rationalisation actually 
takes place post facto. In Freudian terminology, such memories are repressed as 
they are in conflict with the project of developing an ego which thinks itself 
sovereign. Reminders of the randomness and corpularity of our physical origins 
are also presages of a similarly random or meaningless death, the ultimate loss of 
coherence, and have their corollary in our culture’s attitude to other abjected 
objects: excretions, bodily fluids, spoiled food. Objects which remind us of our 
role in the ingress and egress of the rest of the world tend to be treated with 
revulsion.
Mary Douglas argues that taboo subjects and repressed experiences reflect this 
need to occlude death and origin from the narratives of self in a society (Douglas 
1970). The realness of death and decay are typically supplanted by a symbolic 
discourse about perfect or ideational origination and consoling stories of death. 
To use Lacanian terminology, the uncanny experience occurs when a sign alludes 
to the Real, extralinguistic origins or history of the self which has lain under the 
surface of the shared, symbolic and consoling narrative. This also re-enforces the 
feature of binary conflation presented above, since what Piaget calls the adualism 
of early infancy is part of the precognitive history which the symbolic order 
serves to exclude. Adualism is a cognitive state in which differentiation between 
self and other, and between different types of otherness, does not occur. This lack 
of differentiation, is recovered in the uncanny and accounts for the horror of 
unwanted recognition which is its defining quality.
74
C h a p te r  T h ree :  T h e  G r a m m a r  of T h e  U n ca n n y
The concept of repression or absence is therefore central. Other notions of 
repressed knowledge share this focus with the uncanny. Julia Kristeva described 
the concept of abjection as a reaction of horror to the presence of that which is 
both part of us and apart from us at the same time: excrement, food, non­
functioning body parts, for example (Kristeva 1982). The presence of these 
reminders of the physicality of birth and death produce abjection (and indirectly 
an uncanny reaction) because they resurrect the repressed knowledge of human 
limitedness within the limitlessness of the world and thereby expose the 
narratives of birth and death as devices of consolation which act sedulously in 
place of the immemorable and unimaginable bookends of origin and fate which 
otherwise could not be authentically framed within the self-narrative.7
These embedded conventions which have become part of the self-concept and 
social narratives about selfhood appear, during the uncanny experience, to be 
insufficient to capture the anarchic, pre-rational and extra-linguistic reality to 
which attention has been momentarily drawn. They are the symbolic order which 
the reader momentarily sees to be concealing Real disorder.
3.5: O n t o l o g ic a l  C o n f u s io n  a n d  P a r a d o x
In the previous chapter I discussed how readers use inferential schema to assign 
newly-encountered people (and characters) to conventionally established social, 
psychological and ontological categories. I have argued that the uncanny requires 
that this attempt at assignation should hesitate between at least two possible 
categories. It also seems to require that these two categories be of a superordinate 
variety: that is, involve very fundamental categories such as living and dead, real 
and unreal, present and absent, true and false. And self and other. The reason that 
it is between these superordinate classes that the hesitation needs to arise is that 
the uncanny hesitation must make the reader’s choice between a rational 
interpretation of character nature and behaviour and a non-rational one 
equivalent. If it indicates that one interpretation is more likely and useful than 
another, then it fails to induce the necessary doubt about the epistemological 
framework that the reader is using.
Let us look at the example from Auster quoted earlier:
Directly behind Stillman, heaving into view just inches behind his
right shoulder, another man stopped, took a lighter out of his
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pocket. His face was the exact twin of Stillman’s. (Quinn now 
realised that) whatever choice he made - and he had to make a 
choice - would be arbitrary, a submission to chance. Uncertainty 
would haunt him to the end.
(City o f Glass: 55-56)
Hesitation arises because there is a choice involved. Here, Todorow’s ‘rule’ that 
the character should behave like an intradiegetic reader takes form: Quinn’s 
reaction, his confusion, mirrors the readers. He doesn’t know what to think of 
this doubling of Stillmans. As readers we expect, as does he, to find a clue as to 
which is the authentic one. No such information arises. We are stuck in our 
hesitancy while Quinn, for whom indecision is not yet an option, arbitrarily 
follows one of the men for the remainder of the novel. The correctness of his 
choice is never asserted or denied. Between which two interpretations of this 
encounter may a reader hesitate and in what sense is this hesitation of the 
uncanny type?
One reader inference is that the first Stillman is the real Stillman, and the second 
someone who coincidentally shares his appearance. Or it could be the case that 
the second is the real Stillman, the first the impostor. Either way, this constitutes 
a rational inference about the nature of character as it retains the premise of the 
uniqueness of selfhood -  no two people are exactly alike: the self is singular, 
unmistakably its self. The second available inference is that there are two 
Stillmans8, neither of whom is more or less authentic than the other. The 
implication of this inference is that identity is not something which is unique, it 
is not bounded or attached singularly to one person but can spread, seep and 
multiply. A third interpretation is that Quinn is mistaken in his vision or is 
demented. But, as Freud said of Nathaniel in The Sandman, there is no reason to 
think this of him for he is sufficiently bewildered by the experience for us to 
accept his rational credentials. We are left between a rational conclusion and an 
irrational conclusion about the nature of character identity. The narrative does 
not give the reader sufficient confidence to strongly infer one interpretation over 
the other.
Cultural and ethical binarisms do not necessarily offer up this rational dilemma, 
whereas foundational oppositions do. When the narrative refuses to speak too
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strongly in favour of either interpretation, it can enact a paradox, which is a 
crime of disorientation in modular views of characterisation, because the reader 
is forced to work (to continuously engage in the re-negotiation of categorial 
assignation which ultimately will be frustrated) to decide which character schema 
to use. In DS’s case, as told by Ramachandran, this splitness in the nature of 
others is in the choice between deciding upon his own lack of authenticity (which 
perverts the rational premise of the integrity of the ego) or the inauthenticity of 
his parents (an equally disturbed conclusion but one which preserves the integrity 
of the ego).
When the conflation or confusion of two opposing, superordinate categories 
occurs, the hesitation is more profound. The effect which arises is like that which 
proceeds from ontological paradoxes. Consider this paradox from Auster’s City 
o f Glass where Peter Stillman Jr’s wife instructs Quinn that:
You mustn't assume that Peter always tells the truth. On the other
hand, it would be wrong to think he lies.
(City of Glass 25)
Grice’s rule of conversational implicatures suggests that a listener automatically 
infers that his co-locutor desires and is able to tell the truth (Grice 1968). 
Stillman’s wife advises that this assumption be questioned in his case. The 
inference is now that falsity, being truth’s counterpart, is sometimes his mode of 
expression or his preferred language function. But, in the next statement, that 
inference is also thwarted: ‘it would be wrong to think that he lies’. And so no 
straightforward inference is allowed to make sense. The statement is equivalent 
to: “He is not always X, but it would be wrong to assume that he is not not X”. 
This is an example of the Eubulides paradox (“This statement is false”) which 
works by demonstrating how logical inferences can produce illogical errors. In so 
far as the effect of such statements are uncanny, it is because they avail of the 
doubledness of much conceptual thinking wherein “not X” always implies “Y” 
(i.e. ‘not alive’ implies ‘dead’ and ‘not self implies ‘other’). When a situation 
does not present the necessary conditions for membership of either category -  
and those categories are foundational -  then hesitation, and awareness of how 
inferences have failed, is the fate of the reader. Another paradox - the 
Smarandache - encapsulates, in a very simple way, this ability for category
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assignation to drag the reader into inextricable convolutions in the attempt to 
affix a character to just one ontological category: Everyone is dead, even those 
who aren't.
This is an example of what Christopher Ricks calls the Irish bull that permeates 
Beckett’s critique of dualism. Beckett writes that “nothing is more real than 
nothing” (Malone Dies 161). Ricks’s gloss on this line sums up one of the 
appeals of the poetic truthfulness of logical impossibilities:
Nothing can only be as real as nothing, nothing can be neither 
more nor less real than nothing. But not only do you know what 
he means, you sense the chilly comfort of the thought.
(Ricks 1990:203)
This suggests an additional aspect of the uncanny as revealed through paradox: it 
makes no logical sense but, somehow and in a way difficult to explain, ‘you 
know what it means’. Applied to characterisation, the paradox offers the 
possibility for immediately thwarting reader impression formation about a 
character, as well as introducing a splitness in the epistemological scheme 
required to decode it. This can work in two ways: by actively providing 
information about a character through a paradoxical description offered by 
narrator or another character, or by indirectly characterising the one who issues 
the paradox. In City o f Glass, the oppositions of animation, volume and gender 
are subjected to paradoxical characterisation by the description offered of 
Victoria Stillman’s telephone voice:
It was at once mechanical and filled with feeling, hardly more 
than a whisper and yet perfectly audible and so even in tone that 
he was unable to tell if it belonged to a man or a woman.
(City o f Glass: 7)
Her voice is mechanical and emotional, loud and quiet, male or female. There is 
no information here except a confusion of opposites and an acknowledgement of 
how easily identity confusions can arise. Here are two further examples of 
characterisation through paradox from Monsters Worse to Come. In the first 
example, Kinnegan questions The Duff about the actions of a giant named 
Devaney of whom he has heard many rumours.
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The Duff interrupted with a laugh:
‘There’s a great many stories told about that man and his deeds.
It’s a wise man who listens to them all and disremembers them 
instanter. Where the Devaney is concerned the fabric of logic is 
double-ravelled and yet is hardly knit at all.’
(Monsters Worse to Come: 144)
Which can be summarised contradictorily as: ‘Pay attention to the characteristics 
which have been attributed to him and then forget them straightaway. These 
attributions have a strong basis in logic and have no logic at all’. The contrary 
advice serves to make Devaney enigmatic and also reflect the instability and 
ongoing doublings and reversals of his character during the novel (from 
automaton to conscious being to amnesiac to truth-seeker back to automaton). 
They also characterise The Duff as someone at ease with chaos, opposed to any 
order except his own will. The split-mindedness is reflected in his paradoxical 
love of control and his inability to exert any, even over inanimate things. The 
Duff straddles categories, one foot in each, like a virile eunuch.
Such paradoxes resemble the uncanny in their coalescing of the rational with the 
irrational and their frustration of the attempts of inferential schema to assign 
characters to particular categories. They are themselves uncanny when this 
frustration is applied to superordinate categories which describes a person or 
character’s ontological status. In the next section, examples of this specific type 
of use in the works of Beckett and Auster are offered.
3.6: T h e  u n c a n n y  in  B e c k e t t  a n d  A u st e r
They looked alike, but no more than others do.
(Molloy: 9)
I have already introduced some uncanny aspects in the works of Beckett and 
Auster’s approaches to characterisation in their respective trilogies. I would like 
now to briefly outline where the effect is most strongly focussed in their works 
and what particular aspects of uncanniness are presented. Beckett’s trilogy is 
concerned with the disintegration of the self in isolation from others and the 
opposing forces of confabulation which tries, and fails, to keep the self in some 
semblance of coherence. The idea of a self is premised on distinction from
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others, internal coherence, continuity and self-determination. The uncanny effect 
presents the counterpoints of these qualities (incoherence, contingency, origin in 
others) as equal possibilities for the self and for self-other relations. Beckett’s 
work has been extensively studied for its epistemological scepticism, its critique 
of the rational method, its teleology of endless non-progress, and its view of the 
self as constituted and distorted through language. Each of these features impact 
on the uncanny by virtue of the way in which they allow for a reading of the self 
as something that is vulnerable to change and disintegration: or as a construct 
which tells itself stories to enable order to prevail over disorder, but which never 
manages to fully succeed and is suspended within the dialectic.
Auster’s trilogy has remarkably similar features. Its epistemological uncertainty 
is more directly expressed than Beckett’s and the expression of identity 
disintegration more brusque because, while Beckett works outside of genre, 
Auster picks up on the detective genre (amongst others), with its attendant 
rational epistemology and narratives of the self pursuing the other, to critique the 
founding notions of the genre itself, as well as those of narrative in general. The 
first two novels of Auster’s trilogy have third-person lead characters, the last a 
first-person narrative and so the slow erosion of the self-construct, its relapse into 
solipsism and crisis, benefits from two perspectives. The most pressing similarity 
between the trilogies is the correspondence between the detective Moran, in 
Beckett’s Molloy and the detectives Quinn and Blue in Auster’s City o f Glass 
and Ghosts. Auster describes Quinn’s initial reluctance to forsake rational 
methods in his attempt to grasp the nature of Stillman’s self in the following 
way:
It seemed to him that he was looking for a sign ... This meant only
one thing: he continued to disbelieve in the arbitrariness of
Stillman's actions.
(City o f Glass: 69)
But later, because of the perverse and inscrutable nature and irresolvable 
strangeness of Stillman’s actions which do not surrender their meaning or give 
rise to an impression of the man which can be stabilised and grasped, Quinn 
realises that his method has failed and his rational detecting self begins to 
unravel:
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Quinn was nowhere now. He had nothing, he knew nothing, he 
knew that he knew nothing. Not only had he been sent back to 
the beginning, he was now so far before the beginning that it was 
worse than any end he could imagine.
{City o f Glass: 104)
Moran’s plight, in pursuit of the elusive Molloy -  whose name he cannot even 
grasp -  describes the same descent into doubt about the other. Where once he 
was punctual, decorous and organised (“a solid in the midst of other solids” 
(Molloy: 108)), Moran becomes disordered, disorganised and doubtful as to his 
purpose:
It was then the unheard of sight was to be seen of Moran making 
ready to go without knowing where he was going, having 
consulted neither map nor timetable considered neither itinerary 
nor halt, heedless of the weather outlook and with only the 
vaguest notion of the outfit he would need, the time the 
expedition was likely to take, the money he would require and 
even the nature of the work to be done and consequently the 
means to be employed.
(Molloy: 124)
These instances provide examples of the key features of the uncanny in its 
treatment by Auster and Beckett. Broadly speaking, it has three aspects. In each 
case the approach to characterisation contradicts the advice offered by modular 
creative writing discourse, in its formal expression of how expectations about 
how character behaviour should cohere, and appear clearly purposed and 
coherent, so as to allow the reader to develop reliable knowledge 
(epistemological mastery) of characters. These aspects are: the failure of the 
distinction between the self and the other and of the identification of the other to 
be maintained; the gradual loss of the selfs coherence and continuity; 
displacement of purpose from self to an unidentified external agency.
3.6.1: T he  fa ilu r e  of the  d istinc tio n  betw een  the  se lf  a nd  the  o th er
AND OF THE IDENTITY OF THE OTHER TO BE MAINTAINED
People pass too, hard to distinguish from yourself. That is 
discouraging.
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cMolloy: 9)
Any attempt at person evaluation or characterisation must first establish a 
bounded space to which character qualities can be attributed. The ability to 
distinguish between the self and another is prior to any such attributions. Without 
this distinction, the whole world is interior and every element within it is the 
same. Such a place is one of nameless and orderless chaos, similar to what Plato 
called Korah (Kearney 2000). The perceiving subject requires an object of which 
to speak and, eventually, with or against which to understand itself as an object 
in other's eyes. If the subject is not aware, or sure, of what is external to it as 
opposed to internal or attached to it, then there is nothing it can say about the 
object as it is not recognisable as an object. Similarly, the narrator or character 
who cannot distinguish between himself and other characters cannot pass on 
information about that character which will enable the reader to construct a 
useable and coherent impression.
This failure to distinguish between self and others is an extension of the aporia 
expressed in the Cartesian rationalist method. It is an extension which Beckett, in 
particular, was keen to pursue (Knowlson 1998). The subject contemplating an 
object can be argued to have made the object an object in the act of 
contemplating it. That is: the Other is not found, but made in the self s gaze. 
Prior to this gaze - and the epistemology which gives it authority - the act of 
looking at another does not reveal anything about either the perceived or the 
perceived. Without this epistemology which presumes the ability to 
epistemologically master the other, the difference between the self and the other 
can become less distinct. For the reader, the revelation from the central character 
that he cannot always distinguish himself from the supporting cast of other 
characters, as Molloy has made, evokes this uncanny failure of distinctive 
recognition between self and other.
J. Allan Hobson, in writing of the narrative form of dreams, speaks of their 
disorienting quality in this connection in which the loosening of rational schema 
and associations can elide the difference between specific others who together 
constitute the not-self:
The people in dreams are particularly fluid. Sometimes they don’t
look like the ones they are supposed to be, and sometimes they
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seem like two people, or even a hybrid of two sexes. Sometimes 
characters appear out of nowhere, a woman suddenly becomes a 
man. Very often the identity of the person is uncertain.
(Hobson 1996:87)
In such cognitive states, anyone who is not the self is open to the fate of being 
consigned only to the most fundamental of ontological classes, that of 
unspecified other, and in this way can be endlessly substituted for and 
transformed into any other. The authenticity, singularity and durability of 
personal identity have no claim in the formalism of dreams. The uncanny has the 
same quality. For Auster’s Quinn the search for the unchanging and authentic 
impression of another, represented in an image, fails because of this conclusion: 
that when faith in durable identity and identification wavers, one person could 
just as easily be -  or turn into -another.
The picture told him nothing. It was no more than a picture of a 
man. He studied it for a moment longer and concluded that it 
could just as easily have been anyone.
(City o f Glass: 31)
Confusing one member of a social category (be it gender, age, race) with another 
is a specific possibility of the failure of other-identification. Beckett treats all of 
these failures, most notably the one that gives rise to Oedipal fears of mistaking 
the mother for a lover. Speaking of his past relationships with women, Molloy 
writes:
There are days, like this evening, when my memory confuses 
them and I am tempted to think of them as one and the same old 
hag, flattened and crazed by life. And God forgive me to tell you 
the horrible truth, my mother’s image sometimes mingles with 
theirs, which is literally unendurable.
(Molloy: 59)
This constitutes the horrible truth that identity, so heavily reliant on outward 
signs of category membership can degenerate (being weathered, their unique 
impress is no longer visible), as those signs (face, dress, body) degenerate in their 
uniqueness, to the point where the once-unique sign, the rigid and unique
83
C h a p te r  T h ree :  T h e  G r a m m a r  of T h e  U n ca n n y
designator of Kripkean symbolic logic, now belongs to no-one in particular. The 
doubledness of things also reflects this fear of indistinction. Beckett’s characters 
pass much time by confusing paired items with each other: knees, bicycle 
wheels, ideas, selves:
I forget which wheel it was. As soon as two things are nearly 
identical I am lost.
(Molloy. 156)
Wondering ... whether it had been the same knee then as the 
one which had just excruciated me, or the other. And that is a 
thing I have never been able to determine.
(Molloy: 139)
Perhaps it was the same one back again, ideas are so alike when 
you get to know them
(Malone Dies: 225)
As Quinn concluded about his attempts to grasp the essence of another: within 
this alternative epistemology of grievous doubt, you can never be sure who it is 
you’re grasping for. In Monsters Worse to Come, this elision of other’s 
differences occurs in the description of Kinnegan and Devaney’s respective 
attempts to understand their encounters with Hoc Danger and his various 
anagrammatised alter egos. The duplication, or wayward multiplication of Hoc 
Danger, means that he cannot present a single and coherent impression to any 
other character, let alone the reader, and cannot meaningfully unmask himself, 
because there is always another mask underneath. Because he appears boundless, 
through his ubiquity and protean nature, even when he takes off his disguises he 
is not graspable:
Divested of his paint, Devaney still did not know who this man 
was except that he was the man he had met at the bus station 
and he was the man driving the bus. A man who called himself 
Hoc Danger and Doc Hanger.
(Monsters Worse to Come: 40)
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3.6 .2: T h e  g r a d u a l  l o ss  o f  t h e  s e l f ’s c o h e r e n c e  a n d  c o n t in u it y  
This aspect of doubledness can also affect the self and is associated with the
belief that the self is somehow surpassing itself or that its centre ‘really’ resides
somewhere outside the body or outside time. This is known within personal
pathology as Cotard’s Syndrome or the negation delusion: a belief that elements
of the self and others do not exist or are about to cease existing (Cacho 2000). In
such a case, the outward markers of identity which are presented as part of the
self-as-object do not correspond to its internal state and are cast away from the
self-concept, except that they continue to prepare others to form an impression of
the self based upon its external features. This dissonance between self-concept
and how the self is presented to others enacts the ontological paradox of the self
which does not recognise itself, has shed its markers of identification somewhere
along the way and does not know how to retrieve them:
He was alive, and the stubbornness of this fact had little by little 
begun to fascinate him - as if he had managed to outlive himself 
as if he were living a posthumous life... He had long ago stopped 
thinking of himself as real.
(City o f Glass: 5, 9)
But the loss of a coherent and continuous self-identity, in the sense that one has 
ceased to be as one was, is not the most radical outcome of self-doubt. There is 
always the possibility that one will eventually cease to notice this absence of a 
self-concept and will continue to be, regardless of this negation.
Yes, there were times when I forgot not only who I was but that I 
was.
(Molloy :49)
This basic dissonance is perhaps the defining characteristic of the detective 
Deeds in Monsters Worse to Come. His is a heightened sense of self-unreality. 
He does not have any sense that the presented aspects of his self have anything to 
do with him. He knows what his role is (detective) and what expectations others 
have for him on the basis of this role, and yet his self-concept and his other 
identity markers (he is young, callow, emotional, delusional) do not match up to 
these expectations. He can only think to mend this sense of incompatibility by 
changing his outward attributes as a way of easing the dissonance:
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Captain Deeds, his muddy hand cupped about his mouth, 
whispered some urgent words to Inspector Whelms.
‘I need a pipe and tobacco, Whelms. I need them. I don’t know 
why I don’t have them.’
‘You need them now?’
‘No, not now. But I need them very soon. I need them so I can be 
realistic. I want to be realistic. I’m not a realistic police without a 
pipe and without tobacco.’
(Monsters Worse to Come: 81)
3.6 .3: D is p l a c e m e n t  o f  p u r p o s e  f r o m  s e l f  t o  a n  u n id e n t if ie d  e x t e r n a l
AGENCY
The absenting of will might lead to what Beckett called the wisdom that consists 
of ‘the ablation of desire’. If the self is not responsible for its own actions, and 
holds out no hope of positively affecting its own fate, then the kinds of coherence 
and anima which are assumed to be the lot of fictional characters becomes 
deeply troubled.9 If the character has no internal struggle, no reservoir of desires, 
fears and hopes which drive him onto action which constitutes lends profluence 
to the narrative, then where does his animation come from?
In forsaking any kind of desire or instinct for survival, self-advancement or goal- 
oriented behaviour, the last vestige of the self is expunged and the representation 
of character as coherent, self-determining and rational becomes untenable. If 
there is no expression of internal will, then the implication is that a character’s 
agency is determined by some authority external or invisible to him. This creates 
the impression of the character as an automaton but, in the uncanny, this is 
suggested in only a very oblique way. The author cannot not reveal the hand 
behind the character’s movement as this would lead away from hesitation. This 
complete absence of intention becomes all the more estranging because of the 
similar absence of an explanation for the character’s movement. No other 
internal or external centre of will is posited. The character’s sense that they are 
following the order of another, and are disinterestedly watching their own 
actions, becomes disconcerting and raises questions about the need or 
compatibility of free will with the deterministc nature of both fictional narratives
8 6
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and the self-narratives of personal identity. In the case of Molloy it is a voice 
which issues commands to him:
Yes, it is rather an ambiguous voice and not always easy to 
follow, in its reasonings and decrees. But I follow it nonetheless, 
more or less ... And I feel I shall follow it from this day forth, no 
matter what it commands. And when it ceases, leaving me in 
doubt and darkness, I shall wait for it to come back, and do 
nothing.
(Molloy: 132)
Quinn is a spectator of his own actions, one who observes them with surprise as 
though he were being remotely controlled by an inscrutable intelligence whose 
intentions for him are never clear and from whom he eventually expects no 
explanation:
It did not occur to him that he was going to show up for his 
appointment but he found himself doing a good imitation of a man 
preparing to go out. ‘I seem to be going out' he said to him self... 
he felt remarkably calm as if everything had already happened to 
him.
(City o f Glass: 12)
Quinn tends to distance himself from his own behaviour at every turn and comes 
to regard it as a feature which does not represent him or characterise him but as 
something which has nothing to do with him. The will of others passes through 
him, although he does not know who or what this other is. This peculiar type of 
self-self relationship bears similarities to that of the character Devaney in 
Monsters Worse to Come. Devaney can never get accustomed to asserting his 
own will or even recognising that he possesses such a thing. He, like Quinn, is an 
observer of his own actions, as though he were a satellite half-gazing at his own 
affairs or a passenger within a larger self who feels no responsibility for the 
outcome of the self s journey:
He had only meant to stop killing, stop being the dispatcher. That 
decision had entrained other decisions, but he had not made
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them. They were not his decisions. He was being wafted along on 
a quest not of his own making, describing a circle which someone 
else had authored; acting out some foreign body's volition
(Monsters Worse to Come :24)
The repressed fear of derealisation and control loss are what this kind of agency 
deletion achieves. The relationship of free will and agency to uncanny 
characterisation is developed more fully in Chpater Five.
3.7: C o n c l u s io n : O u t l in e s  F o r  U n c a n n y  C h a r a c t e r is a t io n  
This chapter has examined the concept of the uncanny, and cognate concepts 
from psychoanalysis, psychology and neuroscience which offer insights into the 
possibilities of a radically different epistemology of otherness and self-other 
relations than that presented in modular discourse about characterisation. The 
uncanny involves two principle features which apply to the writer’s 
characterisation task.
The first feature is the evocation of pre-rational or repressed modes of thought 
with regards to the nature of self and others which challenge the dominant 
discourse of rationality. The two rational assumptions which it challenges are as 
follows:
• That the self and the self-concept are independent of Others. Others are 
regared as psychologically coherent and their behaviour can be predicted or 
explained from a knowledge of their traits (their essence) within conventional 
creative writing discourse. This coherence is manifested in the relationship 
between all the signifiers or aspects of self-presentation which comprise the 
characterisation process: name, appearance, body, gender, age, occupation and 
so on. The argument follows that the self can master an understanding of Others 
through methodical and transcendental reasoning -  can ‘look into the head and 
heart’ of the other - and show how these external traits offer a complete and 
cohesive model for the comprehension of otherness.
• That the self is autonomous, possesses free will and is not subject to 
influence from any external agency. This also describes the theory of mind 
which is applied to the understanding of others. Action is the outcome of self­
8 8
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determination and not contingent, that is, not without purpose or beholden to the 
prompting of some external or unnamed authority.
The uncanny posits the counterthesis to these conventions by making the reader’s 
projected understanding of others fail when it assumes these aspects of self and 
self-other relations. The ‘irrational’ forms of self-other relations are made to 
appear as equally useful inferential schema in the explanation of character 
essence and action. The self is co-presented in the uncanny as:
• Unstable and analogous to a narrative which strives to impose order where 
the potential for disorder is always present;
• Tending to disintegrate without others against which it can define itself and is 
prone to mistake itself for that other;
• Liable to disappear, or become fused, split and confused when clear role 
assignations are not available.
The second aspect of the uncanny involves the production of uncertainty which 
causes the reader to hesitate between opposing interpretations about the essential 
nature of character such that the decision is not subject to closure within the 
narrative and the character quality under crisis is of an ontological type. In this 
connection, the use of logical paradoxes which assign a character to two 
mutually exclusive ontological cagetgories (dead/alive, true/false) is one 
available strategy. The most forceful blurring of distinctions is between the self 
and other; in which the social constuction of the self and the integrated 
naturalised order of the ego, are put under great stress by an exposure of the 
fluidity of the self, its provenenance in relationships with others and the potential 
for misrecognition between these two fundamental categories.
The next chapter details how the project of representing these aspects of unstable 
selfhood and its impact of the understanding of otherness is revealed through 
characterisation with the treatment of character name as a means for creating and 
maintaining a bounded space to which character impressions are tied. Through an 
examination of the logic of the proper name and the philosophy of naming which 
subtends ‘modular’ fictional conventions, I will propose guidelines for uncanny 
onomastics (acts of naming) which are evident in Beckett and Auster and applied 
in Monsters Worse to Come.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e  N o t e s
1 This would satisfy what I have called the writer’s need for humility in representing self- 
other relations. In order for the narrative to take place, it is of course necessary for 
information about characters to be presented to the reader but the origin of that 
character information can also be co-presented or even framed within a modal context 
which implies the narrator’s faith or otherwise in the representation. Using epistemic 
downtoners like ‘seems’, ‘perhaps’, and ‘maybe’ -  expressing reservation in judgement -  
is one example of this. It does not necessarily follow that such an approach to 
characterisation must endorse the uncanny or solipsistic view of others but it offers the 
reader the option of considering the narrator’s authority and the provenance of their 
supposed mastery of others.
2 In Monsters Worse to Come, the reference to the book which the giant reads in 
O’Mahessy’s Readings also contains a veiled allusion to -  a reminder of - the physical 
book which is in the reader’s hands. On page 241, we read that:
The unshaven bookseller was paying him no heed, was semi-awake, 
perched behind an antiquated and empty cash register with a copy of 
Catnip Mirkrat’s “The Parsimony of Friedrich” in his damp hands.
He opened the book at a random spot and fixed his attentions halfway 
down page 241 et seq.
(Monsters Worse to Come: 241)
3 ‘Uncanny’ is an approximate but generally accepted translation for the German term 
“Unheimlich” which literally translated means “unhomely” . Freud considered it an 
acceptable, if slightly deformative translation, in that its use in English corresponded 
roughly to its original German sense but failed to capture the same semic possibilities 
which attend the idea of “home” as well as the antonymous-synonymous relationship 
which exists between heimlich and unheimlich in German.
4 The fluidity of selfhood and its movement between dependence on others and 
solipsitic independence is treated extensively in psychological literature. See: Erikson 
1959; Epstein 1980. Treatments of borderline personality which exhibits inconstancy and 
negative self-concepts include: Westen et al. 1984; Perry & Cooper, 1986.
5 The aetiology of the disorder is not very straightforward. Francis Dejode (Dejode et al 
2001) record the following list of documented neurological causes of the syndrome:
In addition to Capgras syndrome, other delusional misidentification 
syndromes exist, such as Fregoli syndrome, intermetamorphosis and the 
subjective doubles syndromes. These states constitute a complex group 
of cognitive right cerebral hemisphere dysfunctions]. The patient refuses 
to acknowledge a person as being who they say they are, but recognizes 
most of the physical features of that person]. Illusion of doubles is usually 
found in psychiatric diseases, particularly in schizophrenia]. However, 
many authors emphasize that the appearance of Capgras syndrome may 
correlate with the following: cerebral lesions (head injury and ischaemic 
cerebrovascular lesions, which are often located in the posterior area of 
the right hemisphere, where face recognition is performed); electrical 
disorders on electroencephalography (seizure disorders) with or without 
clinical manifestations; and metabolic disorders (secondary nephrotic 
syndrome, diabetes mellitus with dementia).
6 In referring to research in mainstream social psychology I must acknowledge that, in 
‘real world’ examples of the effects of social influence conformism on the self-concept 
and attendant behaviour, the role of social structures and their relationship to different
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types of subjectivity exert different types of effects. The Stanford experiment in particular 
is concerned with male identity and its tendency to confidently align itself within roles in 
which power is invested and for which aggression is required. The research on female 
identity with regards to self-rejection or abnegation has tended to focus on 
developmental stages in which the socialisation of female identity takes place. Bill 
Dorris’s treatment of the development of Marilyn Monroe’s ‘perfect self doubt’ is such an 
example. Dorris cites Zanarini et a). (1997), Shapiro et al. (1975) and Westen et al. 
(1992) in considering the effect of early parental reationships on the development of 
Monroe’s borderline adult personality, negative self-image which produce an uncentred 
and unstable personality. The uncanny is a concept so completely bound up with ideas 
of the unpresentable that it is not necessarily concerned with directly acknowledging the 
different social, developmental and emotional pressures which affect masculine and 
feminine identity problems. What these differences in etiology suggest, however, is that 
in each case, and for each type of subjectivity, the specific nature of what is repressed -  
those primitive fears and pre-rational knowledge -  may be very different in content and 
tone. My treatment of the uncanny extends only to general principles which, depending 
on each character’s case, will manifest itself in different ways.
7 Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive model of how metaphor-based narratives underpin our 
shared understanding of the origin and destination of the self points out the recurrence 
of metaphors which reveal an understanding of life-as-a-journey, a movement of stable 
ego along a neatly punctuated continuum of ideational beginning and meaningful end 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The uncanny and the abject gain their power through 
allusion to the unknown and un-narrativised aspects of the pre- and post- self which are 
elided by such a metaphor.
8 No indication is given in City of Glass as to how this doubling might have arisen. By 
implying, or allowing for the possibility, that cloning is an available technology within the 
world of the novel, the uncanny effect would be lost as this would offer a rational 
interpretation for the duplication. As it would if it was implied that Stillman had a twin. 
This line of inference is not supported by any other information in the narrative and so 
prolongs the hesitation.
9 This is the same kind of ‘trouble’ that the participants in Milgram’s experiments 
encountered: having ceded their agency to an authoritative figure from Yale University, 
the subjects engaged in acts which later caused them great stress, anxiety and what 
Festinger calls ‘cognitive dissonance’. They wanted to disown the acts and reclaim the 
self-concept in which such actions could never have been carried out by them (Milgram 
1970; Festinger 1957).
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The previous chapter presented the concept of the uncanny and examined how its 
features of estrangement could be applied to the creation of techniques of 
characterisation. It suggested that reader hesitation, confusion about a character’s 
ontology and the invocation of repressed knowledge about self-other relations 
were central to this.
This chapter discusses an integral aspect of the process of misrecognition: the 
referential functions of names and the possibilities which exist for their creation. I 
argue that modular creative writing discourse (Card 2003; Bickham 1997; 
Edelstein 1999; Marshall 2002; Frey 1995 for example) implicitly relies upon a 
model of correspondence between language and reality, such as that espoused in 
analytical and empiricist views of language (Russell 1903; Currie 1982), in its 
rules for generating character names. The analytical approach to names and name 
functions is presented in detail to foreground the staple philosophical basis or set 
of assumptions which inform the modular approach and folk psychological 
concept of names -  that a name uniquely refers to, connotes the qualities, and is an 
internal attribute of the character. Turning to poststructuralist notions of the proper 
name, in the writings of Derrida (1962) and Wittgenstein (1958), I offer a series of 
opposing rules for naming characters, and treating the onomastics (the act of 
naming) which occurs within the narrative, in a way designed to elicit an uncanny 
reaction by demonstrating the contingency of their provenance and their potential 
for disconnecting from the things they would denote. Example of different 
approaches to the design of character names are drawn from classic texts Beckett 
and Auster, and contemporary naive fiction, in which the application of modular 
creative writing rules can be most easily discerned. The effect of these 
considerations on my naming strategies and treatment of naming in Monsters 
Worse to Come is then discussed.
4.1: I n t r o d u c t io n
In designing a name for characters, a writer has two principal considerations: (1) 
the possibilities for naming which are permitted by the system of language and 
the conventions of fiction; and (2) the function of the name - whether it is used 
simply to allude to a character’s presence or whether it serves to connote or 
describe the character’s attributes. In fact, there can be no such thing as a purely
4: N a m e s  a n d  N a m in g  s t r a t e g ie s
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referential name: a name without connotation or instance, or what Yagisawa calls 
a ‘vacuous or negative existential name’ (Yagisawa 1984). Regardless of 
authorial intention, names connote character qualities at their first invocation -  
even if it is simply to provide an implicature about the character’s gender, class 
or ethnicity. When this descriptive or connotative aspect of the name is 
acknowledged, a secondary set of questions presents itself: how is description 
achieved and what is the name intended to describe or connote (the characters’ 
physical appearance, temperament or narrative function, similarity to other 
characters or people, for example).
Mary Seeman suggests that there are four psychological elements involved in 
adults’ choice of names for their children1 : denotative, connotative, magical and 
commemorative (Seeman 1976). I will argue that, with regard to fictional names, 
the ‘magical’ element infuses the naming process through both the referential 
and descriptive functions and that the ‘commemorative’ aspect has its own 
equivalent in fiction (‘allegorical’ or ‘transfèrent’) which can be subsumed under 
the broad banners of description and connotation.
Within literary criticism, the discussion of names has tended to concentrate on 
their descriptive and allegorical function with particular emphasis on the 
intertextual play which is often the focus of proper name use. For example, in his 
analysis of Mr. Knott in Samuel Beckett’s Watt, John Calder offer the following 
hypothesis:
Mr. Knott is quite possibly God, and it is not difficult to 
think of God as being a knot that mankind has always 
tried to untie or may be untieable.
(Calder 1998:28)
This is an example of the critic’s search for an origin, intention or descriptive 
function to the name, or an analytical method in which the given name makes 
absolute descriptive sense and corresponds to the character’s perceived narrative 
function and relationship to other characters. In many cases, the polysémie 
potential of created character names seems to provoke speculative assessments of 
what the name says about the character. These assertions about what a name 
‘means’ often end in judgements which have no way to ultimately authenticate
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themselves and, by failing to formally consider the other functions of naming, 
often overlook important aspects of what is at stake in the writer’s choice and 
treatment of names within the novel. Creative writing discourse foregrounds the 
importance of reader-orientation and places almost exclusive emphasis on the 
referential function of names. Because it constitutes and announces the character, 
the referential function of the names is the aspect which is most closely linked to 
the uncanny effect.
4.2: R e f e r e n c e  a n d  R e a d e r - o r ie n t a t io n
Use a different first initial for all your more important 
characters’ first and last names. Readers get confused 
when there's an Adam and an Alec, a Mrs Wilson and a 
Mrs Webster. To keep track, write out the alphabet and 
write down the names you decide upon.
(Marshall 2000:27)
In order to avoid possible confusions about who or what is the subject of the 
narrative at any given time, the writer needs to focalize on recognisable 
characters and objects, signalling their presence and relevance through the use of 
their name (Gennette 1980). Thus naming is a precondition of speaking about the 
world, particularly a world in which characters are the main concern. This is how 
what Saul Kripke calls the ‘necessity of naming’ impacts upon the novelist’s 
activities (Kripke 1982). The names that a novelist uses to signal the presence of 
one character or another have more than a referential functional -- and that 
function is by no means simple — but this aspect of it is primary. The central role 
of orientation and recognition in the rational-modular design of character was 
discussed in Chapter Two in which it was argued that creative writing discourse 
relies upon and naturalises a complex of epistemological assumptions about the 
elements of character. In the case of the referential function of naming, these 
assumptions are closely bound to the causal theory of names espoused in the 
discourse of analytical philosophy.
The existence of proper names is, in the first place, predicated on the possibilities 
for designation which the system of language provides. There are two very 
different theoretical schools which attempt to describe the nature of these
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possibilities: the analytical school which I will discuss presently, and the 
poststructuralist approach which is treated later on in the chapter.
The analytical school, of which the causal theory of reference or the anti- 
descriptivist approach (Kripke 1972; Putnam 1975), is representative, and with 
roots in the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (Russell 1903; Frege 
(Beamey 1997); and Carnap 1943), argues that a name becomes attached to its 
referent (its existential quantifier) in an “original baptism” and consolidated 
through reference-preserving causal links. As such, this approach denies the 
necessity of the descriptive aspect of naming, as advanced by Searle and 
Donnellan, in which it is argued that the name means its object because it has the 
observable properties of that object (Searle 1983; Donnellan 1970). In anti- 
descriptivism, individual human perception and experience of the object does not 
affect the name’s use and therefore does not affect its meaning.
The causal theory model, as with others from analytical philosophy, 
acknowledges the role of repeated use and communicative convention in 
affirming the name, but tends to ignore the fact that names are not rigidly but 
only socially and conventionally affixed to their referents and are therefore 
subject to change. As Slavoj Zizek points out, anti-descriptivism fails to see the 
logical extension of its own conclusion which is that the mark of the proper name 
is just a ‘positivisation of a void’ and is utterly contingent (Zizek 1989:90). The 
Kripkean approach accepts the relationship between the name (signifier) and its 
bearer (signified) as possessing no internal logic of its own but maintains that 
this link is nonetheless necessary and stable. That is: it produces no surplus 
which could result in the additional signification of anything else that is not its 
object. This ‘absolute necessity’ of names is to allow speakers to refer to other 
speakers and other objects and thereby enable communication through common 
reference points.2
In the novelist’s case, the causal theory model suggests that, for referential 
purposes at least, one name for a character is as good, authentic or referential as 
any other, as long as it applies uniquely and serves to differentiate one character 
from another. The ‘original baptism’ of the object has its mirror in the writer’s 
decision about which name to apply to a character. What causal theory does not 
describe are the ‘rules’ governing the initial production of names, the grammar or
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ideology of these baptismal rites or how one can acknowledge or reveal the 
instability in sign-referent relations through the design or treatment of names. 
This is one aspect of the theory which is most roundly criticised: that it gives no 
consideration to the diachronic quality of name use and change, nor does it 
consider the role of power in the initial affixation of name to the object, 
particularly where alternative external and internal names for the same object, 
person or concept are in competition. (Ziff 1977; Schalkwyk 2002).
In modular approaches to characterisation, the name is similarly vaunted as a 
trustworthy, eternal and unique identifier, a signifier which is designed to 
disguise its non-natural, arbitrary relationship to the one it names. This 
conception of the name is expedient and aspirational. It ignores the pressing logic 
of the constitution of the name which is that the name does not refer to an already 
existing object but actually constructs the object as an object -  it reifies it by 
naming it. It is adopted within modular discourse because it allows for the 
validation of conventions by disguising their contingent origins and it sweeps 
aside the contradictory and discrepant potential for a character or object’s 
meaning which precedes, or operates outside, the act of naming. David Lodge 
writes that when an author decides to change a character’s name halfway through 
a novel, or explains the origins of the character name in the writer’s 
considerations, then the game of realism is truly up (Lodge 1992:37). The name, 
once given, is fixed and in turn fixes the range of meanings which can attend the 
object which has been named. It is in this creed that the prescriptive logics of 
analytical philosophy and creative writing instruction coincide.
As a result of its exclusive focus on the referential function of names, causal 
theory requires that a proper name designates a thing by a consistent and unique 
appellation -  Kripke’s “rigid designation”. In order for the name to be useful it 
must not refer to nor connote other objects. This requirement of unique sign- 
referent relations, in the case of characters, carries an implication of the broader 
ontological uniqueness of the character itself. Narrative structure has an equal 
requirement for character uniqueness/differentiation in that the roles which 
narrative logics prescribe are premised on conflicts and oppositions — sum 
differences — between characters which are inscribed firstly by surface
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identifiers, of which the name is the beginning (Todorow 1970; Shklovsky 
1991).
This avoidance of character identity confusion through the preservation of 
name/sign uniqueness or singularity is a staple metaphysic of creative writing 
discourse. In many ways, modular approaches to creative writing and analytical 
approaches to language have a very similar project: the maintenance of crisply 
defined boundaries around characters/objects so that conventions can evolve 
which enable the reader to fully recognise, ‘know’ or ‘care about’ a character or 
object on first and subsequent sightings. The fiction editor Sol Stein advertises to 
this need for instant recognition of, and crisp distinction between, characters in 
name choice when he discusses the uses of ‘already known’ characters in fiction:
The characters in (plot-driven) books come across as 
stereotypes with names. If they are not alive, why should I 
care if their well-being is threatened? Let’s look at proof 
that characters come first:
“Harry jumped off Brooklyn bridge”
The typical reaction is “So what?” Who’s Harry? Suppose 
we add just one word, a second name of someone you 
may remember, a popular singer and film star. With the 
addition of a second name, does your reaction to the 
sentence change?
“Harry Belafonte jumped off Brooklyn Bridge.”
Suddenly the sentence means something. If you 
remember the singer Harry Belafonte, you can visualise 
the character. With no characterisation beyond a name, 
because its someone we know about, we begin to care.
(Stein 1995:50)
Rational-modular creative writing discourse, on the topic of character, insists 
upon minimal detail resulting in maximum recognition. Recognition is 
strengthened by the presentation of the already familiar. In this case, there is no 
characterisation beyond the simple act of reference. All that is ‘known’ or 
‘familiar’ is the name: the character is characterised by predicate reference. He is
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someone the reader already knows, an object of familiarity. It is a feature of 
modular approaches to acquaint the reader with the character, and their type, as 
quickly as possible and without ambiguity. Referencing an already existing 
familiar ‘character’ is simply a hyper-application of this. And it is the crispness 
of the ‘already known name’ which serves this function.
The connotative potential of names, mediated through similarity to other signs, 
can upset its effectiveness as a reference marker. This is because naming 
conventions are implicitly based on the Saussurean model of language (Saussure 
1916). That is to say, a character’s name is useful or useable if it is sufficiently 
different, as a phonic and graphic sign, from the other names in the novel and the 
pool of known names outside the novel. Sufficient difference between names is 
concentrated on initial letters, phonemes and syllabic stress. And so names such 
as ‘Marcus’ and ‘Marco’ do not tend to co-appear in novels, because not only do 
they have similar graphical and phonological properties, but they can also refer 
to individuals from the same gender class. Identity confusion occurs when 
insufficient difference (at a phonological, graphical, semantic and social level) is 
posited between character identifiers. And identity confusion — the radical 
positing of similarities between characters or the exposure of the conventions 
upon which naming depends ~  is censured in creative writing because of its 
potentially disorienting and non-referential effect. As Oscar Scott Card writes:
No two characters in the same story can have their key 
name (the one most commonly referred to) start with the 
same letter or the same sound. In a work of fiction, it 
causes readers endless confusion to have two characters 
whose names begin with the same letter or sound. So 
besides all the other concerns, you have to make sure 
your main characters have names that are easily 
distinguished.
(Card 2003:46)
This rule has become an explicit part of the novel craft and relies heavily upon a 
philosophy of language which is concerned with reference and recall to the 
exclusion of other language functions. It represents the characters of a novel as a 
set of tokens whose sign, function and appearance must at all times remain
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mutually exclusive. The same objective to avoid name interference features in 
advertising research in which it is advised to name products using words without 
common association, so as to avoid triggering recall of rival brands:
Brand names composed of low frequency words stimulate 
distinctive encoding, which may eliminate or reverse the 
former pattern of interference effects.
(Meyers-Levy 1999: 206)
Noticing the confluence of interests between advertising and modular creative 
writing, we can call this rule ‘the maximisation of sign difference’ between 
character names for the avoidance of ‘brand’ interference.
Some examples from the characters lists of classic fiction illustrate this point. In 
Bram Stoker’s Dracula (Stoker 1897), the following characters appear:
Arthur Holmwood, aka Lord Godawmer; Dr. John Seward; Dracula; 
Jonathan Harker; Lucy Westenra; Mina Murray; Mrs. Westenra; Peter 
Hawkins; Professor Abraham Van Helsing; Quincey Morris; Renfield.
In terms of the phonetic and graphic space which they mark out for themselves, 
these characters are given ample differentiation. There is no repetition of initial 
sounds and no repetition of phonemes in key positions (that is, there are no 
rhymes). The only difficulty presented is the recurrence of ‘h’ at the beginning of 
the surnames. The following graph depicts a lexicometric analysis of these 
names. This is done by converting the names into numerical arguments which 
can be mapped to indicate the spatial difference between the names.3 The order 
of the names is unimportant, what is important is the distance between them.
102
C h a p te r  Four: N a m e s  a n d  N am ing  S tra te g ie s
Lexicometrical Analysis of Difference between Character
Names in Dracula
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;< Renfield
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S Peter
>I< Mina
__.... .....  ........ 1?ri  J  l |p \ /rA L u u y
>I< Jonathi jnJohn
V  vUOQaW I 
1
Tier
ri  Dracula
►I< Arthur
Table 1: A plot of the metric difference between the character names of 
Stoker’s Dracula
This set of characters obeys the rule of maximal sign differentiation which is a 
product of a particular ethic of contemporary creative writing discourse in which 
information and the way in which it is structured are viewed as primary, if not 
the only, concerns. Stoker wrote in the gothic tradition with which the uncanny 
is most closely associated. But it is Beckett, his fellow Dubliner, whose naming 
strategies are more consonant with the epistemological commitment which the 
uncanny implies.
The cast of referred-to and presented characters in Beckett’s trilogy demonstrates 
none of these differentiating concerns and flaunts the rule to an absurd extent by 
having eight characters whose names begin with ‘M ’, three with ‘J’, three with 
‘L’ and so on. The outcome of this failure to distinguish between identity signs is 
to highlight the fact that confusion between two characters on the basis of their 
names is a possibility which is allowed by the system of naming:
Big Lambert; Edmund; Father Ambrose; Gaber; Jackson; Jacques; Johnson;
Lady Pedal; Lemuel; Lousse; MacMann; Mahood; Malone; Martha; Mercier;
Molloy; Moran; Murphy; Nicholson; Pat; Ruth; Sapo; Watt; Wilson; Youdi.
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Dispersal of Names in Beckett's Trilogy
♦  Youdi
♦-V'éatíVilson
-♦ S a p o  
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 ---------------------------------------------------        ♦-Nicholson
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Table 2: A plot of the lexicometrical dispersal the character names of 
Beckett’s Trilogy
The imbrication of names (particularly those beginning with ‘Ma-‘ and cMo-‘) in 
the chart gives an indication of the difficulty a reader experiences in trying to 
distinguish one character from another. As an analogy, it points to the confusion 
which a reader faces in trying to create a separate semantic memory or character 
space for each of the characters without running the risk of brand name 
‘interference’.
In the rule about starting character names with different letters cited by Orson 
Scott Card, the term ‘distinguishing’ implies the objective of character inter- 
differentiation. A writer who adheres to this rule chooses names for their 
referential or orientative function at the expense of other possibilities. In so 
doing he reveals nothing of the rules which govern the name’s creation, nor the 
possibility for change or confusion which runs through each act of naming. And 
finally, the partial echo between two signs, which is part of the grammar of the 
uncanny, is lost when greater difference between signs is pursued in this 
methodical way.
For the most part, research in this area of name recognition and distinction from 
the reader’s perspective, has been conducted within the sphere of experimental
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psychology and marketing. Its chief application is to the ‘science’ of brand 
names and in this it has the very same objective as name design in modular 
creative writing: to enhance the memorability and familiarity of the named 
products. Keller et al. (1998) define a successful brand name as one which is 
memorable and allows for further information processing about the product at a 
later date. There is a strong correlation between name memorability and low 
frequency of previously low general usage of the word or word parts (Meyers- 
Levy 1989). Berg and Lippman suggest that humour positively affects recall of 
the relationship between brand name and product type. (Berg and Lippmann
2001). Memorability can be enhanced by use of initial plosives (/p/ Dd /t/), 
irregular spelling, semantic appositeness, paronomasia (punning), (Lowry et al. 
2003), words rich in visual imagery (Bellezza 2002) and repetition or re­
enforcement (Leong et al. 1996).
What we find in modular creative writing discourse, with its emphasis in 
economic encoding of character as a familiar known entity, is an endorsement of 
these heuristics for name recognition or, more precisely, a suggestion that the 
choice of names for the characters should always be engineered so that they 
instantly announce their natural differences from each other and anchor 
themselves within the reader’s mind as instantly recognisable entities in the
familiar environment of the novel. The name is the character’s brand and the
«
onomastic function is to provide such names as enable a reader to identify with 
and recognise the values of each brand as it appears in the novel.
Within naïve fiction4, one finds the same rules being used. For example, a 
novella by Michael Vance, entitled ‘Undertow’, illustrates the prohibition on 
similar naming. It features eight characters whose names, lexicometrically, are 
highly differentiated. The effect of modular discourse on naming strategies in 
amateur fiction is not necessarily proven by this feature but the prohibition on 
ambiguous naming is observable throughout the field:
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4.3: R a t io n a l -M o d u l a r  r u l e s  fo r  r e f e r e n t ia l  n a m in g
In attempting to synopsise what I regard as the most commonly advocated
approaches to names in creative writing discourse, I have used the word ‘rules’.
This is, of course, a highly loaded term. I use it because of its application within
computational linguistics and descriptions of local grammars to refer to persistent
and typical forms of language use within a domain. Creative writing advice,
although heterogenous in many respects, can be said to comprise a set of implicit
and explicit rules in so far as it expresses a coherent set of criteria by which a
work is evaluated. The discourse coheres on a set of particular value judgements
about what is allowed and what is prohibited. There is a close kinship between
modular creative writing rules and analytical theories of language function in
their insistence, for different reasons, upon the referential function of names. In
these approaches, names must refer to crisply defined entities and must therefore
be crisply defined or differentiated themselves. From this premise, and the advice
offered by creative writing instructors (Frey, Bickham, Lukeman, Marshall et
al.), a series of ‘rules’ or description of modular referential naming practices can
be advanced:
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1. A unique name must be applied to each character and may only refer to 
that character. The character name is sacred. Pronouns may share the 
referential load but only where there is no doubt as to whom they denote.
2. Initial letters and phonemes for character names must also be distinct to 
prevent character misrecognition or identity confusion;
3. The unique name should be ‘brandable’, that is: its referential potential 
cannot already have been exhausted. Referential exhaustion can be said to 
occur when a name is already, and popularly, associated solely with an 
existing fictional character (Huckleberry, Atticus) unless one is attempting 
to co-opt an existing brand name into the fiction for the purposes of 
economy or irony. Similarly, very popular names (Jack, Sarah, Tom5) 
offer less differentiation as few are untouched by a reader’s ‘private’ 
knowledge of people with the same name. Of course, this naming strategy 
can work conversely, where popular names are deliberately chosen to 
connote the character’s ‘everyman’ qualities;
4. The character’s name must be unambiguously iterated and re-iterated as an 
aid to recognition. This works as an economic form of closure over 
character identity: all of the contradictions, ellipses and absences in the 
character’s profile can be stabilised, at least momentarily, by the 
invocation of the single name;
5. In fiction, but not in referential theories of language, the name must carry, 
or be able to carry, non-referential (connotative or descriptive) meaning;
6. The name must resemble other names orthographically and constitutively: 
that is, it must bear similarities to the name prototype. This notionally 
prototypical name is culture- and genre-dependent but salient features 
include length, initial capitalisation, pronouncability (what the language 
allows in terms of phonemes or letter combinations) and exclusion rules,
for example whether or not numbers and punctuation can be a valid part of
6a name.
These rules are increasingly part of an explicit methodology for generating 
character names in novel writing. In other cases, the rules are more implicit but 
equally pervasive. They rely upon the logic of referential models of language and
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share the same tendency to view names as signs whose relationship to referents 
should be stabilised and rigorously differentiated from others. This is anathema 
to the uncanny effect and to revealing the precarious nature of the sign-referent 
relationship to the reader. By reducing the phonological and graphic difference 
between names, and weakening the application of the rule of unique assignation, 
referential naming can achieve an ordered but disorienting, uncanny effect.
4.4: R efe r en c e  & ‘F r ustra ted  N o m in a t io n ’
Analytical philosophy accepts non-transcendence in the relationship between 
sign and referent. The contingency of this relationship is more evident, and more 
persuasively exposited, however, in other approaches to names, particularly of 
theorists whose approach is usually labelled post-structuralist. In Saussurean 
structuralist linguistics, the relationship of the name and the thing-named is 
simply one of convention and the name’s persistence (or success) is a product of 
its iterative use, referential usefulness and, ultimately, historical contingency. In 
the previous section, I considered how this process of maximised difference, 
through graphological, and phonological markers, is usually deployed in the 
naming of fictional characters. Now I will consider a more radical, poststructural 
extension of the Saussurean model which disputes the causal theory approach, 
and, in particular, its idea that reference is the primary function of proper names 
and its requirements that names have a uniqueness and a relationship to their 
referents which is not mediated solely by systemic differences between signs. In 
radical poststructuralism, the single sign does not efficiently refer to a single 
object or concept but is a polysemous indice which can partially invoke many 
such objects through phonic, graphic and symbolic parallels. It is in the 
consideration of some of these aspects of poststructuralist approaches to the 
proper names, that the possibilities for an uncanny approach to the referential 
aspect of naming can be discerned.
Names are possible only because they are part of a system, being the system of 
language. Rules for naming are therefore derived from the rules which govern 
the production of all linguistic terms. After Saussure, the idea that names 
correspond to reality, in that they identify already existing entities in the world of 
phenomena, has been largely dismissed. However, causal theory, as with earlier 
correspondence theories of language (Russell, Frege; ops cit.) still persists with a
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partial and contradictory metaphysics of the relationship between sign and 
referent by downplaying the importance of “difference” to the system. That is, 
analytical philosophy requires, in tacit ways, that representation has some non- 
arbitrary relationship to the thing it describes and that this thing, being somehow 
prior to the representation, is what can be called reality. This is revealed most 
obviously in the argument that the name is constant and uniquely assigned to its 
referent, which formula serves to eternalise and naturalise that relationship, 
despite the admission that this relationship is historically determined, arbitrary 
and subject therefore to change. Jacques Derrida has responded to this by 
insisting upon the primacy of the sign and arguing that the nature of its 
correspondence to anything except other signs within the system is illusory.
From the moment that the sign appears, that is to say 
from the very beginning, there is no chance of 
encountering anywhere the purity of “reality”, “unicity”, 
“singularity”.
(Derrida 1976:91)
What appears at first to be a simple attack on transcendent views of language is, 
in fact, more an attack on the concept of the necessary uniqueness of signs and 
names. This observation impacts upon the task of naming a character by stressing 
that the sign-name and the referent-character do not relate to each other except 
through the use of differential sounds, marks and other linguistic conventions 
which separate them from other characters in the universe of named things. The 
name is not necessarily ‘unique’ nor rigid. In fact, the claims for uniqueness and 
rigidity are more reflective of a wish that things be so ordered, rather than a 
description of an actual state-of-affairs. In this assertion, the poststructuralist 
approach is more cognitively realistic, in its modelling of how people make sense 
of signs and assign them to memory, than the analytical philosophy school. The 
assignation of meaning based upon sign differences must take into account the 
homonymic effect of signs with similar appearance and structure but different 
referents. As we will see, phomemes (sounds) and morphemes (word elements) 
play a large role in how we assign meaning to novel compounds such as fictional 
names. These elements, phonemes and morphemes, do not in themselves refer to 
anything, because they are not actually words, but impart meaning through their
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ability to connote compounds of words through alliteration, rhyme and other 
parallels.
This idea, that the sign has some polysemous potential and can allude to objects 
to which it is not supposed to refer, has no acceptance or treatment in analytical 
circles. On the other hand, the hardline poststructuralist contingency view of 
names presents limitless possibilities for naming strategies to the novelist many 
of which, from a descriptive point of view, border on the meaningless: a name 
such as ‘%6gH~#’ would meet most of the rules previously described for 
effective referentiation but fails to carry any obvious potential descriptive quality 
(as well as presenting extreme difficulties with regards to pronunciation). In the 
world of most fiction, as in the causal theory of proper names, these possibilities 
are circumscribed and limited owing to the persistence of what might be called 
the orientational usefulness of sign singularity and natural sign-referent 
correspondence, as well as the secondary stipulation, discussed later, that names 
always have a functional descriptive quality. If we are to look at the other 
possibilities for designing names, we should first ask what happens when these 
rules are broken and the difference between character names is elided.
4.5: B e c k e t t ’s S t r a t e g ie s  o f  E l isio n  a n d  E n t r o p y
And this name that I sought, I feel sure that it began with
a B or a P, but in spite of this clue, or perhaps because of
its falsity, the other letters continued to escape me ...and
even my sense of identity was wrapped in a
namelessness often hard to penetrate.
(.Molloy :31)
In Samuel Beckett’s drama and novels, and in the trilogy in particular, character 
differentiation is challenged on the levels of phonology, orthography as well as 
that of social category. ‘Molloy’ is pursued by ‘Moran’ in the first of the trilogy 
of novels; in the second ‘Malone’ appears. Both these characters succeed 
‘Murphy’ and ‘Mercier’ in the Beckett canon (and cite them as twins or ghosts) 
and are joined by ‘Martha’ , ‘MacMann’ and ‘Mahood’ within the trilogy. Even 
these similarities multiply under inspection. Moran, the detective who is set the 
task of finding the wandering Molloy, elides the tiny difference between the
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names of Molloy and Malone further by looking into and doubting the former’s 
name.
Of these two names, Molloy, or Mellose, the second 
seemed to me perhaps to be more correct. But barely.
What I heard, in my soul, I suppose, where the acoustics 
are so bad, was a first syllable, Mol, very clear, followed 
almost at once by a second, very thick, as though 
gobbled by the first, which might have been oy as it might 
have been ose, or one, or even oc.
(Molloy 112)
In these thoughts are mirrored the reasons for Oscar Scott Card’s injunctions 
against similar naming: the first syllable is what matters most to the reader, in 
that it should be clear and distinct and, for referential purposes at least, followed 
by a second syllable which is largely irrelevant. Of the four permutations which 
Moran considers, one names Molloy, another names Malone, a third invokes 
Moloch, and the fourth, Mellose or Mollose, is his favourite and seems to intone 
‘mollusc’ or ‘morose’ or both. In the trilogy, what John Calder calls the aporetics 
of Beckett are often tightly focussed on the name and its uncomplicated claims 
to truth (Calder 1995:26). The name, particularly the self-referring pronoun, is to 
be mistrusted, forgotten, as it is the tool with which language, which too cannot 
be trusted, gains its power and in which the speaker thinks he is inventing and 
speaking freely but is instead re-hashing his ‘stale old self-deluding pensum’ 
(Molloy 32). For Beckett, the original tragedy of being bom is mirrored in the 
tragedy of the delusion that language has the ability to capture the nature of that 
first tragedy: a delusion in which a “belief in names” is the first step. The empty 
comfort that names provide is to be undercut by achieving a distance from them. 
Names, as with other features of distinction and uniqueness, are mocked or 
forgotten, ignored or occluded in Beckett’s works.
Most of Beckett’s characters succeed in forgetting the names of others and, at 
times of grace, themselves. Jack MacGowran commented that Beckett had a 
fascination with names that begin with the letter M, which fascination sometimes 
extended to his use of W (for Watt or Winnie or Willie), and noted that one was 
the orthographic inversion of the other (Gussow 2001). The reasons for this
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don’t concern me here, and Beckett’s consciousness of it is similarly outside my 
brief, but the mirroring or doubling effect it achieves -  this repeated use of M 
and its mirror W, hints at another potential strategy for uncanny naming, which 
Beckett seems to comment upon obliquely in Company.
Till feeling the need for company again he tells himself to 
call the hearer M at least. For readier reference. Himself 
some other character. W. Devising it all himself included 
for company.
(Beckett 1988)
The author, thinking himself to have ‘discovered’ the already existing character 
must, like Adam in the Garden of Eden, grant him a name and since the name 
means nothing in any transcendent way (its is not, after all, God’s name for the 
character), any name will do so long as it allows the speaker to refer to it. But 
since, finally, the name does not even refer to anything unique anyway — since 
these characters each spring from the same contriving source -  it does not need 
to uniquely identify anyone or distinguish one from the other. And so the same 
name, or one almost identical, will do for all things. “For readier reference” 
would seem to imply that Beckett took a referential view of names and doubted 
only their capacity for descriptive meaning but the proliferation of Ms and Ws in 
his work undermines even this faith in names and reference. There is a further 
cause for speculating on the erosive referential potential of using M and W so 
frequently. Orthographic ally they are the same mark transposed through 180 
degrees and therefore mirrored. In English these are the initial letters which 
define gender (man, woman) and part of Beckett’s sceptical or uncanny 
characterisation also involves eliding the difference between the sexes. In 
speaking of his experiences of love, Molloy speculates on the true nature of his 
only experience of it with Ruth or Edith, (naturally, he cannot remember her 
name with confidence):
Perhaps she too was a man. Yet another of them... Don’t 
be tormenting yourself, Molloy, man or woman, what does 
it matter?
(Molloy 56-7)
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Malone shares this aporia or indifference to differential markers. In describing 
the stories he will tell, he writes as follows:
Perhaps 1 shall put the man and the woman in the same 
story, there is so little difference between a man and a 
woman, between mine I mean.
(Malone Dies: 181)
In Monsters Worse to Come, Albie Bawn shares this wisdom of indifference 
with Kinnegan, when the latter corrects him for alleging that The Duff is his 
mother:
Mother or father -  what’s the difference? They’re equally 
culpable.
(Monster Worse to Come: 189)
The fundamental markers of identity: name, face, gender, clothes and body are 
all ablated until little or nothing remains in the narrative mind, and subsequently 
the readers, to distinguish one person from another. Doubt and hesitation are the 
defining features of Beckett’s narrator’s characterisation.
With all of these strategies of elision and indifference, Beckett’s naming strategy 
moves towards a dismantling of the edifice upon which the possibility of 
significant -  by which I mean differential -  naming is based. The names are 
increasingly similar and the characters -  or what is known of them -  are elided 
too, into each other or into silence, as though to highlight their spurious claims to 
uniqueness and natural difference. At times, Beckett seems to playing very 
subtle jokes with the concept of name as unique reference. For example, the 
detective Jacques Moran, the most distinct of the trilogy’s characters, in 
mentioning his son, cautions that “His name is Jacques, like mine. This cannot 
lead to confusion.” (Molloy: 92). The boy’s name is very rarely used in the novel 
and would not lead to confusion if it wasn’t for the ominous nature of this 
warning.
The deliquescence of the name is an obvious technique for sublime non-closure, 
uncanny effect or as a complement to the representation of communication 
entropy and aporia which have been noted in Beckett’s work (Sikorska, 1994; 
Stevenson, 1997). In the third part of the trilogy, The Unnameable, the narrator
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who refuses to, or cannot, name himself tries to places himself outside of the 
beckoning of the representation system and seems to avoid fixing his subjectivity 
by precluding the possibility of interpellation. But, perversely, and due to the 
logic and relentless necessity of names, he (in)advertently has a name created for 
him through the simple act of refusing to do so: that is, the narrator has a name 
defined by his decision not to reveal his name. It is ‘The Unnameable’. The 
attempts of the unnameable to draw attention to the inescapable subjectivity 
which language always imposes -  and within which the proper name plays a 
substantial part — is a subject on which Beckett wrote in private correspondence 
to Axel Kaun:
As we cannot eliminate language all at one, we should at 
least leave nothing undone that might contribute to its 
falling into disprepute. To bore one hole after another in it, 
until what lurks behind it - be it something or nothing - 
begins to seep through; I cannot imagine a higher goal for 
a writer today.
(cited in Calder 1998 :17)
The metalinguistic conceit of refusing to play the language game of nomination 
does not succeed for The Unnameable because metalanguage is subject to the 
same inexorable logic of the proper name as first order language. To paraphrase 
Kant on the sublime (Kant 1962), any concept which can be presented to the 
senses will acquire a name even if that name only functions to refer to the 
indescribability and sublimity of the concept. Avoiding referentiality but 
retaining sensibility for a character is not possible. Once the character is 
presented he becomes a named entity, whether the writer wishes or knows how 
to christen him or not. Sense always proceeds contingently from reference, and 
reference, or its appearance, is ubiquitous.
Sidney Feshbach, in comparing the naming strategies of Joyce and Beckett, 
argued that Joyce was primarily concerned with adding complexity to names, 
burdening them with allegorical, connotative information and increasing their 
referential and allusive power (‘Fionn Earwicker’, ‘Jarl von Hoother’, 
‘Comestipple Sacksoun’), whereas Beckett’s strategy was to subtract, to
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minimise the information which could be presented in the label with the 
inevitable result of trying to scour all value and function from the name:
Whereas Joyce risked supersaturating the names and 
therefore the substance of fictional identity until they 
passed beyond a magnitude that readers could 
comprehend, Beckett risked reducing the names and 
therefore the substance of fictional identity until they 
contracted to a magnitude that readers could not 
comprehend.
(Feshbach 1995:615)
To forsake the referential or orientational aspect of naming, by unmasking its 
rules as Beckett does, is not necessarily to give way to apophasis and the 
impossibility of communicating through naming -  despite Feshbach’s allegation, 
it is difficult to see how it can be ascertained whether readers comprehend the 
name ‘Clov’ any more or less than they comprehend “a dustman nocknamed 
Sevenchurches” (From Finnegans Wake (Joyce 1946)) -  except that the 
communication is not centred on the named characters but on the means by 
which their names have no necessary relationship to them, do not obviously 
describe them and only barely refer to them. Beckett’s naming strategy is, on one 
level, a performative acknowledgement of the role of sign difference in the 
creation of proper names. It seems indifferent, apathetic or even openly hostile to 
the game of phonic play. By failing to replace one system of conventions, hinged 
on maximised differences in the sign articulating the differences in the nature of 
those the signs refer to, with another such system, Beckett’s strategy paves the 
way for a reading of character relationships based upon the shared bareness of 
referential existence and because the characters remain undescribed, left in their 
endogenous and private coherence, by their names. These intuitions of faint 
similarities occur when what Lacan calls the pre-symbolic Real -  the preverbal, 
non-referential sign -  is encountered where the symbolic — the coherent and 
conventional sign — is expected and is usually sovereign (Lacan 1955). That is, 
the symbolic marker of difference fails to cleave solely to its referent and, in 
hinting at other referents, other characters, or none at all incuding the self,
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reveals the horror of contingency upon which symbolic conventions are based. 
This, in essence, is one aspect of the production of the uncanny.
When the referential function of naming is ignored, when reference fails to refer 
to a single unchanging and unique thing, what results is a confusion about which 
character is being referred to and what the character is supposed to embody. One 
could say that this confusion or hesitation is due to the fact that the name has 
failed to provide a rigidly designated symbolic space to which the character’s 
attributes and actions can later be unambiguously assigned. One can look at this 
kind of indifferentiation as at an example of fuzzy sets of properties whose 
ambiguous difference is further complicated by the near uselessness of their 
labels.
In such a case the prospect of identification, of affirmation of who the character 
is, becomes problematic, as though consistent, distinct and meaningful names are 
part of a contract between the writer and his reader which, once broken, cause the 
reader to hesitate before, and fail to recognise, the character in their uniqueness. 
In the absence of a sufficiently differentiated name, an epistemological 
queasiness ensues because none of the signposts in the text offer a simple route 
back to perceiving the character as a unique, differentiated, autonomous and 
coherent subject. To fail to differentiate between names is, it would seem, to 
render the name meaningless as a referrer, the character de-individuated. The 
name points at nothing singular and sensible. The uneasy reaction we might have 
to such an under-named character, or characters, is similar to what Kristeva calls 
the horror of the abject: a glimpse at a pre-cognitive, pre-social undifferentiated 
identity (Kristeva 1982).
This play against differences between signs is just one method of transgressing 
the dominant rules of naming in creative writing. Non-differential or frustrated 
naming is possible because language is a system without a centre or a 
transcendent authority to which names and their meaning can ultimately be 
referred. This idea of deferred meaning, of signs which do not provide a link to 
an underlying reality but merely to other signs, can also be used to inform a 
treatment of the onomastics (name use) within the narrative, as in Paul Auster’s 
City o f Glass.
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4.6: A u s t e r ’s N a m e s  a n d  E c h o e s  o f  N a m e s
City o f Glass has as one of its themes the polysemy, function of, and endless 
echo between names. A brief synopsis of the narrative will help to foreshadow 
this treatment. Daniel Quinn, a lonely man approaching middle age, lives an 
uncluttered, unattached life, writing detective stories in his New York apartment. 
One night his telephone rings and a man’s voice asks to speak to Paul Auster of 
the Paul Auster Detective Agency. Quinn tells him he is mistaken and hangs up. 
He begins to regret being so quick to dismiss the query and vows to play along if 
the man should ever call again. Some nights later, he does and Quinn, ‘without 
knowing why’, claims to be Paul Auster and so begins his involvement with the 
case.
The caller is Peter Stillman, a disturbed adult who, as a child, was the subject of 
a language experiment at the hands of his father, also Peter Stillman, who 
deprived him of contact with humanity and with ‘human language’, hoping to 
discern in the child’s naturally developed communication the original, pre-Babel 
language. Stillman Jr is concerned that his father, recently released from an 
institution, is intent on killing him and hires Auster/Quinn to find him and follow 
him. Quinn accepts and follows the man he thinks is Stillman Sr for days, weeks, 
months until he doesn’t know how long he has been on the trail, nor whether he 
knows or can know anything about the case, the people involved and, eventually, 
himself. Along the way, he tracks down the real Paul Auster and enjoys a 
conversation with him which exacerbates his confusion about the case: Auster is 
not a detective either. He is a writer.
A number of features of the narrative underline its concern with language and 
with the function of names. The notion of a pre-Babel, ‘pure’ language in which 
things and names are conjoined and naturalised (or divinised) is the concern of 
Peter Stillman Sr. Nominal frustration, or non-unique referral, is brought into 
focus through two name-related strategies within the narrative. The first is the 
partial identification of the central character Daniel Quinn with the character 
Paul Auster’s son Daniel (who draws attention to it by announcing “Everybody’s 
Daniel!” (City o f Glass: 89)). Quinn’s initials are also echoed in the name of Don 
Quixote, the authorship of which novel he discusses with the Auster character 
and whose defiance of rationality his adventures resemble. A further conflation
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or confusion of name function occurs when Quinn attempts to decipher the 
origins of the pseudonym ‘Henry Dark’ which Stillman Sr. has used. This 
antagonist, if he can be called that, bears the same name as his son. The latter 
remarks upon this:
Strange, isn't it, that two people can have the same 
name? I do not think that he is me. We are both Peter 
Stillman. But Peter Stillman is not my real name. So 
perhaps I am not Peter Stillman after all.
{City of Glass: 18)
Stillman Jr’s attitude to names is the most ambivalent, because of his troubled 
relationship with language. He frequently dissociates himself from his name, 
adopting a contextually bound one, switching names with his addressee and 
following the logic of such switches to their (il)logical conclusions:
'I am Peter Stillman. I say this of my own free will. Yes.
That is not my real name... My real name is Mr Sad.
What is your name, Mr Auster? Perhaps you are the real 
Mr Sad, and I am noone.’
(City o f Glass: 15-17)
The irony being that ‘Auster’ isn’t even Auster but Quinn. Stillman also plays 
with the decomposition of names, and the irrational force of their playful 
recomposition:
She says the father talked about God. That is a funny 
word to me. When you put it backwards, it spells dog and 
a dog is not much like God. Is it?
(City o f Glass, p 20)
The forlomess of Quinn’s pursuit of absolute proof in the case of the Stillmans is 
multiply ironic for he has no sure reason to suspect that a crime has taken place 
or will take place; no way of knowing where it might transpire and is even 
unsure if he is pursuing the right man. Quinn writes detective fiction under the 
pseudonym ‘William Wilson’ (an allusion to the character of the same name in 
Poe’s uncanny story about doubles (Poe 1840)), identifies strongly with the 
direct, macho behaviour of his main fictional creation ‘Max Work’ and answers
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capriciously to the name ‘Paul Auster’ in receipt of a telephone call. Given these 
moves away from his authentically given name, a treble mediation, it is no 
surprise that eventually his own sense of authenticity becomes corrupted. 
Deprived, through playful and frustrated experience, of any faith in the 
authenticity of the name, he glimpses a revelation of his own inauthenticity, and 
can not recover a sense of the self which was tied to that name.
Marc Chenetier has written about the “assumed” arguments which run through 
Auster’s trilogy and which are often the only provision of detail (in terms of 
character names and location) in its first two books. The narrator of Ghosts, the 
second novel of the trilogy, says of the location of the action:
The address is unimportant. But let’s say Brooklyn
Heights for the sake of argument.
(Ghosts: 9)
As Chenetier points out, the argument is, in one way, one of referential necessity, 
since the actions must take place somewhere to distinguish them from actions 
which have taken place in other places (Chenetier 1995). Within the narrative, 
the name of the location does not actually provide any referential information of 
any kind since there are no other places against which the label ‘Brooklyn 
Heights’ acts as a deictic marker. The statement of location, as with the use of 
names, simply acknowledges the prescribed logic that places have names to 
distinguish them from other places. This is also reflected in the choice of names 
for the characters in Ghosts. They are all named after colours: Black, Blue, 
White, Brown. This use of an inventory of colours as an inter-differentiating 
mark suggests a strategy of using a rigorously classified set of labels, possessing 
natural differences, to mark the differences between character types. It has the 
apparent virtue of affirming the authenticity of the name, as tools of reference, 
through the implied comparison with the scientifically, culturally and cognitively 
differentiated medium of colour. But the colours of the spectrum are not 
irreducibly different in this fashion: the spectrum is a continuum in which white 
constitutes all colours, black their absence and colour admixtures are greatly 
possible and nearly infinite in number.
As Quinn observes when he has eventually absolved himself of his affinity with 
order, stability and method:
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“A white wall becomes a yellow wall becomes a grey wall, 
he said to himself. Changes and then more changes still.”
(City o f Ghosts: 104)
Auster’s use of names appears to differ from Beckett’s in their heavily ironic and 
allegorical connotations -  Auster is the playful postmodernist to Beckett’s 
playless existentialist -  but both call the idea of the name as strict designator into 
question by exposing its historicity, birth in the potential of a symbolic system, 
and inescapable relationship to other names. These are techniques which 
frustarate the logic of the proper name. Techniques of frustrated nomination 
exemplify the possibility for avoiding strict designation which the system of 
language based on diffemce provides. To the aspirational and prescriptive logic 
of analytical philosophy, itself adopted by creative writing discourse, it counters 
that names do not always refer unambiguously to a singular something. What I 
have called the uncanny effect results from a radical exposure to the return of 
once familiar things now forgotten; unhomely reminders of the chaotic real 
through fissures in the symbolic order. In the investigation of the referential 
function of names, this amounts to an exposure of the name’s contingency, its 
occasional failure to refer to anything presentable to the senses or singular in its 
nature. Beckett and Auster demonstrate this aesthetic through the strategies of 
phonic indifference, recycling and doubling of names, and distantiation of 
characters from their names. The sublime, the uncanny and the nameless are not 
interchangeable concepts: but the frustration of the logic of the referring name 
helps to allude to the presence of the familiar but ineffable extra-linguistic, by 
pointing out the failure of the sign to cling rigorously to the one thing it is 
supposed to denote.
4.7: A  G r a m m a r  o f  U n c a n n y  R e f e r e n t ia l  N a m in g
The production of an uncanny effect relies upon confronting conventions in 
which the symbolic order of identity is naturalised with one result being the 
demonstration of the contingency and undependability of identity markers. 
Uncertainty results when the writer does not follow these conventions in such a 
way as to enable reader’s inferences about character essence to function. With 
regards to the name, this has the result of drawing the reader’s attention away 
from the task of character profiling and causing them to hesitate, noticing some
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incoherence between the non-differentiating function of the name and its effect 
on making the character seem less distinct from others.
To this end, the rules for producing an uncanny effect are founded on inverting 
modular naming techniques for referential purposes in so far as they describe 
reader’s expectations about the function and nature of character names in a 
novel. These transformations are outlined ideas of how these conventions can be 
frustrated to produce a hesitation and misrecognition effect:
4.7.1: Co n tin g en c y  o f  N am es
Drawing attention to the contingency of names through the treatment of character 
names exposes the name’s non-essential relationship to the bearer. Research 
from cognitive and developmental psychology suggests that children have a 
tendency to regard the name not as a label attached to an object but as an 
essential attribute of the object (Rosenblum and Pinker 1983). By historicising 
the baptism of the character, this tendency to view the linkage between name and 
bearer as natural or divinely authored as transcendent is destablilised 
This can be achieved by having a character adopt a new name, or series of 
names, during the narrative, without allowing the reader to infer that these are 
conveniences necessary for the plot in the form of temporary disguises. In 
Malone Dies, Beckett’s narrator performs this act of abrupt re-naming with 
Saposcat:
For Sapo -  no, I can’t call him that anymore, and I even
wonder how I was able to stomach such a name till now.
(Malone Dies: 229)
Alternatively, the character’s name, it’s provenance, connotation and 
significance, when made the subject of discussion within the narrative becomes 
similarly de-naturalised, as though the unconscious process of characterisation 
which is supposed to attend the name loses its power once its mechanics are
exposed. Auster does this with Quinn in City o f Ghosts: When Quinn meets Peter
Stillman Sr and reveals his name, the latter replies:
Quinn. Hmm. Yes. Very interesting. Quinn. A most 
resonant word. Rhymes with twin, does it not?.. And sin, 
too, if I’m not mistaken .. and also in .. and inn ..I see 
many possibilities for this Quinn, this .. quintessence ... of
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quiddity. Quick, for example. And quill. And quirk.
Rhymes with grin...
(City o f Glass: 74)
And so on. The phonic and alliterative connotations and the name’s ‘surplus’ 
meaning are unveiled in a scattergun deconstruction of the name which leave it 
connoting everything and, as a consequence, nothing much that is singular or 
related to other aspects of Quinn’s character. The name does not cohere him, nor 
uniquely refer to him, but points in a many different partial directions at once.
In Monsters Worse to Come, the opportunity to allude to the origins of names, 
their contingent provenance in capricious decisions as opposed to a rational 
method for describing and identifying the person or character to which they refer, 
arises with the character of Captain Deeds. Those names which seem to be the 
most naturally descriptive and referential are also those which are most 
profitably subjected to an historical account of their origins. Captain Deeds’ 
narrative role, and identity, would seem to be perfectly summarised in his name -  
authority and action. And yet he distrusts his own authority and is aversed to 
action, preferring to sleep. The confounding of the role begins with the 
declaration that his name is not a title but a product of the absurd alignment of 
his parent’s tastes and prejudices.7
'Captain' was not a rank within the Elfin Police - there 
were no ranks - but was the young man's Christian name; 
his father being keen on titles and his mother being a fan 
of science-fiction programmes and an avid consumer of 
popular fish-stick products.
(Monsters: 89-90)
The origins of the name in whim and the inscrutable motivations of the one who 
has the authority to name, is more explicitly highlighted when the giant, formerly 
known as Devaney, meets with the doctor in Monto and is offered the name 
‘Petey’.
The giant shrugged his shoulders. It made no difference 
to him. He supposed he needed a name. He knew
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nothing about Peteys; he knew nothing about himself.
There was equivalence there.
(Monsters, p57)
In fact, his name is changed twice in arbitrary ways which fail to graft. That is he 
is baptised but there is noone around to continue the chain or referral which 
Kripke argues is necessary for the functioning of the name and, so, he loses his 
name and becomes unbeckonable:
And so Devaney, the giant, who was now called Petey but 
had noone to call him that, had stayed in the apartment, 
for months or maybe years, suffering no inspiration to do 
anything else. Devaney, the giant, who was now not 
called Devaney, nor Petey, nor anything else, did not eat, 
did not suffer on this account, did not sleep, ditto. He felt 
no different with each passing day of eventlessness. He 
could not feel different, having no memory of feelings to 
compare new feelings with, and being under no obligation 
to look for any.
(Monsters Worse to Come: 125)
Having no name, he becomes deprived of feelings evoking the prerational 
‘magical’ view of language which Wittgenstein (1950) discerned in discourse 
about names: which carries the uncanny implication that changing the name 
changes the nature of its bearer.
4.7.2: Frustrated Nomination
To use the technique of ‘frustrated nomination’ is to suggest a sublime affinity 
between characters by erasing or reducing the phone and graphic difference 
between their names. This is the effect of Moran’s discourse on the real name of 
‘Molloy’ (Mellose, Molone, Moloch etc.), in which, under doubt and analysis, he 
produces four new names, which invoke other characters or potential characters. 
The rule of unique assignation which supports rational differentiation of others is 
broken here, or fractured by the similarity of referring signs. Using the same 
initial phoneme (sound) for character names achieves this kind of interference, 
but other phonic techniques can have the same effect. For example, Malone lists 
off the names of a few former acquaintances ...
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Johnson, Wilson, Nicholson and Watson, all whoresons.
(Malone Dies: 218)
. . . i n  which it is the last syllable or morpheme which unites them. Frustrated 
nomination also refers to the Kantian subline in that it presents to the senses a
concept which seems sensible but which cannot be known owing to its
magnitude: it is unimaginable because it hasn’t been specified by name. In 
Monsters Worse to Come this strategy of non-referring allusion is used to 
characterise the most enigmatic of characters
‘Does the thing you're looking for have a less complicated 
name?’
‘It does’, said Hoc Danger. ‘It has the simplest name. But 
its name is not to be trusted.'
He may have been speaking the truth but Devaney could
not tell for the young man did not name it.
(Monsters Worse to Come: 22)
This is also the case with the related aspect of namelessness. Being without name 
appear to be a way of avoiding a fixed subjectivity:
‘My name is Kinnegan’, said Kinnegan (to his cow). ‘You 
on the other hand, have no name and cannot be called 
upon to act by anyone, regardless of the circumstances, 
pressing or otherwise.’
(Monsters Worse to Come: 73)
The function of this exchange, which is one of a series of disconnected 
monologues which Kinnegan delivers to his cow, is to raise the spectre of 
namelessness in the novel. Kinnegan’s speech suggests that the unchristened cow 
can escape a fixed subjectivity and interpellation by virtue of remaining 
nameless: a utopian and liberationist sentiment which runs through his thinking. 
He misrecognises the nature of namelessness, however, and cannot see the logic 
of the proper name: in lieu of a given name, he takes to referring to his cow as
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Thing thereby fixing its subjectivity to his own. He is conscious of the dangers of 
being named, intimating that is his own name that will cause him to be plucked 
from the womb in which he has slept all of his life:
'No-one has yet chosen to call upon me but if anyone 
decided that I was worth a go they would know where to 
start. That is, by using my name.'
(Monsters Worse to Come: 73)
It is also possible to defer the giving of a name, in which case the 'meaning’ of 
the character is left in doubt. I have written a short story based on this premise 
which seeks to exploit the inferences that are drawn from names and ontological 
information given about character by offering two possibilities as to what the 
character is and giving only information which is consistent with both 
interpretations. This story, Names for the Children, is in Appendix B.
4.7.3: M ultiplic a tio n  o f  Nam es
Multiplication of names occurs when names, and parts of names, appear and re­
appear to denote different characters and thereby interfere with the process of 
unique assignation. Other interference features such as rhyme and 
anagrammatisation can also be used to this end. The objective with this technique 
is to encourage mirecognition or non-differentiation between characters by 
failing to clearly articulate sufficient or any difference in their nomination. The 
most direct way of achieving this, which both Beckett and Auster use, is to apply 
the same name to two characters (fathers and sons, in these cases). Or, as 
Nabokov and Poe have done, to double the name for a unique character -  
Hermann Hermann, Humbert Humbert and, more cryptically, William Wilson 
(Nabokov 1956; Nabokov 1955; Poe 1976). Raymond Queneau’s attempts at 
reader defamiliarisation involved using the same names to denote different 
characters, or using multiple names for one character (Campbell-Sposito 1988). 
In such cases there is not so much an uncanny echo between names, as a 
deafening roar.
Nabokov’s use of anamorphism (partial punning) of character names in Bend 
Sinister was designed, he said, to create a “wayside murmur” between character 
names to insinuate their generic homogeneity under the eye of the beholding
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state (Nabokov 1962; Boyd 1988). That logic again: name elided is identity 
elided.
In Monsters Worse to Come, the excessive signification of names was funnelled 
through the character whose identity I was most keen to make unstable. The 
character introduced as Hoc Danger reveals himself, or re-christens himself, Doc 
Hanger. Devaney, the only one apprised of this, can make no sense of this, 
particularly since the man seems also to wear disguises. Later on, and in very 
brief ‘wayside murmurs’, mention is made of the authors Chad Grone, Don 
Greach and Rod Change. These are all anagrams of Hoc Danger. The latter three 
are not physically presented in the novel and so there is no other information to 
tie to the character name which might indicate that the character has previously 
been met. Hoc Danger and Doc Hanger re-surface throughout the novel, each 
time looking radically different, as though in permanent flux between one form 
of self-presentation and another. This is done to provide information for two 
distinctly different interpretations:
1) That they are in fact the same character who passes under different 
arrangements of the same name and who disguise themselves;
2) That they are different characters who sometimes share the same name.
The idea is not to force a reader into choosing one of these options but to 
engineer the story so that both are necessary for the reader to make sense of what 
is going on. Since they are mutually exclusive ideas, this causes hesitation and 
misrecognition with regards to the idea of the unicity and coherence of the name 
and the stability of the character they are referring to. Similarly, the anagrams of 
their names which re-surface in another conetxt (Chad Grone, Don Greach and 
Rod Change) are all authors. That is, have the same functional role, and so, to the 
reader attentive to the wayside murmur, these offscreen characters have 
unspoken similarities and the same question can be asked of them: are they the 
same person and is that person the same as Hoc Danger/Doc Hanger? The 
echoing play between names can be used to even greater levels of disorientation 
and sublime allusion: another anagram of the name ‘Hoc Danger’ is used in the 
novel (‘grand echo’). Hoc Danger says to Devaney, on the train to Elfin:
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‘But you will notice me many times when you come to 
read your own biography. My name will sound a grand 
echo in your head’
(Monsters Worse to Come: 266)
And the co-occurrence of the words ‘Doctor’ and ‘hanger’, and the implied 
association between them, also provokes a readerly suspicion about the identity 
of the giant’s benevolent doctor which the narrative is ordinarily expected to 
confirm:
‘I have no hangers’, he said. ‘What would a doctor want 
hangers for?’
(Monsters Worse to Come: 130)
By maintaining silence over whether or not this doctor is the same Doc Hanger 
who told Devaney a ‘backwards secret’, the reader is left to their own inferential 
devices which, because of the fugitive nature of identity attributes involved, may 
be insufficient to deliver a consoling resposnse one way or the other.
4.8: C o n c l u s io n
This chapter treated the various referential functions of names and the 
epistemological assumptions which support their use as markers of coherent 
identity. It was suggested that creative writing discourse has, on the surface, very 
little to say about how a writer should select names for characters except to 
advise that the names coheres with the rest of the character’s social class 
memberships and signifiers (be realistic) and should differentiate one character 
from another at graphic and phonic levels. The relative silence over the issue in 
the discourse might partly be explained by the fact that people already have a 
sensitivity to how names characterise people, as folk theories of naming show, 
and that this is assumed background knowledge which can be transferred to the 
naming task. I suggested that analytical philosophy has explanations of name 
functions which support such notions by insisting on the unique and rigid 
designation which a name effects in its ability to enable the distinction of one 
person from another. Since the uncanny prospers when such a distinction 
becomes confused, one strategy for creating a misrecognition effect is to narrow 
the sign difference between characters.
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The strategies of uncanny referential naming were presented as:
■ Drawing attention to the contingency of the name through the treatment 
of character names (onomastics) and their origins and changes;
■ Using the technique of ‘frustrated nomination’ to allude to the sublime 
and evoke an uncanny reaction;
■ Multiplying names by referring to different characters with the same 
names or creating echoes between characters by using anamorphism, rhyme 
and alliteration (multiplication of name elements) to suggest a shared 
identity between the same-named characters.
The next chapter looks at the issue of character behaviour and action and how it 
is the most popularly used strategy in the definition of character in that it 
harnesses reader inferences for understanding and emotional identification of 
character. It looks at the issues of free will and character transformation and how 
they are cohered to suggest that rational, goal-oriented behaviour is the only 
possible schema to bring to character behavioural psychology. An alternative 
approach which involves counterposing character lack of desire, splitness and 
epistemological security is proposed to produce the uncanny effect.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r  N o t e s
1 Mary Seeman’s model is devised for parents choosing names for children, or adults 
pursuing legal name changes. I think it is valid to extend its application to fictional names 
as an initial explanatory model.
2 One offshoot of causal theory is Austin’s idea of language as a system which is not 
structured simply for description or declaration of truth, but also as a means of allowing 
for language performance, or what Searle calls speech-acts, in which use of the name 
has different meanings or uses depending upon the context of the utterance, the one 
who speaks it and other para- and meta-linguistic factors. (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). 
But, even in such a model, what can be considered the “meaning” of the name does not 
change, but remains stable despite the multitude of ways in which people make ‘sense’ 
of the use of the name. This idea of stable links between signs and referents is central to 
analytical approaches to names, just as it is the bedrock of modular apprroaches to 
creative writing.
3 This table represents the lexical similarity or difference between character names in 
spatial terms. It is achieved by converting the lexical strings of the names to numerical 
arguments using a computer microprogram, and plotting the differences graphically. The 
phonological difference can be arrived at differently, for examples by using phoneme 
groups which are similarly sounded (/p/,/b/) and plotting the spatial differences between 
the names.
4 I am using the term “naive” to refer to self-described writers who are unpublished but 
aspire to publication. This material was taken from publicly viewable material posted on 
the website of Zoetrope (http://www.zoetrope.com) which acts as a workshop for 
working writers. The sample taken from the website were discovered on the novella 
section, and is listed in the bibliography.
5 These are the most popular names in the United Kingdom for the years 1998-2003, 
used here for the purposes of illustration.
6 The last two rules are, to a large extent, subject to genre sub-rules. For example, non­
realist genres such as science fiction tend to stretch the rule on name typicality by, for 
example, adding in phonemes which do not occur very frequently in the universe of 
proper names within the English language. Letters which are used infrequently in the 
English language such as Z, V and X are typically used to connote the exotic and otherly 
qualities of the characters concerned (such as Zargon, Voldemort, Stomoxys). 
Frequently, the science fiction genre also uses what MacLean calls exotic punctuation 
and layout typography (MacLean 1997) to underscore the otherness of the events and 
characters being related. The Character Naming Software designed by DF Creations 
uses some of these implicit orthographic and phonemic rules, or patterns, in its 
development of genre-themed names. See http://www.dfcreations.com
7 Joseph Heller’s Major Major Major Major is an unconscious forebear of Captain Deeds 
(Heller 1962).
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Chapter Five: C haracter Behaviour and Free Will
This chapter discusses the role of action and behaviour in the characterisation 
process. Within modular discourse, action is typically regarded as the means by 
which characters are most efficiently differentiated from each other, and through 
which they become assigned to narrative functional roles (hero, antagonist, 
confidante, love rival, object of desire etc. (Edelstein 2000)). Equally, behaviour 
indicates and confirms the character’s membership of sociological and 
psychological categories (gender, race, age, occupation, kinship (Fiske & 
Neuberg 1990)) and, by relating it to underlying psychological traits, allows for 
characters to appear as coherent, rational and integrated subjects. Action is 
always understood as originating from within the character as an expression of 
desire, will and intentionality.
Novelists are advised to re-enforce reader heuristics for decoding the meaning of 
character action with explicit description of the supporting motivation for such 
actions. I argue that the epistemology of otherness -  the interrogation of which is 
one of the novel’s functions -  with regards to behaviour can also be approached 
from a perspective in which repressed fears of automatism and unbounded 
identity are revived to create an uncanny effect. The uncanny approach to 
characterisation through action and behaviour uses techniques of external 
agency, non-transformation, sublime obstacles and epistemological uncertainty 
(Hume 1992; Kant 1973; Wittgenstein 1954). These features are presented in the 
respective trilogies of Beckett and Auster and their application in Monsters 
Worse to Come is explored.
5.1: In t r o d u c t io n  -  S o c ia l  C o g n it io n  a b o u t  t h e  b e h a v io u r  o f  
O t h e r s
Most literary effects, particularly in narrative prose, depend on 
the fact that readers will try to relate what the text tells them to a 
level of ordinary human concerns, the actions and reaction of 
characters constructed in accordance with models of integrity 
and coherence.
(Culler 1975: 142-43)
If the end of the story does not have a cause-and-effect 
relationship with what came before, it is not a dramatic story.
5: C h a r a c t e r  B e h a v io u r  a n d  F r e e  W il l
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(Frey 1997: 55)
In Chapter Two I outlined a model for conceiving how a character impression is 
formed by a reader on the basis of information provided within the text. In 
summary, this suggested that readers use recognition heuristics to infer the 
character’s membership of various social, psychological and ontological 
categories. The presented attributes of the character, such as age, gender, 
appearance, name, occupation, use of language and behavioural traits provide 
cues for these inferential schema to operate. Subsequently, the reader engages in 
assigning the character to a position within the fluid hierarchy of the chief 
category of which they are a member. This is negotiated through the inclusion of 
episodic information about character behaviour related later within the text. It 
was suggested that the reader adjusts their impression of the character to 
accommodate this new information. One possibility for evoking an uncanny 
response to character might therefore lie in arresting the smooth operation of the 
reader’s inference mechanism by providing contradictory cues about group 
membership or social roles. This would constitute a thwarting of the decoding 
process which looks for affirmation of the familiar prototype to which the 
character’s nominals (detective, father, mother, criminal) point, by revealing that 
the character has none of the prototype’s attributes and instead occupies the 
fuzzy hinterland between two mutually exclusive categories - detective/criminal, 
mother/father, for example.1
Understanding the prototype, and the types of qualities which a character is 
inferred to inherit simply by belonging to a particular group, enables us to 
prefigure ways in which expectations and assumptions arise in a reader’s mind 
about the likely behaviour and traits of the character they have encountered.2 
While inference frustration has a large role in its production, the uncanny arises 
from a very different epistemological base. It requires that the epistemological 
framework -  the schemata, inference rules and categorial thinking -  which 
enables readers to make quick and economic impressions of character must itself 
be called into question by the greater usefulness of other, repressed, forms of 
epistemology.
Profound reader hesitation in decoding a character is produced, for example, by 
her inability to assign a character to one of two mutually exclusive and
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superordinate categories on the basis of their observed behaviour (present / 
absent; alive / dead). But this kind of hesitation rests upon an understanding of 
behaviour as something which stems from the character and which is not subject 
to other forces or constraints. That is, the inference which enables judgement 
about character assumes that the character is the intentional author of their own 
actions. This is a central assumption within some theories of psychological 
intentionality (Searle 1983) in which evaluation of other people proceeds from 
first assuming their awareness of their actions and knowledge of the meaning of 
those actions to others. At its heart, it must make the assumption that one chooses 
to act meaningfully at all times and, by having choice, is not therefore subject to 
constraints, interference and limitations in one’s behaviour. As David Hume 
reasoned, it is necessary for the preservation of any system of ethics or ground 
for judgement about people to assume that they are responsible for their own 
behaviour. In that one assumes that other people exercise free will, one makes 
them responsible for their own actions and one reasons that they are aware of 
how those actions will be decoded by others forming an impression of them 
(Hume 1739(1992)). The idea of free will supports all of the judgements one can 
pass on others. In its absence, or its mitigation, one is helpless to judge 
conclusively the intention behind another’s actions. But this is not the case with 
fictional narratives in which the reader’s knowledge of the contrived nature of 
character’s actions -  their Real provenance in the author/narrator’s will -  is 
repressed in favour of the pleasure of the fictive dream, and its production of 
illusory order.
Part of the supporting fabric of creating character impressions involves mapping 
this human quality of free will onto characters and making them responsible for 
their behaviour. The alternative -  the suggestion that they occupy an 
otherworldly, quasi-determinist universe -  is what is systematically repressed in 
the narrative discourse. This is because it destabilises the sovereignty of the ego. 
The production of fear which attends the return of the repressed 
counterassumption, that the ego is not in charge, defines the uncanny. As well 
as thriving in producing a hesitation response from readers, the grammar of the 
uncanny is such that one of the interpretations which the reader is forced to 
consider must be one which falls outside the domain of rationalism and which
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thereby undermines the validity of the epistemological framework and common 
wisdom from within which such a judgment operates. This impacts on the idea of 
the character’s free determination of their own action because a character’s 
implied lack of free will can cause the reader to recognise the spectre of 
automatism, determinism or external agency in their experience.
So how does this relate to techniques of characterization through action?
The uncanny is less concerned with the revelation of character essence through 
action which marks traditional discussion of characterisation techniques, and 
more with the metaphysical aspect of action and its bearing on character. 
Specifically, this involves the relationship (of intentionality, will, desire and 
control) of the character to his actions and whether he and the reader may 
confidently assume that the character intends and produces that behaviour. That 
is: whether the character’s actions have arisen directly from the attempt of his 
will to assert itself with regards to a clearly signalled objective, or whether the 
possibility must be entertained that nothing sensible exists in the text, or our 
rational experiential schemata, which can account for the character’s responsive 
action. The provenance and purpose of character action (as an expression of 
internal or external will) stands as a major area for exploring the possibility of 
uncanny techniques because it touches upon the three concepts most central to 
that aesthetic: the fear of automatism, the fear of incoherent subjectivity and 
identity diffusion. The treatment of these concepts will also result in the 
production of readerly hesitation between two interpretations of character 
behaviour in which the narrative fails to offer information which could result in 
closure in favour of a rational epistemology of otherness.
Before discussing these concepts, it is useful to look at the specific conventions 
which are advocated in modular writing guides with regards to action, so as to 
see more clearly how what it excludes from its discussion (its own irrational 
Other) is what provides the best basis for devising uncanny methods.
5 .2: M o d u l a r  A p p r o a c h e s  t o  C h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  a n d  A c t i o n  
Good fiction characters are fighters. They know what they want, 
they encounter trouble and they struggle...The character will not 
give up. He's determined; he's going to try again and again. He's
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going to fight to maintain control of his life - and determine his 
own destiny.
(Bickham 1997: 22-24)
For there seem to be two ways of behaving in the presence of 
wishes, the active and the contemplative, and though they both 
give the same result it was the latter I preferred, a matter of 
temperament I suppose.
(Molloy: 53)
Modular discourse insists that character is under strict obligation to act in a way 
which brings her objective closer to realisation: she must operate ‘maximally and 
rationally’ (Frey 1987) and the reasoning behind her action must be made clear 
to the reader. Action proceeds from desire, or at the very least, from the 
expression of will, and these should be uncomplicated, well-signalled and reflect 
self-determination. For these reasons, will cannot express itself in the decision 
not to act or to accede to confusion or the will of others. Nor can it be absent, 
according to these rules. This is to presume a number of things about the 
ontology of character and the universe within which it operates. It suggests that 
the character always knows what she wants; is familiar with the objective and the 
impediments in her way, and the means to overcome them, and has, or will find, 
the will and resources to supplement her knowledge of what action is required. 
At the centre of this universe of behavioural logic and moral law is the doctrine 
that these qualities -  the knowledge of how to act and the desire to act - will 
deliver a result, either by allowing the character to achieve her objective or by 
disproving what Frey calls the character’s ‘premise’: the proposition that her 
behaviour and actions are suited to achieving her desire (Frey 1987). Character 
hesitation, goal insecurity, disinterest, solecism and chronic uncertainty about the 
identity of the self or those people or forces which are aiding or frustrating her 
quest are features which have no place in such a schema. James Frey states that:
Homo fictus always operates to his maximum capacity, and it is 
never within a dramatic character's maximum capacity, when 
faced with a problem or a challenge, to do nothing.
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(Frey 1987: 24)
Not only is a character incapable of doing nothing, but she always does 
something to the best of her ability. What is produced by the rules of rational- 
modular discourse is a character with coherent subjectivity functioning in an 
ordered and knowable universe, always questing and moving towards attainment 
of the quest within a familiar teleology. The contemplative, stoic or indifferent 
response of character to threat, or the absence of desire or awareness of a threat, 
is not permitted. Evan Marshall lists those values which he regards as worthy 
explanations for a character’s motivation to act: duty, honour, love and justice 
being the most important (Marshall 2000: 18). These are affirmative concepts, 
traditional and, in his treatment of them, ideologically stagnant. There is no room 
for doubt or dialectic in their midden. Beckett’s ‘active and contemplative’ 
responses, although they are presented as equally useless as reactions to desire in 
Molloy, are completely different species - one obligatory, the other unusable - 
within the view of modular approaches.
The epistemological issues which uncanny treatments raise about 
characterisation require a reconsideration of what action, and inaction, each 
reveal about character and our understanding of the meaning of other people’s 
behaviour. The reliance of modular theories on an assumption of the sovereignty 
of free will in dictating action, individual certitude about what it is that one 
wants, and the strictly causal relationship between actions and outcomes that it 
implies, aborts such an exploration. This is partly because character action, 
which is what lends profluence to the narrative and the plot in that it makes 
things happen, is put to service in such a way to encourage the reader to always 
understand the character as a particular and rational archetypal agent. The 
character’s actions, in the face of a specified problem, are what mark her out as a 
different type to other types.
Characterize through an action ... we individualise by seeing 
characters doing things and saying things, not by the author 
telling us about them.
(Stein 2000:51)
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Meaningful action is action which places the character within a salient cultural 
frame of reference. A character about whom nothing else is known, except that 
he is climbing a high mountain in a blizzard, for example, is at least placed into 
an implicature from which the reader can draw inferences about his traits, nature 
and desires (adventurous, brave, foolhardy etc.). A character sitting in a room 
watching television, in contrast, seem too quotidian to be any particular type of 
person, and since the economic rationality of modular advice is to ensure 
specificity and uniqueness of character -  assignation of type -  the latter is not a 
character sufficiently defined through their actions at that point. Other actions, 
prompted by narrative developments are required for the television-watching- 
character to be branded with particular traits.3
A lot of human behaviour is not meaningful in this sense - it does not 
differentiate one person from another. There is no popular character type in the 
literature described as “food-eater” since the point of action, with regards to 
characterisation, is to lend the appearance of uniqueness. The fiction editor Sol 
Stein pre-empts criticism of this myth of uniqueness upon which creative writing 
discourse is based and at the same time tries to justify the flawed 
representationalism of much novel fiction when he comments pithily that:
People who are exactly like other people probably don't exist.
(Stein 2000:61)
The key words here are the adverbs ‘probably’ and ‘exactly’. It is highly 
‘probable’ that each person is genetically distinct from all others, for example, 
and yet, when considered side by side with all other living and nonliving 
creatures, people have more commonalities than differences -  and our 
perceptions of them move between uniformity or association and difference or 
dissociation. It is partly the commitment to individualism which represses the 
adualist way of thinking. Stein advances a thesis about the naturalness of 
differences between people which fiction openly amplifies between characters so 
as to make them more ‘lifelike’, consoling for the reader in their uniqueness and 
recognisable as different brands. And there is the word ‘probably’ which, 
although it acts here as a rhetorical downtoner to prevent claims of totalising 
logic, also reveals the kind of hesitant deliberation about the exact nature of the 
difference of other people from the self and each other: a hesitation which is not
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recommended for fiction. This hesitation acknowledges, in faint outline, the 
legitimacy of the Beckettesque question: what can I finally know about the 
difference between me and others, and others and other others? How can I 
repress the feeling that I cannot rely on my ability to differentiate one from the 
other? To which a supplementary question might be asked by the writer: how can 
I show something of the way in which my understanding of myself has its 
provenance in others and that, because of this doubled relationship, can cause me 
to misrecognise something of the other in the self?
These uncanny hesitations disappear in Stein’s subsequent comments, as he 
skirts around the question of doubt to address the apparent nature of those 
differences. The process is simplified once more: the writer simply sees what the 
character does next and describes it, to quote John Gardner, and looks into the 
character’s heart and head to see the reasons for it, to quote Jack Bickham. This 
is necessary because, when a character acts, “readers must be able to understand 
why your character does what he does” (Gardner 1999; Bickham 1997: 19). 
Victoria Schmidt classifies standard fictional types partly by their agentive 
quality (The Mystic, The Warrior, The Nurturer for example (Schmidt 2002)) 
and outlines a model of understanding these mythic types by referring to their 
tendency to act in highly specified and pre-determined ways when confronted by 
particular threats or in pursuit of particular goals. For example, the Nurturer is 
driven to help people and, if a needful person is not available, the Nurturer will 
act to acquire one -  through seduction, entreaty or kidnapping. This formulates 
the behavioural law that action proceeds from trait, and trait itself is a 
formulation of a core desire or need. It is therefore the business of plot to present 
the character with the specific threats and goals which excite these action traits 
so as to reveal or confirm their presence to the reader. The novelist John Gardner 
writes that:
Plot exists so the character can discover for himself (and in the 
process reveal to the reader) what he, the character, is really like: 
plot forces the character to choice and action, transforms him 
from a static construct to a lifelike human being making choices 
and paying for them or reaping the rewards.
(Gardiner 1999: 52)
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“Really like”, “lifelike”: action is presented as an alembic which, literally, 
animates the character who otherwise would be stillborn; would be too 
authentically and statically human to be of interest. This is a peculiar feature of 
the discourse about characterisation -  the more authentic the character is and the 
greater his similarity to real-life people, the less ‘real’ he will appear to the 
reader. It is what Christopher Ricks calls the contradictory presence of the 
language of death in life (Ricks 1991: 76): the soulless one is the more animated 
one. Another doubled entity. A writer developing a character for whose actions 
the narrative offers no simple, single motivation, and in doing this 
acknowledging the partial and tentative nature of any explanation for those 
actions, runs counter to this ethic of transparently motivated action. In the face of 
threat, for example, the character must be seen to make the choice to fight or flee 
and not, as Marshall and Stein separately put it, to dither and act like a ‘wimp’, 
because readers are not interested in ‘wimps’ (ops. cit). This accusation of 
wimpishness is based on a particular, and highly limited, idea of what a rational 
response to threat might be which itself rests on the issue of ontological security 
and self-determination. The possibility of a character making no response to a 
present threat, or a response which follows an interior and oblique logic, or to fail 
to pursue a well-signalled objective without explanation, is annulled within the 
discourse because it does not conform to reader’s expectations of rational 
reaction. Just as importantly, within modular discourse, it does not drive the plot 
forward.
Stasis of narrative and character, inaction or non-disclosure of the motivation for 
character action conspire to create confusion in the reader’s mind. The twin fears 
of confusion and stasis in all their forms is endemic in modular discourse:
Characters in the midst of static conflict, Egri points out, stop 
developing. The shy character remains shy, the brave characters 
remains brave, the weak remain weak, the strong stay strong.
Nothing bores a reader as much as static conflict except no 
conflict at all.
(Frey 1997: 40)
Which suggests that the most pressing reason to agitate a character into action is 
to prevent the reader from losing interest. In one way, this seems like rowelling a
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caged lion to rage just to frighten young children. If we were to ask the strange- 
seeming and naive question “why not leave the character in peace and solitude?” 
we would be in danger of straying away from the essence of fiction which, we 
are told is about conflicting movement, desire and force, and yet, it seems to me, 
that to counter the relentlessness of this approach which exalts the movement of 
plot above the consideration or interrogation of character and the possibility of its 
representation, this is a notion worth considering. The character whose actions 
are playful and cryptic, in the sense that they seem only to take place because 
something has to take place -  one has, after all, to do something - and are not 
directed at any discernible end, comes to seem, in this light, like a courageous 
refusal to submit to the demands of narrative and socially signalled coherence. 
But within modular narratives, action and ensuing change must happen and for 
change to happen, the character must ‘recite their pensum’ and perform their 
narrative chores so that lessons may be finally be learned.
This change-through-action is also, of course, to allow for the emergence of 
conflict between characters competing with opposing desires. A warning is often 
given to aspiring novelists to amplify the difficulties which a character must 
surmount in achieving her goal -  Marshall suggests that “it should appear 
practically impossible for the lead (character) to achieve her objective” (Marshall 
2000: 19). A wealthy character is not stretched, nor the reader engaged, by the 
objective of her paying rent or buying food, since she can easily achieve this. A 
character in this position behaving as though in a crisis would, according to 
Marshall, confuse a reader as there would be no objective correlative to her 
stressed behaviour. And yet, the heuristics which people use for understanding 
the behaviour of ‘real’ others can often result in such confusions, fail to 
correspond to expectations produced by rational schema, in that they fail to 
explain satisfactorily why other people behave as they do when no obvious 
source of threat or attraction or presented trait is around.4
The key concepts of characterisation-through-action of modular approaches to 
creative writing centre on the following precepts:
• Rational behaviour proceeds from character traits and desires and these 
behaviours are provoked by the necessity of movement and change to the 
telling of stories;
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• Character transformation occurs through action and such actions are an 
expression of the character’s conscious will;
• Obstacles and antagonists will emerge which produce certain specific 
actions which correspond to and re-enforce the traits which have been 
attributed to the character;
• The character has an unassailable epistemological certainty and 
ontological security about all of these matters.
The inverse of these things - the absence of character desire, the character who 
cannot act or for whom everything which is not the self is necessarily an obstacle 
which cannot be overcome, the character who does not know why it is he does 
what he does and who senses the contingency or absurdity of his actions -  are the 
first, broad features of the uncanny, and are also staple features in the work of 
Beckett and Auster, in that they deprive the character of his recognisable 
characterness, and so return him to the fold of the contradictorily lifelike yet 
unreal subjects who cannot easily engage and disengage from conflict and cannot 
conceive what kinds of actions might deliver closure to them and their 
difficulties. And of course, for the uncanny, there is a question mark to be hung 
above the head of the narrative consciousness which, with the unaccountable 
ability to explain the force of will and desire which produce these actions, has the 
task of cementing character desire to character act and affirming their rational 
nexus.
These features cohere on an epistemological level to reaffirm the coherence of 
the character, the integrity and rationality of their actions, and the sovereignty of 
the ego in the ownership of these actions. As with other aspects of modular 
advice, it excludes any opposing possibilities, using the argument that the reader 
will disengage if these familiar conventions are not employed. The rationalist 
assumptions of modular discourse affect the different aspects of narrative upon 
which character impinges. I will look at the ways in which the uncanny reaction 
can be effected by calling this dominant epistemology into question through 
proposing an alternative possibility.
5.3: U n c a n n y  A s p e c t s  o f  C h a r a c t e r  B e h a v io u r
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The more powerful the lens of the microscope observing the self, 
the more the self and its uniqueness elude us; beneath the great 
Joycean lens that breaks the soul down into atoms, we are all 
alike. But if the self and its uniqueness cannot be grasped in 
man's interior life, then where and how can we grasp it? The 
quest for the self has always ended, and always will end, in a 
paradoxical dissatisfaction. I don't say defeat. For the novel 
cannot breach the limits of its own possibilities, and bringing 
those limits to light is already an immense discovery, an 
immense triumph of cognition.
(Kundera 2000: 25)
For Kundera, individuation for the self proceeds directly from action but 
ultimately the self s quest for, and claims to, uniqueness fall apart and, like 
doubt, will tend to multiply under analysis where the self and other come to seem 
more and more alike. The pure route to a self-other distinction, which is assumed 
in everyday discourse about the self, proves illusory. The demonstration of this -  
its bringing to light -  is a function of the novel which involves the uncanny. As 
with other aspects of self-grasping that is the process of characterisation, this is 
achieved through interrogating those conventions which allow the self to think of 
itself as discreet, fixed and autonomous. These conventions are the basis of 
modular characterisation -  which grasps the self by first removing the thorns - 
manifested in the sovereignty of conscious will with regards to action, subjective 
coherence and differentiation from others, and epistemological and ontological 
security which are assumed and re-enforced by its representation techniques. The 
uncanny -  the re-visiting of denied knowledge in the form of recognition and 
misrecognition -  can be approached by devising methods to sunder the easeful 
coherence of desire-action relations in the presentation of character behaviour.
Chatman discusses the indeterminacy of character impressions which arise when 
the character exhibits an inconsistent multiplicity of behavioural traits (Chatman 
1978). A perfectly formed modular character only performs actions which are 
consistent with pre-established traits -  a detective may disregard legal 
conventions to exercise his duty but cannot ignore his epistemological 
conventions and begin to doubt the plausibility of his methods -  because the 
character’s first task is to be coherent and to allow for productive inferences to be
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drawn, by the reader, based on a shared model of human nature and the 
behaviour of generic types. Indeterminacy (the failure of the reader’s heuristics 
to predict or explain character behaviour) in character actions hints at the 
character’s incoherence, their potential for cryptic changefulness and 
irrationality, and, more tellingly, their possible lack of autonomy. These are the 
province of the uncanny effect: when apprehensions of automatism, loss of 
coherence, the return of pre-rational ways of thinking, such as adualism -  now 
represented as chronic doubt -  return to mind.
5.3.1: F o u r  P r o p e r t ie s  o f  U n c a n n y  B e h a v io u r
There seem to be four ways in which the uncanny impacts upon characterisation- 
through-action by causing a hesitation in the reader’s processing about what the 
provenance and significance of the character’s behaviour is. These correspond to 
rules of frustration directed against the rational conventions typically employed 
in characterisation through action:
1) Action arising without any indication of will or desire on the part of the actor. 
Better, in fact, if there is a suggestion of the contrary: that the character is 
behaving against their will without any sensible force present to explain their 
actions to them. This is a nod to automatism -  the idea that they are puppets 
acting on the command of some external agency - which itself hints at a fear of 
control loss, of the ego’s disintegration or, at least, the vulnerability of the self s 
coherence when it has become socialised (merged with the selves of others) and 
is engaged in action. The agency, in fact, does not have to be external, it only 
requires that the narrative does not describe it as a rational, homuncular decision. 
For instance, Auster’s Quinn walks out of his apartment “simply going wherever 
his legs happened to take him” (City o f Ghosts:3). His legs lead him and legs are 
not normally the seat of reason in characterising conventions.
2) Action which does not stem from nor is attributable to an established 
psychological or sociological trait, but is instead only accountable by thinking of 
it as the expression of an irrational fear or desire which remains unarticulated 
within the narrative and unknown to the character. Typically, Freudian 
complexes, and developmental phases in which perceptual and personal 
reasoning follow different and dreamlike paths provide instances of this. The 
reading heuristic which extrapolates anticipated action from observed traits in a
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character should hesitate when presented with one of what Culpeper calls an 
“unfaithful range of characteristics” (Culpeper: 41). Since the action (pursuing 
and observing a suspect, in the case of a detective such as Beckett’s Moran or 
Auster’s Quinn, for example) is expected to correlate to some aspect of the 
detective’s cluster of traits (curiousity, a belief in the empirical method), the 
emergence of actions which intimate disinterest in or doubt about the plausibility 
of the objective, on the part of the detective, and which are not accounted for by 
narrative developments, will tend to produce hesitation in the reader owing to the 
failure of the “trait produces action” heuristic. The detective who cannot detect is 
a creature of lack because, once he ceases behaving in the prescribed way, we 
cannot claim to know anything about him and must doubt what we thought to be 
the centre of his self and our way of perceiving it. In other words, our 
understanding of his categorical membership needs to be refreshed but what 
rational schema can one use to deal with a detective who refuses to detect and 
about whom one knows almost nothing else?
3) Should the action arc of one character mirror that of another without them 
being aware of each other, the effect which arises will be the impression of 
doubledness or of unbounded identity. This duplication, it seems to me, will have 
two senses: that the narrative functional roles have been over-produced, and 
instead of their being one character with detective traits and the detective 
method, there are two, working towards the same objective, unbeknownst to each 
other, as though functional clones of each other. If we apply this to the world 
outside the text and return briefly to the Capgras patient of Chapter 3, 
experiencing the duplication of roles is like being presented with two mothers. 
One knows that the Mother role is conventionally singular and so must make a 
decision between the two ‘candidates’ (the present one or the absent one, in DS’s 
case). The other sense of doubledness in this case is the more primitive one: that 
they are in fact the same person - because they are doing the same things for the 
same purpose - and are simply labelled with different names or immured in 
different bodies. In either case, the assumptive logic of schemata, inference and 
known things is waylaid and there is an added effect of undecidability which 
persists for as long as the narrative does not try to indicate which interpretation is 
more rational.
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4) Inaction in the presence of threat would seem to evoke an uncanny effect if it 
is not rationalised within the narrative and it seems inconsistent with the stimulus 
which the character has encountered and which would seem to require him to act 
in a certain way. Character inaction produces non-profluence in the narrative and 
it is the reader’s expectation that the narrative moves towards a denouement, 
through certain understood narrative codes, producing a solution -  and not a 
dissolution -  of the character’s problem. The character’s refusal to respond to the 
accepted stimulus which should produce the required action produces hesitation 
in that it brings us to doubt the stimulus-response account of human, or character, 
behaviour. In such cases, the character fails to cleave easily to his agentive role: 
his actions bear no relation to the objective which we know him to have and, in 
fact, suggest that he has no desire to intervene in his own fate or, as Bickham 
puts it, has no desire to fight to determine his fate. This is a thanatological 
feature, a death instinct, which is usually denied to fiction characters.
Placing narrative process above character rights always fixes the human-in-text 
within a limited behavioural range and a fixed epistemology. High modernism 
and postmodernism, in freeing the character from these labours does not solve 
the epistemological issue but, at least acknowledges the limitations of the 
approach. The uncanny works well to display those limitations. With regards to 
character action, the formalist and humanist approaches are most different in 
their vision of the provenance and teleology of action and quest. I will now look 
at how these features, and others, occur in the works of Beckett and Auster to see 
how the uncanny principle can work in fiction and to further explore the issue of 
a different teleology in which neither character nor narrative indicate any sure 
knowledge of what all this action leads towards. The main areas which have 
potential for creating an uncanny effect with regards to character behaviour are:
■ Change and Transformation;
■ Free Will and Behaviour;
■ Sublime Obstacles;
■ Epistemological Uncertainty.
In the following sections I look at these features separately, examining each by 
looking at the precepts of the modular approach and the alternative techniques of
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the uncanny ectypes which Beckett and Auster provide. For each of these 
components of characterisation-through-action, I discuss some of the related 
‘decisions’ made in the composition of Monsters Worse to Come.
5 .4: C h a n g e  a n d  T r a n s f o r m a t io n
Aristotle’s concept of the peripatetic narrative in which characters suffer 
reversals of fortune which leave them at an endstate which diametrically opposes 
their starting position is heavily influential in modular characterisation (Aristotle 
1961). Character transformation tends to follows a trajectory of self-discovery 
which is itself mapped out by the development of the story. For Propp, narrative 
is characterised by a description of a state, a change of this initial state (the 
introduction of disequilibrium) of which the focus of the change is on the main 
character (Propp 1968). In the process of the journey or quest which the narrative 
describes and which the action punctuates, the character typically loses, then re­
acquires something in order to restore equilibrium. The interval between the loss 
and the restoration is the period of the character’s action from which a lesson can 
be adduced. Frey summarises the Aristotlean peripatetic reversal thus: “The 
length of a drama should be such that the hero passes by a series of probable or 
necessary stages from misfortune to happiness or from happiness to misfortune" 
(Frey 1987: 75).
This rule, because it is not explicitly presented to the reader, is a cryptic metatext 
for the universe of actions within the narrative in that it suggests that the lesson 
drawn from journeys and progressions of a lead character within the narrative 
should be salutary and co-incide with the end transformation of that character. 
Frey calls this lesson the novel’s premise, and cites James Foster Harris in his 
description of the relationship of the premise to the narrative as "a solved 
illustration in moral arithmetic" (Frey 1987: 50). That is: the novel establishes or 
proves the truth of a particular moral lesson. In the same way, the character acts 
in such a way as to prove or disprove his or her own individual premise. The 
premise of Humbert Humbert in Lolita, for example, is described by Frey as 
“great love leads to death”. His actions are said to ‘prove’ it in that Humbert dies 
having worked through his doomed romantic obsession with Lolita. On the 
surface, this idea of premises seems reductive and inane5 but it describes an 
important point in modular approaches -  that the character’s actions, proceeding
146
Chapter Five: C haracter Behaviour and Free Will
from his desire, will result in a change in his state which imparts a conclusive 
moral lesson because it corresponds with the resolution of the narrative and the 
return of normative order to the world of the story.
And so the character’s journey knits their actions together and the stories closure 
is the end of that journey upon which the writer has caused the character to 
embark. The character must return to an unconflicted state, whether by the high 
road of some kind of victory or the via dolorosa of loss. Movement, change, 
transformation: these are the features which define character action within 
modular discourse. It cautions against stasis of any kind, and at every turn, 
because of its non-profluent nature. Frey cautions:
Do not think of your characters as fixed. To have a vibrant, 
vigorous, gripping novel, the characters must change as a result 
of conflict. The character premise is a description of that change.
(Frey 1987: 93)
In order to get the character to that resolution and the proof or disavoval of the 
lesson, the writer must consistently deprive them of closure and of stasis until 
most of the narrative has passed. Once entrained, the conflict cannot relent until 
the story is told. This is the leeside of Freitag’s triangle in which a series of rising 
conflicts reach a crisis point at which they are resolved and the denouement 
ensues, relating the nature of the metamorphosis which the lead characters have 
experienced.
When this connection of will to action is successfully exposited then, according 
to such advice, the reader can engage in pre-empting the character’s actions and 
can pass what Frey calls the “would-she-really-do-that”? test. If a character 
behaves in a way that does not conform to the expectations which the cues about 
their type have encouraged the reader to develop, then the fictive dream fails, the 
character has changed too suddenly and a fissure, a misrecognition, develops 
between the reader’s internal model of the character and this changeful being 
who now appears in the novel. As previously mentioned, these kinds of cues are 
sociological, behavioural, occupational and they must, through the common 
language of prototypical thinking enable accurate prediction of other attributes, 
including available actions:
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“In short fiction, characters and their backgrounds are almost 
always much more consistent than real people in real life”.
(Bickham 1997: 19)
The rational-modular assumptions about the relationship between character 
action leading towards transformation are as follows:
■ Character action results in the transformation of the character, the re­
establishment of the norms which existed prior to the appearance of conflict 
and the establishment of a moral premise which comments on their means of 
attaining the objective;
■ Character behaviour within this teleology must be placed within an 
epistemological framework which accounts for their behaviour in rational terms 
(suitable response to stimuli of threat or entreaty) and which represses the fact 
of the narrative’s demand of action from them.
■ The character must continuously encounter barely surmountable difficulties 
and obstacles before reaching the point of closure and transformation.
These rules define the expression of the epistemological framework for 
understanding otherness with regards to the transformative powers of narrative 
with which the discourse works. It is their overturning, thwarting and exposure 
that the route to the uncanny lies. The works of Samuel Beckett and Paul Auster 
offer counter-strategies, in which radically different notions of the relationship 
between character to the narrative’s demand for action and meaningful behaviour 
are to be found.
5.4 .1: B ec k ett  a nd  T r an sfo rm a tio n
Many fictional journeys either educate the hero (Tom Jones) or 
test an education already received (The Odyssey). Neither form 
is relevant to Molloy except insofar as both provide the reader 
with expectations that Molloys narratives will thwart.
(O’Hara 1972)
Discussing Schopenhauer’s influence on Beckett on the topic of human will and 
its consequences, John Calder summarised Beckett’s attitude as follows: “To be 
the first mover in anything is to carry a curse, which is why inaction is always
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preferred to action” (Calder 2001: 25). Inaction, and the preference for it, runs 
through Beckett’s first-person character-narrators. Molloy confesses that he has 
“always loved doing nothing” (Molloy: 93). And yet this love is complicated 
because he has a presentiment that regardless of his love for doing nothing, there 
is always something being done to him. Molloy inhabits his room, does not yearn 
for escape from it, but awaits release, not believing it will come and doing 
nothing to obtain it. He waits and tells the story of his quest to return to his 
mother, despite his inability to tell stories, and despite the abject failure of his 
quest.
Change, like narrative profluence, seems inexorable. In the case of Beckett’s 
characters, it is the change of decomposition, a process not arising from will but 
one which expresses a teleology -  a narrative arc towards decrepitude. In Molloy, 
change, being the expression of character transformation through action, is not 
the outcome of the character’s will alloyed to an objective (it is not his action), 
but something that happens to him and in spite of him. The result is that 
transformation, such as it is, is not something by which he comes to know 
himself, but rather the means to his dissolution of self and whatever it is he 
thinks he knows. This would seem then to offer a structure, albeit a perverse one, 
which resembles the conventional narrative: a narrative of decomposition leading 
to the full stop of death which, in line with the form of the peripatetic narrative, 
describes a perfect reversal of the character’s state. But even this lesson or 
transformation is not guaranteed. The failure of the ultimate change to arrive, of 
the transformation to have a final form or meaning, is a permanent feature of 
Beckett’s narratives:
Change was like a kind of clawing towards a light, a countenance
I could not name, that I had once known and long denied.
(Malone Dies: 149)
Beckett’s characters seem to share his reasoning that while not living is 
preferable to living, never to have been bom is the better than both (Ricks 
1991:17). Since this cannot be achieved -  because being, like story, has already 
begun -  one must go on telling the story without ever knowing when and where 
the story will stop or what sense it might make to one who has perceived it. 
Because of this attitude, death is not a denouement within the trilogy. It doesn’t
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arrive for any of the narrators, or, if it does, they fail to notice the difference. The 
fear of change, because it is a voyage into an unknown, repeatedly surfaces in the 
trilogy and, from one angle, seems to operate as a narrator’s commentary on the 
absurdity of the character’s journey in fictional narratives.
I used not to know where I was going, but I knew I would arrive, I 
knew there would be an end to the long blind road. What half- 
truths, my God.
(Malone Dies: 182)
There is no end in sight to hard road, or, perhaps, only half of one. Then why do 
these characters continue? What compels them to continue without any prospect 
of ending or achieving the quest that they only half-know? Why does the narrator 
carry on relating his inability to attest to anything or telling stories that cannot 
end? Because as life goes on, irrespective of will, narrative goes on even if there 
should be nothing to relate and its characters do not want to participate in it. In 
the logic of modular creative writing, narrative can do nothing else but go on 
hurtling towards its restoration of balance or, if it attempts to fail in this duty, it 
fails to be narrative. To look at it through the formalist view: the structure and its 
need of roles and conflicts and closures drives the characters on to fill in the 
paradigmatic slots.
For the narrative to go on, the character must continue to invest in action, in 
striving to achieve his goals, whether he knows what they are or not. Stasis, or 
what Beckett called the “wisdom that consists of the ablation of desire”, is not an 
easy possibility for characters (Beckett 1936). John Calder says that it is the 
tragedy of this kind of ow-ness that is at the centre of Beckett’s trilogy: the 
endlessness which always appears as something final succeeding other frustrated 
promises of closure giving rise to the character’s impulsion onwards with a sham 
teleology, without belief in any meaningful final state or goal-achievement 
(Calder 2001: 28). The presence of on marks the insistence that the subject must 
always go on, though it wishes for nothing more than to cease, to be restful and, 
in fact, wishes it had never been set onwards in the first instance. Hence the 
seemingly contradictory final words of the unnameable -  “I can’t go on, I must 
go on, I’ll go on” (The Unnameable: 406) - although it is impossible and
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undesirable I will do it, having no alternative. The story demands it. Non-closure 
under duress.
Beckett endorsed the philosophy of Geulincx, repeated in Molloy, that the only 
desire of value was “the desire and ambition to become nothing, to desire 
nothing, expect nothing and be nothing” (Cited in Calder 2001: 8). Of course, 
one cannot desire to be nothing and desire to have no desire at the same time. But 
it is this kind of thwarting of logic, desire and will that explains the emphasis on 
stasis and the impossibility of a final resting place for Beckett’s characters. For 
narrative an absence of ending is equally calamitous. Without a teleology, a 
belief that all this matters and that a denouement will soon be reached, the 
progress of the characters through their rising and falling conflicts, seems to have 
less appeal. If one considers the notion of transformation through reversal with 
regards to Moran, Molloy’s pursuer, we can see the perverse implications of 
applying this logic of the profound reversal in a story which has no 
epistemological foundations:
At the narrative’s commencement, Moran, recording the events relating to his 
pursuit of Molloy in his diary, notes:
It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows.
oMolloy: 92)
At the conclusion of his account, he writes:
Then I went back to the house and wrote, It is midnight. The rain 
is beating on the windows. It was not midnight. It was not raining.
(Molloy: 176)
The beginning and the end, normally the site for the restoration of the familiar 
are given this strange quality of reversal: we are back at the beginning (familiar) 
but what we were told at the beginning is now denied and so the scene returns as 
strange. The scene has been properly reversed but with the implication that the 
either the beginning or the end, or both, are a sham which are used simply to 
service the needs of narrative form. The familiar returned as strange causing 
epistemological uncertainty: the outline of the uncanny.
5.4.2: T r a n s f o r m a t i o n  in  A u s t e r
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The form trusts too much in transcendent reason. Part of the 
strong appeal of detective fiction, critics have suggested, is that 
readers can identify with the detective and achieve interpretive 
victory alongside him, or closely on his heels. Recent anti­
detective fiction denies this satisfaction and instead portrays the 
detective’s frustrated pursuit of authorial knowledge. William 
Spanos, in "The Detective and the Boundary" describes the anti­
detective story (and its psychoanalytical analogue) as "the 
paradigmatic archetype of the postmodern literary imagination; its 
purpose is "to evoke the impulse to 'detect'... in order to violently 
frustrate by refusing to solve the crime".
(Sorapure 1995: 71)
By placing his narratives at least nominally within the detective genre Auster 
signals the appropriateness of the detective reading schema to the reader. This 
carries with it implications as to what form the detective’s transformation will 
take. Typically in the genre this involves a movement from ignorance to 
knowledge -  an assumption of authorial knowledge about the identities and 
activities of the other agents in the novel. The knowledge, although it comprises 
the search for someone else’s identity (the identity of the criminal in 
conventional detective fiction) is often read as the detective’s inadvertent search 
for self. Chenetier describes Quinn’s behaviour in City o f Glass as:
Watching, stalking, turning into a voyeur, everything becomes an 
attempt at discovering one's identity by default.
(Chenetier: 38)
This is a useful synopsis of the fate of Quinn, Blue and Fanshawe in each of the 
novellas. The narrator of Ghosts, by way of a hypothetical simile, tells us as 
much:
For in spying out at Black across the street, it is as though Blue 
were looking into a mirror, and instead of merely watching 
another, he finds that he is also watching himself.
(Ghosts: 144)
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Quinn’s status as a detective in City o f Glass should only be provisionally 
accepted by the attentive reader, since he begins the novel by becoming someone 
else: “the voice on the other end asking for someone he was not” (: 3). In what 
looks like a reversal transformation, he concludes the novel by becoming no-one 
and being nowhere. His application of the rational method of detecting is 
premised, like modular creative writing discourse, on the assumption that he can 
inhabit another by properly surveilling them. The ‘real’ Auster tells him that 
“Noone can watch a person for 24-hours a day. It’s impossible. You’d have to be 
inside his skin”. To which Quinn replies: “That’s just the trouble. I thought I 
was” (:90). He assumed the possibility of transcendent reason and held that it 
would help him to master the other he was pursuing. But it has not and his 
investment in it, once collapsed, collapses him too. Because his objective is to 
observe another and, in effect to be a supemarrator, he is waylaid by the 
mysterious behaviour of Stillman which admits of no coherent impression and 
which, if  it is motivated by some will or desire on Stillman’s part is "so oblique, 
so fiendish in its circumlocutions, that he did not want to accept it.”(:71). Failing 
to accept the irrational interpretation open to him, he stays suspended in a 
moment of chronic uncertainty.6
Transformation occurs. Quinn begins to change but his change is only brought 
about by the operations of the outside world in response to his behaviour. Its 
inscrutability, its unwillingness to lay its mysteries bare in the presence of 
enquiry, crashes in on him. The change that it brings in him, which should be the 
lesson which the narrative imparts -  its judgement on character premise - has no 
meaning for him:
He had been one thing and now he was another. It was neither
better nor worse. It was different, that was all.
(City of Glass: 120)
Quinn reaches a terminus, ending up like one of Beckett’s heroes in a strange 
apartment, being fed by an invisible hand and keeping a journal of his thoughts 
against the eventuality of forgetting. He wishes to be in a place where the 
confusion of others is no longer present. In that he does not recognise himself as 
himself, has forsaken his name, no longer knows anything, except that he wishes 
to disappear:
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To be inside that music, to be drawn into the circle of its 
repetitions: perhaps that is a place where one could finally 
disappear.
(City o f Glass: 109)
And so finally, Quinn disappears or, at least, that is the information provided by 
the rigorous narrator who, in the sentiments of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, will 
not record that which is not definitely known: “Information is scarce and he (the 
author) has preferred to pass over in silence what could not definitely be 
confirmed” (:113)7. Quinn is gone -  his uncanny objective “achieved” through a 
complete transformation -  he has disappeared from the perceiving eye of the 
narrator. This would mark a kind of restoration of balance -  a reversal of sorts, 
except that Quinn re-surfaces (or does he?), in the third novel of the trilogy: The 
Locked Room. This phantasm is another application of the uncanny -  this second 
detective Quinn bears little resemblance to the first, it seems. But in fact, we 
know nothing about the second Quinn except that he is named Quinn and is a 
detective. The expectation that the narrator will intercede and assure or dismiss 
the implied comparison -  to affirm that they are the same or admit the 
coincidence - is not satisfied. The reader cannot know if Quinn has disappeared or 
become re-integrated or what kind of transformation has really befallen him. It is 
in the thwarting of the transformation -  the studious avoidance of closure -  that 
uncanny narrative arcs relieve the character from the constraints of the consoling 
metamorphosis.
5.4.3: T r a n s f o r m a t io n  in  M o n s t e r s  W o r se  t o  C o m e
The character’s transformation is distinct, salutary and observable when they 
rectify the loss which Propp’s disequilibrium has visited upon them, or when, in 
failing to do so, they acquire something, usually painful knowledge, about the 
nature of the world they inhabit. In Monsters Worse to Come, this schema of 
‘vindication or education’ is thwarted for all of the characters but for different 
reasons in each case. Treatments of transformation are unlikely to be uncanny 
purely by themselves as the uncanny relies upon the presence of other features. 
But because the effect relies very heavily on prolonging hesitation -  encouraging 
the reader to unsuccessfully overcogitate about the ontological nature of the
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characters in the narrative - the transformation or reversal cannot be complete. 
It must remain undecidable at some level.
There are a number of ways in which incompleteness can be achieved. If we look 
at the conventions for reversals, we see that they must allow for an inference 
about the continuity of the character beyond the end of the narrative and are 
likely to imply that the character’s endstate does not change in the future. An 
endstate suggests character coherence, satisfaction, closure. An effect aimed at 
hesitation before recognition must have the qualities of indeterminacy and refuse 
to comment on the nature and success of the transformation.
This applies to all of the characters in Monsters Worse to Come. It is particularly 
marked in the case of Devaney who, at the beginning of the narrative, appears to 
be without any recognisable human interior life. His external features present no 
emotion. He receives instructions and hopes one day to give them himself:
He had been instructed to kill the butcher. His attitude to the task 
had no remark in his appearance. His eyes remitted nothing in 
the shade, no features present there, as though the character of 
them had been smudged away by inkstained thumbs.
(Monsters Worse to Come: 2)
At the novel’s end, having undergone various trials in search of his fugitive 
identity -  he has no name, no past, no occupation, no self-concept, no others who 
care to pass sufficient time with him to enable him to recover any semblance of a 
self -  he is restored to this absence of conscience. His interior life is quelled and 
he is left an uncontemplative prisoner in his own body:
The giant staring at his feet, perhaps wondering how he could not 
order them to move from that spot, but happy enough not to 
have to think about where he might go if he could instruct them.
(Monsters Worse to Come: 275)
Devaney’s trajectory is like a double reversal -  he begins without conscience or 
integrated self-consciousness, gains it, loses it, gains it again, loses it again. He 
does not escape from the ensign of his character but is returned to his beginning 
state without any lesson. And since he is at no stage the author of his own 
actions, he cannot even be inferred to have learned from, or have been
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responsible, for anything that has happened to him. The absence of free will -  or 
its problematisation -  is the aspect of the uncanny that this non-transformation 
rests upon. This is the subject of the next section.
5.5: F r e e  W il l  a n d  A g e n c y
Character behaviour must, within conventional narrative, be viewed as the 
outward extension of inner character will. Real characters are active, self­
knowing and self-determining:
Interesting characters are almost always characters who are 
active - risk takers - highly motivated toward a goal. Many a story 
has been wrecked at the outset because the writer chose to write 
about the wrong kind of person - a character of the type we 
sometimes call the wimp. How do you build a character who will 
not be a wimp? In the first place, you determine to do so. He is 
committed. Attainment of his goal is necessary for his happiness.
(Bickham 1997: 22)
There is an irony in that the stimulus-response model of behaviourism (he sees it; 
he wants it) which underpins this notion of rational, self-determining character is 
so often accused of placing a facile determinism at the heart of human behaviour. 
There is the double-inscription of will in that the writer himself must be as 
determined (and self-determining) as his character in his approach to 
characterisation. The philosophical approach to free will which is called 
compatibilism, holds that freedom is the dependence of action upon will (Watson 
1987). Actions which arise without an origin in the desire of the actor are 
deterministic. Modular discourse does not discuss this as a consideration of 
character identity. The character’s fight for control with external forces may be 
the basis of a narrative, but their inability or unrelatedness to their own actions is 
not tolerable. One cannot attain one’s goal through action if one has no way of 
exercising one’s will. So, one can reasonably say that all characters from within 
the modular view are, by default, free agents. Where a character is constrained in 
her actions, this constraint will signal the obstacle against which she will fight or, 
in less dramatic narratives, it will at least be called to the reader’s attention to 
provide a framework within which the character’s behaviour can be understood 
as rational.
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Richard Double's interprets free choice as having three necessary conditions:
1) One is able to choose otherwise;
2) One can exercise control over what one's choices will be;
3) These choices are rational.
(Double 1991)
The uncanny fear of automatism can be promoted by causing the second of these 
criteria to be unproductive as an assumption -  intimating loss of control which 
implies loss of free will, but without accounting for that absence within an 
authoritative framework which acknowledges it as absent. That is, the reader 
must not be confident in the assumption that the apparent absence of self- 
determined action is accounted for by something which could be posited as 
rational within the narrative such as hypnosis or a temporary disorder which 
heightens the character’s suggestibility, which would only serve to normalise the 
effect and re-integrate it within the rational reading schema.
The first of Double’s criterion can be problematised within a treatment of the 
sublime obstacle: the absence of meaningful choice in the face of the death and 
disorder. The third criterion -  that the choices available to the actor are equally 
rational -  is what is troubled by the thanatological impulses in the uncanny 
which often causes a character to use the language of free will, agency and self- 
determination to explain the attraction of oblivion. Since oblivion is not an 
maximal-rational choice for an agent who has no signalled problems except that 
she is alive, the implication follows that the “obstacle” which prevents the 
character from achieving her goal is life. The preservation of self does not admit 
this into the fold of rational choices because it mocks the very idea of agency.
5 .5 .1: B e c k e t t  a n d  A g e n c y
Discussing this aspect of Beckett’s philosophy and characterisation in such a 
short space doesn’t do his treatment of agency any justice but I am not 
undertaking an extensive audit of his themes but looking for ways in which he 
uses unconventional approaches to characterisation which create uncanny effects.
Moran, in pursuit of Molloy, being a detective, is a rational operative. His 
immediate goal is clear, the obstacles consistent with those of other pursuit
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narratives (distance, absence of information, difficult and unknown terrain). But 
questions can be asked about his agency in the matter. He has been requested to 
undertake this task by Gaber, on behalf of the obscure Youdi, and has no option 
but to accede. And yet, Moran can justify the actions to himself. His choice to 
accede to the command is rational in that it is, after all, his job to do such things. 
His agency becomes suspect, however, when he treats the purpose of the quest:
The longer I took to find Molloy, the greater my chances of 
remembering what I was to do with him.
(M olloy: 138)
This is a character who falls into the trap of filling a narrative-functional role but, 
upon reflecting upon its purpose, realises that he has no knowledge of it. It can 
hardly be a choice premised on rational ends if the ends are not in sight. At least, 
they are not in the character’s sight, they may abide elsewhere. The analogy with 
fictional characters is clear: they are set forth on action not of their own making 
but have no space to reflect on the ultimate purpose of the acts. Only the narrative 
consciousness knows that. For this reason, identity, so strongly correlated to 
behaviour and to the rationality of that behaviour, is itself something which seems 
to reside elsewhere. Moran’s effort to fill his role, with its inequality of 
knowledge, power and will leads him to another dubious ‘choice’:
I have been a man long enough, I shall not try anymore.
(Molloy :176)
The idea that one “tries” to be what one cannot help but be is a peculiar piece of 
wisdom: it mocks the idea of free will by using the language of agency to 
describe the one thing over which one has no control: one’s coming into being. 
Choice does not exist in this domain nor is effort requested: life commences 
through the action of others. This parodying of agency is also applied to the task 
of Beckett’s narrators who, in imposing themselves on the story material which 
comes to mind, occasionally halt to wonder about the provenance of the story 
and whether their conscious striving to produce something external to them is all 
a trick which the mind plays on itself to convince the ego that it has achieved 
some control and mastery of its materials:
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I wonder if I am not talking yet again about myself. Shall I be 
incapable, to the end, of lying an any other subject... soon I shall 
not know where Sapo comes from, nor what he hopes.
(Malone Dies :189)
These reversals of the criteria of free will are indicative of Beckett’s tendency to 
use the language of rationality to encourage empathy and identification with 
sentiments which are otherwise irrational in themselves. These stop short of 
dismissing agency in favour of determinism because that would be to offer the 
consolation of secure knowledge. This commingling of two opposed 
philosophical concepts is less oblique in Auster in which more traditional fears of 
agency-loss are evident.
5.5.2: A u s t e r  A n d  A g e n c y
Little by little, Quinn began to feel cut off from his original 
intentions, and he wondered now if he had not embarked on a 
meaningless project.
(City o f Glass: 60)
In Chapter Three I discussed the presence of automatism in the character of 
Quinn. This approach is one of two characterisation strategies in Auster which 
are related to the exaltation of uncertainty about what degree of control 
characters exerts over their own behaviour. These are:
■ The attribution of agency to an unspecified elsewhere (often expressed in 
the character’s sense that they are separated from their own intentions);
■ A derealisation of self and the loss of ontological security.
The three main characters in each of the novels each undergo both of these 
operations. With Quinn, the sense of automatism is most urgent. Even his most 
basic actions are accompanied by a sense of dissociation from self in which, 
rather than finding his centre of identity through actions, he loses himself with 
every step:
Each time he took a walk, he felt as though he were leaving 
himself behind this brought him a salutary emptiness within.
(City o f Glass :4)
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The clearest expression of automatism is to be found the direct comparison of a 
character with a puppet or a doll. Peter Stillman Jr. is presented variously as a 
marionette and a puppet, one who is not conventionally dyspraxic but thoroughly 
derealised: he has no control over his body or his mind and only aspires to 
become real:
It was like watching a marionette trying to work without strings. “ I 
know that I am still the puppet boy. That cannot be helped. No, 
no. Anymore. But sometimes I think I will at last grow up and 
become real.” (City o f Glass: 15-22).
But, since the narrative offers the history of Stillman as an explanation for his 
strange behaviour, his dislocation, the uncanny effect is less pronounced in his 
case. It is with Quinn, and Blue in Ghosts, that the re-centring of agency is most 
effective:
But the days pass an d still he does not call. This, too, is troubling 
him, for he cannot remember a time in his life when he has been 
so reluctant to do a thing he so clearly wants to do. I’m changing, 
he says to himself. Little by little, I’m no longer the same
(iGhosts: 145)
Neither Quinn nor Blue nor the narrator of The Locked Room are men in control 
of their behaviour. Perversely, their actions are carried out in pursuit of the 
reclamation of agency. They wish their behaviour to be meaningful and 
intentional, but this can only come about if they are re-united with ‘themselves’. 
But once the innocence of the symbolic self is lost in contemplation of Real 
selflessness, it is very difficult ever to re-capture it.8
5.5.3: A g e n c y  in  M o n s t e r s  W o r s e  t o  C o m e
In Monsters Worse to Come, the issue of free will, and whether any of the 
characters exhibit any such thing, is centred on use of the words ‘instruction’ and 
‘decision’. An understanding of free will is such that character actions are simply 
assumed to emerge as a result of autonomous choice, not as a result of some 
unspoken edict or alternative sovereignty. People do not give instructions to 
themselves, because that makes choice seem like an act of communication 
between two aspects of the self -  a commander and a servant which model
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implies the splitness of subjectivity and is therefore prohibited within modular 
approaches. At the outset, this idea was established by using the term 
‘instruction’ to describe how Devaney was motivated into action.
These strategies fall into two complimentary strategies which hint at the 
following qualities of character: a lack of agency and a sense of unreality. In this 
light, it is said of Devaney that:
He had only been instructed to dispatch the butcher, not to 
remain dry, not to please himself, and so he stayed where he 
was ... sentiments resounded in his head. They did not sound like 
his words either but he found himself agreeing with them.
(Monsters Worse to Come: 1,7)
The transformation is almost the same as the switch from active to passive voice. 
This is jarring when the action being referred to is regarded as so inimical to 
coherent selfhood as to make no sense if one uses rational assumptions to build 
an impression of character.
The derealisation of self and other has been pointed out already with regards to 
the character of Captain Deeds. His partner, Whelms, is prone to chronic doubt 
about the nature of otherness and is forever entertaining doubts where doubt does 
not ordinarily apply. This extends even to the authentic agency of others:
Through the window he could see the outline of the orphan, 
sitting alone in a highback chair, staring into space, as though 
awaiting instruction or, Whelms thought and, in thinking, 
disturbed himself, waiting for his true self to come home so that 
he might move from that spot.
Kinnegan, as though aware of Whelms apperception of him, succumbs to this 
way of thinking about himself and confides to Albie Bawn his Capgras-like 
dissonance:
I have a me that is me. I sometimes feel though, that I am not 
me. That there is a me elsewhere and that I am just holding his 
place until he returns. The real me knows what is going on and I 
am shaming him with my actions. I am a false me. When the real 
me returns, what will I do?
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(Monsters Worse to Come: 219)
The most important in aspect of characterising in this way is to repress any 
indication of an agentive role for any named entity within the novel: the 
confusion about agency and authenticity which the characters undergo does not 
find its resolution in the acts of intentions of a masterful other (despite the 
possibility that The Duff is the external agent for all their actions) but alludes to 
an agent that is absent and about whom little is known or can be said. This 
sublime allusion is necessary for the avoidance of closure and the re-introduction 
of irrational means to the decoding of character.
5 .6 : S u b l im e  O b s t a c l e s
Conflict is the collision of the character's d esires with resistan ce - 
from nature, from other characters, from the spirit world, from 
outer sp a ce , from another dim ension, from within th em se lv es , 
from anyw here.
(Frey 1987: 30)
Obstacles and antagonists are expected to be as clearly visible, rational and 
resourceful as the protagonists whose objectives they thwart. James Frey 
advises that:
G ood opposition requires that the antagonist counter ea ch  of the  
protagonists attem pts to so lve  his problem s with a s  much force 
and cunning a s  the protagonist exhibits.
(Frey 1987: 32)
When Frey says that opposition can come from anywhere, he also means that its 
nature and provenance must also be signalled to the reader and character: they 
must know what they are dealing with. This suggests that the obstacle should 
have particular qualities which enables the use of rational inferences in the 
process of understanding character:
1: The obstacle must be presented to the senses. That is, it must be named and 
capable of being distinguished from others. Conventional threats and aides in a 
narrative are those who have the potential for assisting or preventing the chief 
character. Their relationship to the central character, in this matter of assistance 
or resistance must eventually be coded for the reader to infer.
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2: There must be equivalence in the force exercised by the two opposing agents. 
An obvious imbalance of capability does not encourage reader anticipation 
about the outcome of the quest. This rule also re-enforces the rational basis of 
narrative conflict: it is not rational to attempt to defeat an invincible opponent.
If these rules express the rational aspect of how the obstacle must be designed 
so that the rational side of character can be made manifest, it is with the 
appearance of unidentified, sublime and overwhelming obstacles that the 
uncanny appears.
5.6 .1: S u b l im e  O b s t a c l e s  in  B e c k e t t
For the outer world opposed my succeeding too.
(Molloy:87)
The first rule, that of presentability, requires that each potential obstacle is 
recognisable, nameable and can easily be identified so that its nature as an 
obstacle will be recognised when it is introduced. In Beckett this becomes 
problematic because, in most cases, the obstacle is ubiquitous and is outside of 
the character’s realm of control. That obstacle is the fact of being. Everything 
constitutes an obstacle which prevents the character from his goal of inexistence. 
“Things” -  all objects which also exist -  are similarly benighted and benighting:
The inertia of things is enough to drive one literally insane.
cMolloy: 120)
Identification of the obstacle is premised on being able to distinguish between it 
and non-obstacles. This requires its treatment in the narrative, its presentation to 
the reader’s senses in such a way as to allow them to infer the nature of the 
obstacle and therefore the qualities of the character who wishes to overcome 
them. Moran, who perversely refuses to engage in anything which would mark 
his report as literature, is equally reticent about relating information about the 
impediments which he met on his journey:
I shall not tell of the obstacles we had to surmount, the fiends we 
had to circumvent, the misdemeanours of my son, the 
disintegrations of the father.
0Molloy: 158)
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And so reveals nothing about them or about himself in the telling. Being 
possessed of no specific identity, these obstacles seem to surround the characters. 
When everything in the character’s universe is similar in its failure to provide 
assistance then the equivalence of forces which constitutes the second rule is also 
broken. Resistance is everywhere and by preceding the character into being it is 
implied that the obstacle is like the god of Whiteheadian theology: outside time, 
outside space, beyond recall and irreducible (Whitehead 1957). Of course, the 
obstacle is sublime in the second sense of Kant’s definition: its order of 
magnitude suggests an infinite size and duration which cannot be presented to the 
senses. Not alone can the character not overcome it (which makes every choice 
to act against it an irrational one) but he cannot even imagine its nature (Kant 
1973).
In Auster the obstacle is rooted more firmly in the epistemology of self-other 
relations. Each of his characters wish to apply rational methods to the complete 
understanding or mastery of a specific other. Armed with faith in these methods, 
their attempts are thwarted by the nature of otherness. As Fanshawe tells the 
narrator at the end of The Locked Room:
You can’t possibly know what’s true or not true. You’ll never 
know.
(The Locked Room: 312)
And so the uncanny obstacle for character is one against which its character is 
always defined as behaving irrationally and which has the following 
characteristics:
1: The obstacle has an order of magnitude and ubiquity which seems to pervade 
everything that is not the character: for Beckett it is the fact of existence and 
everything which is co-existent, for Auster it is Others whose behaviour 
correspond to nothing sensible which the self can apprehend.
2: The obstacle is, for these reasons, unidentifiable or at least should remain 
unidentified (unnamed) within the narrative.
3: The obstacle has force vastly superior to that of the character and which he can 
never overcome and can never know with confidence its identity. As a result, his
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behaviour is always better understood within a framework which permits an 
irrational connection between behaviour and desire.
5.6 .2: S u b l im e  O b s t a c l e s  A n d  M o n s t e r s  W o r s e  t o  C o m e
These three features of the sublime obstacle form the basis of some features of 
characterisation in Monsters Worse to Come. The irrational view of confronting 
the obstacle (of resisting resistance) which is outside time is expressed in the last 
chapter of the novel by Hoc Danger:
[Them dogs] would fight to escape their captivity except that they 
have become inured to it, you see. They would bite through the 
ropes if they thought it would do them any good. But what good is 
there in biting through one rope only to find that you’ve really 
been harnessed to the flat earth by another, invisible set of 
chains all this time? One chain succeeds another. The world 
knows that the tie that seems to bind you is only the first of an 
infinity of its kind.
(Monsters Worse to Come: 255)
If one chain succeeds another -  if each thing and process is only the an ensign of 
a fate which cannot be escaped -  then fighting ‘maximally and rationally’ against 
an obstacle in order to determine your fate is itself irrational. This possibility -  
for it is one mode of being amongst others -  is expressed so as to offer a 
counterpoint to the relentlessness with which Hoc Danger and The Duff each 
engages in aggrandisement.
The Duff, in one of many contradictory excurses of the role of will in the 
universe, states his intentions (and intentionality) in his first meeting with 
Kinnegan:
Tm awful fond of decisions. Can’t get enough of them. I have to 
make a decision every few minutes or I get very tense. As the 
man said ‘whosoever relinquishes his fate to the common destiny 
of creatures will subside back once more into the primal mud 
without a scream but he who claims his own fate will by that 
arrogatlon alone’ ... you know the rest.’
(Monsters Worse to Come: 75)
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And yet, this exertion of will has no discernible focus. It reflects only a will-to- 
power which uses any available means which might lead to an end which has no 
name. The D uffs history of extending his will into the outside world shows that 
he has no intention, or desire, beyond the exercising of a will-to-power which is 
always irrational in its failure to match means to ends:
These and more had been his projects of the past, progress the 
theme, experiments of a kind in which he had sought to prove 
something to himself and to his compatriots. Something which he 
could hardly describe. This list of his failed missions, pressing 
itself upon his field of vision, nestled with his other 
disappointments, including this last one with Devaney, and their 
recital to him seemed like some litany of woe.
(Monsters Worse to Come: 45)
He cannot describe what it is that will be proven or achieved by this exercise of 
power. It has no teleology of its own except the continuation and extension of his 
realm of sovereignty, self-perpetuation as an end in itself, which is what 
Nietzsche called the only application of will9. The uncanny effect relies on not 
specifically identifying the obstacle which prevents the success of will in this 
endeavour. It must remain elusive and abstract. Dehistoricising the obstacle or 
the reasons for failure can help to achieve this. The Duff, confiding to his 
automaton McAnnix, admits of some awareness of his inability to deal with 
adversity and suggests a glimmer of contradictory awareness that he is the 
obstacle standing in his own way and, being such, is something from which he 
can never escape:
I sometimes feel that the long, long past which I have behind me 
contains more than I can recall. I have done some things that I 
cannot immediately summon up and cannot reflect upon. But, 
and I'm sure you would agree Mister McAnnix, that is not a sin 
and if a man can acknowledge his very few blindspots then he is 
a man with a great degree of self-awareness
(Monsters: 131)
The Duff appears to be both the object of his own will and the impediment to its 
achievement. Extending the range of his influence will always also extend the
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range of his failings. The uncanniness comes from this doubledness of self (as 
will and negation) and from the splitness which it posits at the centre of human 
endeavour.
5.7: E p is t e m o l o g ic a l  U n c e r t a in t y
Characters who have ‘simple’ doubts about themselves can be said to be of a 
conventional kind when those doubts are posited as part of the obstacle which 
they must overcome to effect their transformation or reversal: a mountaineer who 
does not know if he has the courage and skill to master the summit is such an 
example. In the case of such characters, doubt or scepticism act as pebbles in the 
machine of the rational method which the narrative must crush en route to a 
clear confirmation or rejection of the authenticity of the fact under dispute. That 
is, the mountaineer will come to know if he has the ability to match his will by 
testing himself. This systematic treatment of doubt is part of an Enlightenment 
ideal which endorses the inevitable success of the application of method and the 
observation of experience to the resolution of doubt. To endorse this view of 
character behaviour, we must accept that facts or states-of-affairs exist, and are 
prior to human consciousness, and that human beings are capable of discovering 
and understanding them.
Doubt, in the uncanny, has very different features and does not permit this 
evidence-based erasure. Uncertainty moves into the province of the uncanny 
when it is directed not at the authenticity of particular facts but at the very 
possibility of facts. This primitive scepticism does not aid the rational empirical 
method but imposes a distance between the subject and the world of information 
about others and objects which are not the self. It wonders if  facts are not 
discovered but made (sees the Real behind the symbolic) and, being a creature of 
hesitation, it never gets past wondering.
The modular or conventional character “knows what he wants” and exhorts 
himself to attain it. The uncanny character may come to reject any confidence 
that he can know anything of the kind and may, as a result, never try to attain it, 
may never possess an achievable objective in the first place. This uncertainty 
about the possibility of knowledge is observable on the micro-level, where 
characters preclude themselves from making anything that looks like an assertive 
declaration or description, no matter how trivial its bearing might seem. When
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the character type is heavily bound up in roles which require rational/empirical 
and epistemological security (detectives and scientists, for example), the crisis of 
its removal disables them as actors and causes the readers decoding of them to 
falter.
The expression of the uncanny, by involving the return of repressed ‘knowledge’ 
which causes profound hesitation, is clearly signalled by the expression of radical 
doubt of this kind. The specific type of doubt which holds most claims to being 
uncanny is that which cannot forsake doubt as the primary force in all reflections 
about the self and other. In such cases, the impossibility of absolute knowledge 
about things outside the self and the necessity of claiming to know implied by the 
very fact of representing that reality, embody a splitness between the irrational 
and rational which produces both a hesitation and an uncertainty about how such 
a contradiction could ever be resolved.
5.7 .1: E pist em o l o g ic a l  U n c erta inty  in B eck ett
Of myself I could never tell, any more than live or tell of others.
(Malone Dies: 196)
It is best to adopt the simplest explanation, even if its not simple, even 
if it does not explain very much.
(Malone Dies: 183)
Doubt is usually signalled in a discourse system by the inclusion of hedging 
markers such as ‘perhaps’ and ‘maybe’. The rational limitations imposed on 
doubt preclude these hedges being applied to aspects of existence which are 
fundamental: Cartesian introspectionism holds sway and one cannot doubt that 
one is, as long as one has the ability to doubt. I have already touched upon 
particular epistemologies in which this fundamental doubt is active (such as 
Fregoli’s syndrome), where the self can doubt its own existence or where, 
accustomed to playing a diverse range of roles to accommodate others, it is left 
without a bearing when those others are not present. Secondary aspects of being 
can also be subjected to doubt. Within narrative, and with regards to 
characterisation, there are usually certain doubts which must be suspended before 
anything can be related. The narrator must have and encourage faith in his ability
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to describe states of affairs accurately. Beckett’s trilogy furnishes examples of 
what happens when this faith is lost:
But perhaps there were several hens, all grey and so alike in 
other respects that Sapo’s eye, avid of resemblances, could not 
tell between them... And yet that is a thing that will never be 
known.
(Malone Dies: 203-4)
Malone, as a character-narrator, is in a specialised position with regards to 
uncertainty, in that as well as harbouring doubts about his own existence, he also 
has doubts about the premise of storytelling as it relates to aspects of the world 
outside himself. In his case, the recording eye of the narrator keep blinking, 
asking itself if what it sees in its imagination can really be related. Of course, in 
Beckett, it both cannot be related and must be related. This impossible obligation 
results in the whole texture of reporting being riddled with hesitation over what 
seem like the most trivial details. Molloy shares this “aporia pure and simple” 
with regards to description of encountered phenomena:
A little dog followed him, a Pomeranian I think, but I don’t think 
so... Yes it was an orange Pomeranian, the less I think about it 
the more certain I am. And yet.
(Molloy: 12)
“The less I think about it, the more certain I am”: one can only be sure by 
suspending all rationality.
Bishop Berkeley’s influence over Beckett’s unconsolable scepticism is 
considerable (Berkeley 2001). The latter’s idealism, in its radical dismissal of the 
idea that empirical or commonsense vindication of widely held and simple truths 
can ever fully convince against scepticism which seeks no ground, influences 
Beckett’s treatment of the possibility of knowledge, or the potential for 
irresolvable doubt, in his characters’ interactions with the world of objects. The 
infinite regression of rational proof against radical scepticism like this, wherein 
facts are proven by their synchrony with other facts which ultimately rely 
assumptions and a priori truths -  or what The Unnameable calls “affirmations 
and negations invalidated as soon as uttered” (: 293) - leaves the authority of
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knowledge in obscure hands. When the writer begins to describe the actions of a 
character whose behaviour, observed within the imaginative process, are integral 
to a revelation of the character’s essence, the presence of groundless doubt -  
where Wittgenstein might say it is less reasonable to doubt than to accept the 
representation -  can reveal the fragility of the assumptions upon which attend 
extensions of character into the outside world. The process of characterisation 
ties character behaviour to other character signifiers to lend it an ordered 
coherence but when the character cannot act, because he cannot first accept the 
existence or qualities of the outside world upon which he is expected to act, then 
character behaviour is limited to behaviours of doubt and hesitation. There is no 
external trait with which to create a picture of the coherent other, just the 
incoherent trauma and grotesque humour of groundlessness. In such cases the 
repressed “knowledge” which the uncanny approach unearths is that of pre­
modem solipsism.
5.7 .2: E p ist em o l o g ic a l  U n certa inty  in A uster
I understand now that each fact is nullified by the next fact, that 
each thought engenders an equal and opposite thought. 
Impossible to say anything without reservation: he was good, or 
he was bad. All of them are true.
(Auster 1990: 67)
The implication was that human nature could be understood ... 
but after struggling to take in all these surface effects, Quinn felt 
no closer to Stillman than when he first started following him.
(City o f Glass: 67)
In Auster, enquiring into facts results in the endless task of corroboration or 
Derridean difference which seeks and fails to ground the simplest of observations. 
This failure to find ground affects characters at a basic level: they lose their 
potential to infer the significance of others behaviour and their own external 
behaviour becomes muted: they act only for themselves, acting only on the 
interior. This provides few conventional cues for the reader to create a coherent 
character impression. It also creates vision of a character whose predicament is
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troubling and whose fate is sad. If the character can infer no meaning from his 
own behaviour and that of others, then he is lost and beyond communication.
Auster’s approach to self-other epistemology has been described as nihilistic and 
pre-modem in that offers no hope for the self to re-connect with meaning (either 
for the character self or for the reader self who has identified with him). In 
response Dennis Brone has said that Auster’s purpose is moral in its instruction: 
the character must lose themselves in order to know and possess themselves 
(Barone 1990: 20). This has the uncanny aspect in its doubledness and 
contradiction: one must first admit to knowing nothing before one can know 
anything.
5.7.3: E pist em o l o g ic a l  U n c erta inty  in M o n ster s  W o rse  to  C om e
‘Witnesses’, said Whelms, ‘are not the best arbitrators of what 
has and has not happened. They carry no weight in judicial 
circles. Proof,’ he continued, ‘that holy grail of the police, is a 
ghost. Nothing can be proven beyond reasonable doubt 
anymore. It’s not that doubt has changed, it’s just that the limits 
of reason have been extended. Reason is elastic nowadays. You 
can doubt anything, reasonably, if you have a mind to’.
(Monster Worse to Come: 84)
The character most defined by epistemological scepticism in Monsters Worse to 
Come is Inspector Whelms. His chronic doubt leads to hesitation and surface 
inaction. Whelms’s scepticism is revealed thorugh open proclamations and 
access to his interior logic. This raises the question about what a character who is 
unable to act because of chronic doubt can do that signifies aspects of self to the 
reader. The rationalisation of doubt as the reason for inaction can result in the 
character being categorised and will present hesitation. This is a strong 
possibility. The compensation, from the view of the uncanny, is that this can only 
be done if  the reader acknowledges the rational explanation given for the 
irrantional, incoherent behaviour which is manifested by the character.
Many cultural commentators have pointed out that the splitness of subjectivity 
and the removal of traditional identity markers far from liberating an individual 
serve to leave them stranded and incapable of reforging connection with anything
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outside the self. In the case of Whelms, who has difficulty convincing himself 
that anything he does can be of any consequence to the point where he doubts the 
fact of his own existence, the resolution of this lostness in the novel seems 
perfectly Aristotlean and yet perverse. Whelms has been doctored by The Duff 
and is wandering around with only half of his face (a split sign), when he 
encounters a sewing machine which bears the other half:
He got down on his knees and with his one eye traced the outline 
of his jaw on this machine, seeing himself as another would, 
marvelling at the displacement. And marvelling to at this new and 
inviolable form of proof of the fact of his own existence. He could 
see himself and he could see himself seeing himself.
The totality of being' he said 'has made itself known. Through the 
eye of the beholder beholding the eye of himself, known now as 
the subject and the object!'. He held the remnants of his face in 
his hands and delivered himself finally of all the colossal doubts 
that he had harboured.
'Not only that', said the young boy who stood in attendance 'but it 
comes equipped with an Olfa rotary cutter.'
(Monsters Worse to Come: 250)
This closure seems to be a parody of affirmation of the re-integrated subject as it 
suggests that the only way one can rid oneself finally of existential doubt is to 
meet ones (near) double along the way and to see what others see. That is: in 
order to feel coherent and integrated, one must first be split in two.
5.8: C o n c l u s io n
This chapter looked firstly at methods for integrating character behaviour into a 
coherent impression of character essence. These methods are part of the 
conventional rational discourse about characterisation in the novel and are 
premised on a model of well-integrated, rational selfhood in which the will to act 
is uncomplicated and is provoked by the proximity of threat or desire. Characters 
are said to act maximally and rationally to secure their objectives in such a way 
as to reveal the motivation for their action to the reader. The intention was to re­
examine the epistemological assumptions which allow for character behaviour to 
signify other sociological and psychological aspects of character. In treating the
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approaches of modular creative writing, it was hoped to uncover a method of 
devising general techniques which might engender a hesitation in the reader’s 
decoding of character behaviour along these lines. This attempt at disorientation 
had four points of focus: transformations, agency, obstacles and doubt.
Firstly, it examined the teleology of transformation involved in the standard 
Aristotlean reversal in which character development is seen as the process of 
progressive change in the narrative from one state of being to an opposing one. 
The presence of the determining influence of narrative logic is part of the 
reader’s repressed knowledge which can be recovered in an uncanny treatment of 
this aspect of characterisation. This ‘knowledge’ returns when the character 
remains static or unchanging, either through an inability to achieve her objective 
or by failing to become aware of it in the first place. While a treatment of the 
character arc in itself does not create an uncanny effect. This end is aided by 
underdetermining the character’s final state by failing to allow a sense of closure 
to be drawn over the reader’s impression of the character.
The second issue is that of agency. Agency is the singlemost important aspect of 
the uncanny in treating character behaviour. Jentsch’s notion that the blurring of 
the automatonic with the animate produces intellectual (and emotional) 
uncertainty can be used to furnish descriptions of character behaviour in which 
the character exhibits a sense of dissociation from the action she is undertaking. 
Many aspects of documented non-normative behaviour and identity problems 
bear all of the features of this uncanny phenomenon in that they describe a 
process of derealisation or dissonance -  the person cannot locate the relationship 
of the self to its physical and mental behaviour. The use of hypothetical similes 
tends to mark this approach to characterisation with regards to behaviour: people 
move ‘as though they were puppets’; ‘as if they were jostling on a string’. 
Characters feel estranged from their own behaviour, as though in horror at what 
it is that their bodies to signify to others about them.
The identity and location of the agency which seems to be exerting control over 
the character must itself remain unresolved. This dislocated sovereignty may be 
internal (in which case the ‘problem’ is with the subject) or external (in which 
supernatural explanations may be given) but in naming it, the writer provides a 
cue to the schema as to which inferences will be more productive. This solves the
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crisis of uncertainty, even if its advances an irrational view of the world and the 
self. It was argued that, besides this problematisation of immanent agency of the 
self, other techniques could be devised which interfere with the appearance of 
character free will. This specifically relates to the third aspect: that of obstacle.
In conventional forms, obstacle is identified and has qualities which are 
diametrically opposite to those of the character. It also has an equivalent force. In 
uncanny treatments of character, the obstacle which prevents the characters 
attainment of goal. A much greater order of magnitude than him and seems 
unidentifiable and ubiquitous in that it seems to comprise everything that is not 
the character. The obstacle is therefore a process which enfolds him. It many 
cases the character cannot identify the nature of this obstacle. It seems to have a 
particularly uncanny effect if the character himself is unconsciously the obstacle 
to his attainment of the goal. The obstacle is therefore sublime and 
unpresentable. As a result, the character’s behaviour is always better understood 
within a framework which permits an irrational connection between behaviour 
and desire.
The last quality of the uncanny and behaviour concerns that of doubt. It was 
argued that while conventional characters may experience doubts about aspects 
of the self, the uncanny character experiences doubt about the existence of the 
self and the possibility of faithfully recounting aspects of the not-self. For this to 
be presented to reader, representation of character is necessarily heavily 
interiorised. The uncanny effect is realised by the rational coherence which is 
lent to the vision of aporetic solipsism in which the self can never say anything 
about the other that it knows to be true but cannot stop itself from speaking all 
the same.
The next chapter contextualises these and other aspect of the techniques for 
creating an uncanny character within a discussion about the relevance and 
suitability of rules for the purpose of creative writing and the other possibilities 
which exist for developing alternative epistemologies with which to approach the 
characterisation process.
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C h a p t e r  F i v e  N o t e s
1 This is a feature of contemporary film noir drama -  such as Angel Heart, LA. 
Confidential - in which the cultural distinctions between identity roles are heavily blurred 
to amplify a feeling of moral relativism. This is not the same as the uncanny because it 
resolves itself by finally assigning the character to one category or another and because 
its hesitation is only categorical, it does not place the reader in the position of hesitating 
between rational and irrational explanations for characters’ behaviour without any help in 
achieving closure.
2 Developing those expectations only to frustrate them is strategy which has often been 
attributed to Paul Auster (Sorapure 1995).
3 In Jasper Fforde’s comic postmodern novel The Well of Lost Plots, the characters who 
are aware of their fictive nature discuss the fact that none of them have ever had 
breakfast or have had to cut their toenails. The ‘real’ protagonist, Thursday Next, 
realises that the reason for this absence in their fictional lives is that nothing dramatic 
happens over breakfast and that clipping toenails is not the kind of action that signifies 
much about anyone (Fforde 2003).
4 Confusion in this regard is, after all, the failure of presumptions to correspond with 
reality and in most other situations, presumptuousness is something to be challenged 
and criticised, rather than rewarded.
5 The accusation that such advice is ‘reductive’ or ‘inane’ needs qualification. Naturally, 
texts which are designed for the purposes of teaching or instructing aspiring writers have 
a tendency to present techniques in such ways as to allow students to understand and 
identify with them. Such methods, supposedly, permit the student to master some basic 
concepts before ‘transcending’ them and seeing how problematic they are. However, I 
have never been satisfied that this bartering away of complexity for the sake of 
communication serves the purpose it declares for itself. By reducing character 
development to a ’solved problem in moral arithmetic’, failing to point out the limitations 
of this conceptualisation and dismissing the relevance of philosophy to the art of fiction, 
Frey's advice closes up the enquiry and affirms its approach as an end in itself.
6 It is tempting to see in Quinn’s pursuit of Stillman his pursuit of a re-integrated self: 
Stillman the cipher for the other-as-lost-self. This interpretation still holds the same 
transformation of dissolution over solution.
7 This is uncannily similar to Wittgenstein’s own summary of the import of his Tractatus: 
“what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must 
pass over in silence”. There is a strong irony in this claim from a narrator who, despite 
his attempts ‘to stick to the facts’ in the same way that the Tractatus tried to isolate the 
sayable from the unsayable, he errs in the same way that Bertrand Russell alleged of 
Wittgenstein: in making this argument about epistemology, one has already said “what 
cannot be said”. The Tractatus is an extremely useful book for devising uncanny-like 
techniques with regards to language since all of its statements about factuality and 
presentability are as confessedly aspirational as creative writing discourse claims to be 
descriptive. The similarities, with regards to names in particular, between the ideal 
logical grammar prposed in the Tractatus and the advice of Marshall, Frey and Bickham 
is quite remarkable:
3.325 In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes 
them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially 
similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign- 
language that is governed by logical grammar--by logical syntax.
(Wittgenstein 1958: 33)
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8 Many other examples of this deletion of agency occur in Auster’s trilogy. Here are a 
few more examples:
For reasons that were never made clear to him, he suddenly felt an 
irresistible urge for a particular red notebook at the bottom ... He was at 
a loss to explain why he found it so appealing.
(City of Glass: 38)
Auster was no more than a name to him: a husk without content. To be 
Auster meant being a man with no interior, a man with no thoughts.
(City of Glass: 61)
He did not feel himself to be the author of what he wrote.
(City of Glass: 4)
9 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes: “Anything which is a living and not a dying 
body... will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, 
become predominant - not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and 
because life simply is will to power... 'Exploitation'... belongs to the essence of what 
lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after 
all the will to life.” (Nietzsche 1989: 259)
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Conclusion
C h a p te r  Six: C onclusion
This chapter summarises the discussion of the uncanny approach to 
characterisation and contrasts it with the conventional, rationalist modular 
approach promoted in popular creative writing discourse. The different solutions 
they present to the representation of human nature and behaviour in the 
characterisation process are used to devise a quasi-formal model of the uncanny 
effect. The role of rules, constraints and guidelines in the production of creative 
writing is discussed and it is argued that, while constraints are necessary for 
productive creativity and meaningful communication, what Margaret Boden calls 
the ‘heuristic of constraint-negation’ is one way in which a creative domain can 
be expanded and its dominant assumptions or chronic tendencies can be 
destabilised (Boden 1990). The idea of a ‘conceptual space’ for the creation of 
different approaches to creative problem solving (Fauconnier 1997; Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002) is presented and its relevance to characterisation is examined. 
The application of conceptual space blending to the transformation of author- 
character relations which might ensue from this is then outlined.
6.1: A  M o d el  of  the  U ncanny
This dissertation had as its goal the development of a framework for 
characterisation techniques which have an opposing epistemological basis and 
critical function to those treated in popular examples of creative writing 
discourse. In examining the uncanny and related concepts which trade in 
ontological and epistemological insecurity, the process of characterisation was 
revisited to devise techniques which would result in a disquieting estrangement 
for the reader in her decoding of character. The trilogies of Beckett and Auster 
were used as prototypes of this approach and their consonance with the 
techniques attempted in Monsters Worse to Come was highlighted.
The contrast between these two highly dissimilar approaches is partly simplified 
by the fact that, for the most past, their techniques are perfectly antithetical. The 
uncanny is based on troubling rational and dominant ‘knowledge’ about 
ontological boundaries, conventions for representation and the self-other 
distinction. As such, it is the inverse of the knowledge expounded in rational 
discourse about characterisation in popular creative writing guides. What the 
rational discourse represses and denies to be useful as ‘knowledge’ is what is
6: C o n c l u sio n
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recovered by the uncanny effect. The rational and irrational aspects of 
intersubjective relations are inscribed in uncanny characterisation which has as 
one of its features an implied proposition of their co-equivalence in which the 
narrative suspends judgement.
In treating aspects of the uncanny, three general properties were proposed to be 
fundamental to its effect. They were:
• Reader hesitation;
• Irresolvable confusion of superordinate ontological categories;
• Return of repressed knowledge, fears and taboos.
These features were examined in detail for their presence in, and impact on, the 
creation of names for character and in the treatment of character agency and 
behaviour. In pursuit of comprehensiveness, the same approach could be applied 
to the other elements of characterisation to unearth the ‘local grammar’ of 
uncanny transformation with regards to elements such age and ‘distinctive 
speech patterns’, for example.1
The principal differences between the rational-modular and the uncanny 
approaches are summarised in the following sections using visual representations 
of the organisation and function of each approach.
6 .1 .1 . C o h er en t  c h a r a c t e r  im pression
, announces cnaracuers 
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Connotes essential
qualities
hips 
t
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The creation of a 
coherent character 
impression ^  c h a r a c t e r s
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The rational-modular process requires the agreement of the different elements of 
characterisation with respect to the information provided about the character. 
Within this approach, each element must enact and then refer to the same 
impression. ‘Character impression’ is another way of describing the essential and 
prototypical aspects of character which dominate in the reader’s internal 
representation of who or what the character is. This singular impression is 
stabilised by ongoing re-enforcement through the supplementary agreement of 
other elements. The stabilising elements which were treated in the dissertation 
were name; actions/behaviour; traits; interpersonal relations. The rules which 
operate within rational-modular approaches to characterisation were as follows:
The Name must be unique and refer singularly to the character. It must be 
consistently applied throughout the narrative. This name must be sociologically 
plausible and its relationship to the character may not be degraded by 
phonological or graphical similarities to other names. Its descriptive function is 
enhanced if its connotation corresponds with the other facets of the character 
construct.
Actions must be meaningful and related to the traits of the character and the 
objective which she is trying to achieve. ‘Meaningful’ means differentiating: the 
actions must separate the character from others and be related, by narratorial 
projection or character penetration, to the desire, will and situational intentions of 
the character. Arbitrary or ambivalent actions are censored. Unwilled actions are 
impossible.
Character Traits are immanent and have a simple aetiology in the character’s 
past which need not be investigated. Traits are activated by the presence of a 
threat or an object of desire within the character’s sphere of influence. It is 
impossible for a character to deny their traits. Traits produce actions and both 
signify related aspects of the character’s essence.
These features are re-enforced, realised or exposited through interpersonal 
relations. Obstacles counterdefme the character and provide focus for actions; 
confidantes allow for the character to externalise her desire and intentionality. 
This in turn allows for the narrative to explain character action within a rational 
frame. Obstacles and antagonists must be easily identified and have equivalent
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resources of will to that of the character. They must require the character to 
summon up ‘maximally rational’ behaviour.
These, and other aspects of characterisation can be regarded as complexes of 
signifiers which provide material with which the reader can begin and sustain the 
creation of a coherent impression of character through schematic inferences. 
These rules describe an orientational aesthetic in which the chaotic and 
ambiguous aspects of other people encountered in real life settings -  the reasons 
for their behaviour, their ‘nature’ if such a thing exists, their distinction from the 
self -  are excised so as to allow for an ‘easy’ transcendent reasoning to take 
place by the perceiving subject, the reader. This free ability to capture the nature 
of another is both endorsed by and endorses rational ideas of subject-object 
relations which always rest on contradictions without acknowledging or 
exploring them. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in the spirit of Heidegger, writes about 
the problems of this assumed epistemological mastery of the world outside the 
perceiving self:
Matter is "pregnant" with its form, which is to say that in the final 
analysis every perception takes place within a certain horizon and 
ultimately in the "world." We experience a perception and its horizon 
"in action" rather than "posing" them or explicitly "knowing" them. 
Finally the quasi-organic relation of the perceiving subject and the 
world involves, in principle, the contradiction of immanence and 
transcendence.
(Merleau-Ponty 1964:2)
These contradictions become more problematic when the “world” spoken of is 
another self with whom the self is interacting. The circumscription of Others is 
therefore also a limitation of self, in that fixing the qualities of another allows for 
the maintenance of a rigid self concept which exists only in simple 
contradistinction. The writer who subscribes to this easy mastery of others does 
so not only at the cost of neglecting the many possibilities for intersubjective 
relations which the novel affords, but also at the expense of affixing his own self- 
concept to a set of contradictory and closed ideas. Because the uncanny puts this 
familiar knowledge of others at a distance, it always produces hesitation and 
doubt in the subject who would otherwise contemplate another without conscious
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contradiction or the possibility of disorientation. In comparison with the rational- 
modular approach to characterisation, the uncanny produces more than one 
character impression and its ‘matrix of signs’ points in many different directions 
at once. These features -  disorientation and multiplicity - are the engine of its 
hesitation and basis of its confounding effect.
6 .1 .2  U n c a n n y  C h a r a c t e r  I m p r e s s io n
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The uncanny approach can be summarised by referring to its operation in these 
same four aspects of characterisation (name; traits; actions and interpersonal 
relations):
The uncanny approach to Naming specifies that it should be non-unique in its 
designation, and therefore barely referential in any strict or meaningful sense. 
That is, its use does not exclusively and uncomplicatedly focalise on one 
character but may invoke any number of others. One consequence is that the 
central character’s self-concept may become tied to another through common 
qualities in their designation. The name is prone to change within the narrative 
for reasons which are not explained by the economic rationality of the character 
(i.e. it cannot be an intentional disguise which the character has adopted) or the 
discernible intentions of any other agent in the narrative. The name is contingent 
in its origins and it may also be non-descriptive -  that is, its phonaesthetic and
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referential functions may produce no useable impression of the characters traits. 
As a reference though, it may produce ‘superfluous’ or excessive meaning: the 
single sign, the rigid designator of positivistic logical grammar, may appear 
elsewhere in different forms: anagrams, abbreviations, non-name collocations, 
morphemes and phonemes, which hint at other characters and other referents.2 In 
this form, its boundlessness calls to mind Beckett’s comments on the confusion 
of “nameless things and thingless names” (Molloy: 31) which describes the 
nightmare of ambiguity in language - that the sign is not attached or owned by its 
bearer and operates autonomously outside of our intentions in using it.
This failure of expected relations also obtains in a lack of complementarity 
across Traits. In the uncanny approach, traits do not necessarily produce the 
highly specific actions which would otherwise reveal them, and the character’s 
essence, in rationalist readings. In fact, the existence of traits, in so far as an 
observer can be certain of their nature, may never be clear: the uncanny character 
often seems to have become detached from her own basic emotional life and, as a 
result, anything as essential and stable as a trait often fails to emerge in her 
behaviour. These behaviours are largely interior, where the narrative permits 
comment on the character’s state of mind and thoughts. Where the narrative 
focus remains external, behaviour is usually distanced from the character, 
described in strangely passive terms, as though the character has no 
responsibility for her actions, possesses no will and has no consciousness of an 
objective.3
The obstacles and antagonists which would stand in the way of this objective 
are therefore less obvious. In fact, they suffer from nominal frustration, are 
sublime and unnamed. The obstacle may in fact be coterminous with the self. 
That is -  it may be an aspect of self which is not bared to the character’s 
consciousness and which therefore precludes the possibility of the character ever 
achieving the objective, or her own transformation.4 This is the nightmarish logic 
of the “Paradox of The Gods” wherein the act of trying to attain a goal is itself 
the act which guarantees its failure (Clark 2002). In such a case, the only way to 
avoid failure is to refuse to entertain the goal in the first place, which is equally 
‘suicidal’ for a fictional character, who should otherwise be maximally and 
rationally pursuing an heroic end.
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In making this summary contrast, it is perhaps striking that the transformation of 
character from rational-modular to uncanny potentially has very formal 
properties which could be clearly enunciated using something like a narratorial 
grammar. This would require that the general principles considered here are 
expressed as notational rules which stress when, for example, character action 
should be expressed passively or how character traits can be systematically 
devised to create an impression of acceptable incoherence. Chapter 1 discussed 
the need for creative writing discourse to avoid a stentorian tone when writing 
about techniques so as to avoid the impression of prescriptivism or the 
implication that creative writing is as formal and algorithmic as this invocation of 
rules seems to insist. In order to distance this model of the uncanny approach 
from claims that it simply replaces one reductive grammar with another, and that 
the idea of creativity necessarily precludes the possibility of rules governing its 
expression, I will now consider the usefulness, and the problems, associated with 
these kinds of exhortations and constraints in the characterisation process and in 
the creative process in general.
6.2: R u l e s  and  C r e a t i v i t y
A merely novel idea is that one can be described and/or produced by
the same set of generative rules as are other, familiar ideas. A
genuinely original or radically creative idea is one that cannot. It
follows that the ascription of creativity always involves tacit or explicit
reference to some specific generative system.
(Boden 1994:78)
Contrary to romantic views of creative expression, contemporary psychology 
argues that creative ideas do not emerge from the workings of an alien mental 
architecture undergoing some divine entelechy but in the harnessing of everyday 
cognitive abilities to create new arrangements of conventional tokens (Simonton 
2003, in particular)5. This is labelled a combinatorial or combinationist approach 
to creativity. It implies simply that the process which leads to creative solutions 
to problems, insights and innovative ideas, is not of a different cognitive nature 
to general problem solving. The impetus behind research into the cognitive 
processes of creative originality has been the desire to remove it from the realm 
of the Kantian sublime and, in seeking to account for some of its features -
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propose a commonality to different forms of creativity in different fields of 
endeavour - to avoid its mythicisation and a subscription to Karl Popper’s belief 
that original or creative behaviour results from a process about which nothing 
meaningful or rational can be said (cited in Gigerenzer 1994).
The label “creative” is problematic because it is a term in the social construction 
of human behaviour as opposed to an empirical observable which has a fixed set 
of criteria. Margaret Boden’s distinction between “novel” and “radically 
creative” defines the former as a minor outgrowth of existing approaches and 
techniques to the creative problem and the latter as something which cannot have 
been predicted -  and cannot be accounted for - by these same approaches. A 
radical piece of creativity is not a generative product and involves an implicit 
rejection of extant techniques and received ideas about how the creative task can 
be accomplished, whereas merely novel creativity is generative and can be traced 
back to the system of rules which have typically produced such work in the past. 
In the area of creative writing, this describes a work which subsequently will 
require the development of a singular and tailored hermeneutic model to be able 
to perform textual analysis upon it (such as Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake or 
Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow).
This definition of the radically creative seems to mythicise creativity once more, 
by making it an exception from everyday cognition. However, it also implicitly 
acknowledges the relationship between the creative act and the constraints which 
typically operate in a creative domain. It suggests that radical creativity involves 
the rejection, as opposed to the extension, of these constraints. In either case, 
creativity is defined by rules -  through adherence or negation. This provides a 
useful starting point for analysing how transformation of creative techniques can 
be formally devised. It also suggests a partial defence for an approach to 
characterisation in the novel which supports the inclusion of non-rational 
epistemologies while at the same time appealing to rationality in the 
development of these techniques.
Martindale (1996) and Csikzen .ilialyi (1997) have separately hypothesised that 
innovation within a particular discipline (such as poetry, art or science) tends to 
occur when all of the most potent variations of a particular approach to the 
discipline (or to the generative system) have been exhausted. Practitioners learn
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the tacit rules of the discipline b y  following the conventions of their peers and 
those laid down in the formal or informal canon of works regarded as the best or 
most exemplary of their kind. Tliis will always tend to result in similar formal 
properties and thematic concerns within the work. Any literary generative system 
(such as social realism, dadaism, existentialism which rely, of course, on 
language) will therefore serve to ipose certain constraints on what is produced 
in that it already answers some of the many questions which attend the 
production of the work. This happens in the same way that language, by having a 
formal system of grammar, dictates along syntactic, morphological and semantic 
lines what constitutes a sentence and what does not.6 When the most cogent 
variations permitted by this systc i have been availed of, the generative system 
may be tweaked or replaced by ne which affords greater affect.7 This is the 
distinction offered between the vel and radical. It can also be seen that such 
evolutions and revolutions -  the Kuhnian paradigm shifts in thinking about the 
nature and acting out of change wiihin the discipline (Kuhn 1955) -  hold out the 
promise of there being distinct ! mal properties to the changes which involve 
the interaction of creative cogn it n with a generative system within which the 
rules may be very oblique.
This points to the key question with regards to creativity and formalism - is the 
creative process algorithmic in i ire and can its principles be pre-determined? 
Is there even a place for rules creative writing? Popper’s objection to the 
formal study of creativity and innovation was premised on that fact that, in the 
case of radical creativity, the creative thought is not logically produced by a 
describable generative system, ’ use of this it is, by these standards alone, 
irrational and, being irrational, has no qualities that can be expressed in 
systematic terms. And so, the !v creative cannot be rationally accounted for. 
But this rhetorical argument can. : 1 lias been, turned on its head to suggest just
the opposite: considering that t\e product has been created, that creativity has 
been achieved, it must have ' generated somehow, even if  the generative 
system which has produced : c : . t be described in formal terms. In computer 
science such a problem is de . I as one without an algorithm. But even 
problems for which no algorithm no step-by-step rule-governed recipe -  exists 
have some formal properties, ree r ng patterns, possible and impossible forms.8
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the tacit rules of the discipline by following the conventions of their peers and 
those laid down in the formal or informal canon of works regarded as the best or 
most exemplary of their kind. This will always tend to result in similar formal 
properties and thematic concerns within the work. Any literary generative system 
(such as social realism, dadaism, existentialism which rely, of course, on 
language) will therefore serve to impose certain constraints on what is produced 
in that it already answers some of the many questions which attend the 
production of the work. This happens in the same way that language, by having a 
formal system of grammar, dictates along syntactic, morphological and semantic 
lines what constitutes a sentence and what does not.6 When the most cogent 
variations permitted by this system have been availed of, the generative system 
may be tweaked or replaced by one which affords greater affect.7 This is the 
distinction offered between the novel and radical. It can also be seen that such 
evolutions and revolutions -  these Kuhnian paradigm shifts in thinking about the 
nature and acting out of change within the discipline (Kuhn 1955) -  hold out the 
promise of there being distinct formal properties to the changes which involve 
the interaction of creative cognition with a generative system within which the 
rules may be very oblique.
This points to the key question with regards to creativity and formalism - is the 
creative process algorithmic in nature and can its principles be pre-determined? 
Is there even a place for rules in creative writing? Popper’s objection to the 
formal study of creativity and innovation was premised on that fact that, in the 
case of radical creativity, the creative thought is not logically produced by a 
describable generative system. Because of this it is, by these standards alone, 
irrational and, being irrational, has no qualities that can be expressed in 
systematic terms. And so, the truly creative cannot be rationally accounted for. 
But this rhetorical argument can, and has been, turned on its head to suggest just 
the opposite: considering that the product has been created, that creativity has 
been achieved, it must have been generated somehow, even if the generative 
system which has produced it cannot be described in formal terms. In computer 
science such a problem is defined as one without an algorithm. But even 
problems for which no algorithm -  no step-by-step rule-governed recipe -  exists 
have some formal properties, recurring patterns, possible and impossible forms.8
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Creative writing is non-algorithmic in the sense that the complexity and variety 
of permutations which exist at each level of the writer’s ‘decisions’ together 
create an almost infinite set of possibilities to be explored.9 The ‘decisions’ may 
also be informed by metaphorical thought, by counterfactual hypothesis and 
other features of associative and analogical reasoning whose principles remains 
largely mysterious and closed to formal description. These permutations of 
creative writing are limited if one obeys the constraints which are presented 
within the creative writing discourse. These constraints are not part of the system 
per se, but are part of the ‘field’s’ attitude to certain permutations which the 
system allows. By naturalising constraints against other permutations, by 
labelling deviation from them as ‘bad writing’, creative writing discourse serves 
to make the process more and more algorithmic. It lessens the role of 
unconscious, associative and analogical reasoning in the process and thereby 
hampers the development of the writer’s identification and even recognition of 
suitable approaches to the creative problems which novel writing represents.
The presence and usefulness of rules and constraints in creative writing can be 
explained in the following way: the conventions which underpin acts of 
communication are not simply ways of freezing or reducing the potential for 
expression, but are inimical to the act of communication. They offer ground 
against which the meaning of the communicative act can be figured. Without 
conventions, social interaction and its attendant meaning lose their bearing. 
Creative writing, in working within the conventions of language and narrative, 
amongst other schema, inherits these conventions. Which is a way of saying that 
creativity must always operate with some constraints, otherwise its form becomes 
too nebulous for its communicative purpose to be discerned. However, if creative 
writing is approached as a task which involves the distillation of impressions, 
images and words solely through a system of constraints, then its social, aesthetic 
or expressive purpose is equally difficult to discern. For this reason, it seems 
reasonable to argue that the deletion or negation of certain constraints is where 
the formal aspect of creativity lies.
In examining the uncanny approach to characterisation, what has been advanced 
is a countermeasure to the dominant rational set of rules which govern creative 
writing. This amounts to a negation of the constraints about characterisation
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which abound in the creative writing discourse. In that adhering strictly and 
unthinkingly to any set of conventions always leaves something unsaid, since 
conventions necessarily bring exclusion, any attempt to formalise writing 
techniques must also know what its conventions are doing. A writer must be 
rooted somewhere, partially integrated into a way of thinking about literature, 
about people and about the act of representation, but at the same time strive to 
explore these areas. Csikzentmihalyi argues that its is in the ongoing movement 
between these two forces, the comfort of integration (familiarity) and the 
challenge of differentiation (estrangement) that the flow of creativity reaches its 
peak (Csikzentmihalyi 1990).
The relaxed formalism of this approach to creative writing, its attempts to be 
critical about its own purpose and expression, does not benefit from an overly 
descriptive approach to such issues as constraint negation. That is because 
creativity, for most people, does not automatically result from becoming familiar 
with the rules of the generative model and producing work according to its logic, 
or according to the modified logic which follows from negating one or other of 
the constraint which mark it. The role of analogical and spatial reasoning in the 
genesis of creative ideas has been well documented and provides a throughway 
between formless and unconstrained attempts at creative exploration in writing 
and overly constrained, systematised production. The combinatorial view of 
creativity, in common with contemporary views of the function of metaphor in 
human reasoning, suggests that ideas arrive out of the unconscious drawing of 
analogies between objects in domains which are otherwise regarded as unrelated. 
This analogical ‘mapping’ across conceptual domains, being an element in 
creative thought, can be looked at as a semi-formal means of generating 
unconsidered approaches to different aspects of the creative writer’s task.
6.3: A  B l e n d in g  o f  Sp a c e s
To overcome a limitation in conceptual space, one must change it in
some way. One may also change it, of course, without having come
up against the limits. A small change in a relatively superficial
dimension of a conceptual space is like opening a door to an unvisited
room in an existing house.
(Boden 1994:80)
188
C h a p te r  Six: C onc lus ion
Characterisation can be construed as a conceptual space in that it comprises a 
fixed set of elements whose form is influenced by structured rules which describe 
the relationship these elements have with each other. The transformation of the 
character space which has been outlined in the dissertation could be viewed to 
partially result from the negation of the constraint on rational character behaviour 
and epistemological mastery of the character, amongst others. The notion of 
conceptual space blending as outlined by Fauconnier and Turner ( 2002) provides 
another means of looking at this, in that it outlines the constraints which operate 
in the generation of new ideas through analogy or conceptual blending and 
integration.
GENERIC SPACE 
Background 
knowledge about 
people and fictional 
. characters /
TARGET SPACE V ,  
Universe of 
elements and 
rules in detective 
fiction f
BLENDED
Failure 
character to 
satisfy narrative 
requirements
«
;
r i
»enDiagram 6.3Conceptual Space blending for 
absurd characters in detective 
fiction
The premise of conceptual blending and its application to creative writing is 
simple: mapping concepts from different domains produces new associations and 
new means of dealing with representational problems. In the following diagram, 
the integration of elements from different discourse spaces (in this case, fictional 
genres) is outlined. ‘Generic space’ refers to the type of experiential background
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knowledge which the domains require and invoke for the process to make sense 
so that the comparison can be made sensible. In the case of characterisation, the 
most important set of knowledge is that of social knowledge or cognition about 
other people - the meaning of their behaviour, for example, and genre-specific 
knowledge about how characters are expected to behave, act and what these 
behaviours signify. The ‘Source’ and ‘Target’ spaces refer to the domains which 
are being blended to create the new set of associations. If we take the example of 
a ‘prototypical’ character from the absurdist existentialist drama of Beckett - with 
her defining qualities of inaction, non-transformation and lack of referentiality - 
as the source and project her into the role of detective in archetypal detective 
fiction, we can imagine the odd interplay between character and environment 
which will ensue. The elements which are specific to the detective genre (the 
character’s goals, traits, relationship with others) are cued by the genre and so the 
Beckett character is mapped into a foreign universe in which her qualities 
generate highly peculiar relationships. This imperfect but sufficient mapping (the 
production of a fragile analogy) can be seen in the detectives in both Beckett and 
Auster’s trilogies: the floundering, sceptical and self-less pursuer who recognises 
and misrecognises himself in his quarry and who seems unaware of the normal 
teleology of the genre. He is incapable of delivering the behaviour appropriate to 
the narrative conventions.10
The optimality constraints which Fauconnier and Turner suggest for the 
integration of concepts from different domains11 seem to me to be necessary 
formalities for a post facto description of the reasons for a successful or 
unsuccessful blend. But, in the throes of creativity, the writer’s intuited feeling 
about the qualities of such a blend does not need an exhaustive elucidation of 
these facets and repressing this concern is more likely to allow him to see further 
connections between source and target. The concept of blending between 
discourse spaces, of which genre integration is just one example, gives rise to all 
kinds of possibilities for novel writing outside of the process of characterisation: 
the blending of philosophical and fictional discourse spaces, with the 
transplantation of elements from one to the other is exemplified by the use of 
footnotes, bibliographies is a feature of the works of Flann O’Brien (1998), 
Beckett (1955), Auster (2004) and the travelogue and memoir genres are
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imbricated in the fiction of WG Sebald through the extensive use of diagrams 
and photographs. The generative quality of blending is in its illumination of 
previously unseen connections between elements of the creative writing problem 
which will often result in the arrangement of characters with elements (location, 
conflict, desires) which are alien to the reader’s background knowledge and 
expectation of their traits. The initial incompatibility of the character with the 
target text world will produce hesitation in the reader, and then a process of 
recognition or misrecognition of the appropriateness of the fit.12
As such, striking combinations of elements holds out great scope for 
development and exploration of character in that it breaks the writer free of the 
co-occurrent creation of the character with the generic world within which their 
behaviour is most reasonable. By defamiliarising the character from their 
context, and creating a strange context for them to act in, the writer forces 
himself to work imaginatively to maintain what Auster calls a “sufficient 
realism” -  one which retains the familiarity of the elements, but produces an 
estrangement because of the unexpected and fragile nature of their 
combination.13
6.5: C a v e a t  L e c t o r
There is a difference between describing a formalist approach to an aspect of 
writing a novel and executing that approach. Owing to the dual nature of this 
dissertation -  the critique shadowing the content -  I have found myself worrying 
about how adequately or otherwise the approach outlined here reflects the 
characterisation undertaken in the novel. Some of the intériorisation of character 
thought and desire, the summation of past experience which explain a presented 
action, all run against the grain of the uncanny effect by affording a seamless 
explanation for character behaviour to the prospective reader. In such cases, no 
hesitation effect could be reasonably expected since no cue or absence is 
provided to provoke that reaction. Which is to admit that there are discrepancies 
between the description and the employment of the techniques. From this 
observation follow two reflections on the relationship between creative writing 
and writing about it as a process:
1) It is a salutary lesson on the limits of formalism and another indication of the 
non-algorithmic nature of creative writing. In the heat of composition, most
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writers suspend their concerns with techniques, do not consult a log book which 
explains to them the correct function for achieving a desired effect, and proceed 
to write, hoping to emerge at the other side of the work with something that is 
useful and interesting to them. Knowledge of technique may help to overcome 
flaws and shortcomings after the fact, but during the fact, they only serve to 
interrupt the creative process. Theoretical models provide ideas, suggest 
correctives and, when mastered, enhance the writer’s ability by broadening his 
repertoire of ways of seeing and representing. But they do not generate the work 
and, frequently, they do not comprehensively explain the generation of the work 
because other ways of thinking often hold sway in creativity.
2) Any effect or technique which contrasts so heavily with dominant techniques 
and reading strategies often needs to be accompanied by those strategies so that 
the contrast can be discerned. Novelty, or deviation, gains meaning by virtue of 
its difference form the norm against which it is set. Having characters behave in 
(even minimally) rational ways allows for the uncanny character elements to 
stand in relief and invites reflection on the significance because of its difference. 
If all the characters are deficient in reason, or cannot be understood using any 
conventional reading strategy, then the writers runs the risk of overstepping the 
mark between evoking mystery and producing utter confusion. The balance 
between a complicated style and one that is incomprehensible to most readers, or 
what Jonathan Frantzen calls the contract and alienating styles of authorship 
(Frantzen 2002) is a political and aesthetic issue which would require another 
dissertation. The crux seems to be this: writing, when it requires reading by 
another, is one element in a process of communication. Being aware, consciously 
or subconsciously, of how communication systems operate to maximise 
comprehension does not mean that the writer must adhere to it but he benefits by 
his awareness in that it once again increases the range of conceptual spaces over 
which he can deliberate in order to explore the range of possibilities which the 
novel affords.
One last comment: one discovers what one wants to say by saying it, by writing 
it, by doing what seems correct and not by unthinkingly identifying one’s voice 
with that produced by a formal system, particularly one whose advocates do not 
acknowledge its contingency. The key idea in all of this is that of identification.
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When I was younger I started writing because I felt an identification with the 
feelings evoked in me by the writings of others. I tried to emulate the syntactical 
peculiarities of Cormac McCarthy, the elaborate metaphors of Nabokov. Howard 
Gardner writes that in the acquisition of skill, a young writer works through 
informal mentorship, studying the work of one they admire, feigning to emulate 
them (Gardner 1983). If the writers stops there, no matter how great the one 
being emulated, then they cannot develop themselves or contribute meaningfully 
to the discipline. They become stuck in a one-sided relationship with the 
emulated writer, over-identifying and unable to differentiate themselves from 
embedded practices. The same absence of growth obtains in the subscription to 
any formal system -  while it comforts in that it always has an answer to a 
writer’s concerned question, it is precisely because it always has a prepared 
answer that it is best doubted and the weakness in its offered knowledge brought 
to light.
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C h a p t e r  S ix  N o t e s
1 Once again, the discernment of uncanny techniques such as these is not intended to 
advocate the simple replacement of one set of rules with another but to illustrate ways in 
which a writer can come to understand the contingency of writerly practices through 
praxis and, in giving these facts consideration, can use them as material for the 
origination of approaches to characterisation which do not valorise singular coherence 
over ambiguity, tension and complexity.
2 This is what Rosalind Coward and John Ellis have called ‘the excess of signifier over 
the signified’ (Coward and Ellis 1977). The idea of excess within signification holds a 
particular fascination within poststructuralist criticism while, within more formal linguistic 
disciplines, it is a mark of the irrationalism of continental philosophy. The schism is the 
same as that which holds between analytical approaches to the proper name and that of 
Derrida and his followers. The disparity between the positions adopted within the 
debate, and the animosity between the rival camps, disguises the fact that, in some 
ways, their concerns are not that mutually exclusive. The weakness of logical grammar 
and strict designation in natural language use is central to both stands of thought and 
could give rise to a neo-formalist analysis of ’how’ and ‘what’ is excessively signified by 
name-sounds. Such analysis would have to be centred around generalised cognitive 
operations in the production of meaning from sound, and the social construction of 
phonoaesthetic ‘meaning’. I have treated some of these issues in Appendix A: 
Descriptive Functions of Names.
3 Joyce Carol Oates’s short story Nairobi (Oates 1984) achieves this effect in its 
description of a female character, Ginny, who ‘achieves’ almost complete self­
detachment by viewing herself as the object which successive men have come to want 
her to be. Ginny is one who ‘assents without agreeing’, who watches herself with ‘critical 
interest’ and whose self-abnegation is so complete, that she seems to be incapable of 
developing a sense of loss. The character of Sr. Veneranda Clay (Princess) in Monsters 
Worse to Come is similarly modelled in her difficulty to claim ownership for her 
behaviour and her inability to act outside of someone else’s impression of her, or model 
of her ’character’.
4 The same applies to other elements of characterisation -  they are simply not used to 
provide information about character. One of Evan Marshall’s prescribed elements is 
“Physical Attributes”. Both Beckett and Auster often avoid providing any information in 
this area, the narrative dismissing them as “unimportant” or as details which “need not 
detain us long”. This signals to reader that this channel or implicature is not one by 
which she is going to get to know the character. The same logic then extends to the 
duplication of the non-protagonist. Since they are not differentiated physically, they can 
often come to seem to look like others, and so become confused with others with the 
potential outcome of being confused with the self.
5 Simonton describes insightful problem solving as resulting from ’’constrained 
stochastic behaviour. That is, it can be accurately modelled as a quasi-random 
combinatorial process”. (Simonton 2003:475)
6 Of course, while the motivations for such changes may be aesthetic in principle, and 
largely unconscious in operation, they are subject to localised political, institutional, 
developmental and social factors which may select or reject the innovation and which 
belie the idea that creative genius operates in isolation from the culture in which it is 
produced. See Dorris 2004; Simonton 1994 for discussions of creative ‘greatness’ arises 
less from individual inspiration and more from ‘matching’ between individual traits and 
sociocultural factors.
7 The validation of approaches as creative is, however, a process which disguises its 
social and historical nature. Innovation can easily be dismissed as inappropriate or 
artless in that it, by definition, fails to adhere to established rules for how art should be 
carried out. Martindale discusses how the ‘field’ of practitioners, and those involved in
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the discourse which surround the discipline, exercise huge influence over what these 
rules are and what types of transformation are acceptable. In this way the internal 
grammar of selectivity is matched by an external -  and more ambiguous -  system of 
selection which decides whether or not a product has merit on the basis of how closely it 
conforms to work regarded as superior within the field.
8 The use of neural networks, multi-agent systems and connectionist architecture to 
mirror the non-algorithmic nature of human thought has been only partially successful 
and only in specific domains. Yet, because it mirrors the distributed and emergent nature 
of human thinking, some commentators express confidence that, at the very least, 
machinic creativity can shed light on the process which underpins human attempts at 
creative thinking and expression (see Franklin 1995; Penrose 1991).
9 Artificial intelligence and cognitive science researchers differ in their conception of the 
relationship between creativity and algorithmic processes acts. Tony Veale, for example, 
writes that:
[CJomputational models implement limited and isolated slivers of creative 
thought, they do so largely in a reproducible, almost assembly-line fashion. 
These models show creativity to be grounded in the juxtaposition of 
knowledge-structures, mundane or otherwise, for which algorithmic accounts 
can be offered
(Veale 1995)
10 One could equally argue that the mapping, the projection, in fact the other way: that 
the narrative structure of the detective genre has been partially mapped onto an absurd 
universe and has produced faultlines. The provenance of the blend is an important 
consideration -  since it dictates how the optimality constraints will function -  but the 
effect is my main concern: the automatic production of disorientation and novelty which 
can give rise to further interesting analogies between the two worlds.
11 Fauconnier and Turner suggest five optimality constraints for conceptual integration 
networks. Integration; web; unpacking; topology; good reason constraint (Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002).
12 In teaching narrative, I have often engaged students in exactly this kind of 
experiment. This involves getting them to specify the elements invoved in a genre of 
television programme and defining the qualities of the character/person who presents 
the programme. They are then encouraged to select a familiar character who has 
qualities which are antithetical to those required for the target genre and transplant 
them, looking for ways in which the mapping between character and elements in the 
taget genre are affected by the replacement. The effect of this very simple mapping is 
usually surreal (a cartoon character presenting current affairs programmes) and often 
absurd (a piece of Lego hosting a blind date show) but usually highly ‘imaginative’. The 
exercise provides a starting point for creating imaginative narratives which take the form 
of expositing how the character’s source relationship with elements maps into the new 
genre (the cartoon character is not concerned with contemporary politics but with the 
criminalisation of erasers, for example).
13 The “fragile analogy” is something that needs more investigation. The optimality of 
the blend as outlined by Fauconnier and Turner produces easily understood and 
appropriate analogies. I think exploratory fiction benefits from failing to be optimal but, at 
the same time, being sufficient in its correspondence between target and source that 
some new associations can be generated. It is the point above which the analogy is 
more than sufficient, and below which too fragile, that needs elaboration.
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